Grenfell Tower Inquiry phase 2 report: Scottish Government response

1: Introduction

The Scottish Government is committed to effective fire safety to prevent fires, injuries, and fatalities, which includes learning from the Grenfell Tower tragedy and the findings of the Inquiry to improve building and fire safety in Scotland.

This report sets out the Scottish Government’s response to the Grenfell Inquiry’s Phase 2 Report. The Scottish Government has already made changes and created new legislation following the fire, as well as creating new work programmes to strengthen systems of compliance and enforcement, and to make existing buildings safer. Although many of the matters dealt with in the report are devolved, where the legislation, regulation and guidance differ from that applying to Grenfell Tower, it is important to learn lessons and to ensure that buildings in Scotland are designed, built, and maintained in as safe a manner as possible.

On 14 June 2017, a fire broke out in Grenfell Tower, London which led to the deaths of 72 people and the loss of homes for a community.

On the day following the fire the Prime Minister at the time, Theresa May, announced that there would be a formal Inquiry into the tragedy. The Inquiry, Chaired by Sir Martin Moore-Bick, opened on 14 September 2017 and concluded with the publication of the Phase 2 Report on 4 September 2024.

Phase 1 of the Inquiry focused on the factual narrative of the events on the night of 14 June 2017. Hearings for Phase 1 began on 21 May 2018 and concluded on 12 December 2018. The Grenfell Tower Inquiry Phase 1 Report was published on 30 October 2019.

The hearings for Phase 2 began on 27 January 2020. However, due to legal issues in relation to protection of witnesses giving evidence and the Covid-19 pandemic hearings were interrupted. The Inquiry took evidence between 6 July 2020 to 9 December 2020; 8 February 2021 and 25 March 2021 and then from 19 April 2021 to November 2022.

The Chair made clear in his statement on 4 September 2024 that the 72 deaths were all avoidable. The report sets out the responsibilities and failure of the main parties, including the UK Government, the local authority, the managers of the building, the architect, contractors, manufacturers, certification and test bodies and London Fire Brigade.

1.1 Grenfell Tower

Grenfell Tower was part of the Lancaster West Estate in North Kensington. The 24-storey tower block was designed in 1967 in the Brutalist style of the era by Clifford Wearden and Associates. Kensington and Chelsea London Borough Council approved its construction in 1970. The building was designed and built following the Ronan Point disaster in 1968 when a gas explosion caused the disproportionate collapse of the high-rise residential building in East London. As such Grenfell Tower was built to updated structural standards intended to give strength and durability. The building was constructed from 1972 to 1974.

Grenfell Tower contained 120 one-bedroom and two-bedroom flats. The upper 20 (of 24) storeys were residential floors, with each having a communal lobby and six dwellings, with ten bedrooms among them. The lower four storeys were originally used for non-residential purposes. Later, two lower floors were converted to residential use, bringing the total to 129 apartments, housing up to 600 people.

Like many other tower blocks in the UK, Grenfell Tower was originally designed to be operated under a "stay put policy" in the event of fire. Only those in the affected dwelling would be expected to evacuate. The building was designed under the assumption that a full evacuation would never be necessary with a single central staircase and no centrally activated fire alarm.

The building was owned by Kensington and Chelsea Borough Council and was managed by the Kensington and Chelsea Tenant Management Organisation (KCTMO).

1.2 The refurbishment and safety concerns

Grenfell Tower underwent a refurbishment over the period 2015 to 2016. The refurbishment included new windows, a water-based heating system for individual flats and a rain screen over cladding system. The purpose of the cladding was intended to improve heating and energy efficiency, and external appearance.

Arconic Architectural Products manufactured and sold the Reynobond 55 PE rainscreen cladding panels (aluminium composite material with a polyethylene core) used in the refurbishment of the external wall of Grenfell Tower.

Celotex supplied the RS5000 polyisocyanurate resin (PIR) insulation that was specified and used across most of the building. The insulation was fitted directly to the original concrete structure with a gap between it and the rainscreen panel.

Kingspan K15 phenolic insulation was used on around 5% of the building instead of the PIR insulation. This product had not been specified, and the Inquiry could not conclude why it had been used on the building.

Reynobond 55PE, RS500 insulation and K15 insulation were all combustible materials.

The contract for refurbishment was put out to tender and won by Rydon. The Architect was Studio E, Aretelia was the contract administrator and Max Fordham the mechanical and electrical consultants. Harley Facades installed the cladding.

Residents had expressed significant safety concerns before the fire. The Grenfell Action Group (GAG) produced a blog in which it highlighted safety problems. In 2013, the group published a 2012 fire risk assessment by a KCTMO Health and Safety Officer which recorded safety concerns.

In January 2016, GAG warned that people might be trapped in the building if a fire broke out, pointing out that the building had only one entrance and exit, and corridors that had been allowed to fill with rubbish. GAG frequently cited other fires in tower blocks when it warned of the hazards at Grenfell.

In June 2016, an independent assessor had highlighted 40 serious issues with fire safety at Grenfell and recommended action to be taken within weeks. In October, the assessor asked the KCTMO why there had been no action taken on more than 20 issues in the June report. In November 2016, the London Fire and Emergency Planning Authority served a fire deficiency notice, listing many fire safety issues at Grenfell Tower that required action from KCTMO by May 2017. Areas of concern identified included fire doors, the smoke venting system and the firefighters' lift controls.