Grenfell Tower Inquiry phase 2 report: Scottish Government response

11: Assorted recommendations

Background

The recommendations under this theme cover a range of findings which the Inquiry felt merited further consideration. Access by designers and fire engineers to information on a large range of products, including their performance in fire to assist in assessing the hazards posed by certain materials. This recommendation followed the consideration by the Inquiry of the creation of a Cladding Materials library by the University of Queensland where there has been a particular focus by the Australian Government on having in place qualified professionals as well as supporting training and education.

The Inquiry found that some important recommendations affecting fire safety were ignored by the UK Government in the years leading up to the fire. These included recommendations made in 1999 by a Select Committee that were not implemented and an inadequate response by the government department to recommendations made by the Lakanal House coroner. There was no system for recording recommendations made by public bodies or keeping track of the department’s response to them. It is recommended that it be made a legal requirement to maintain a publicly accessible record of recommendations made by select committees, coroners, and public inquiries together with a description of the steps taken in response. If the government decides not to accept a recommendation, it should record its reasons for doing so. Scrutiny of its actions should be a matter for Parliament, to which it should be required to report annually.

Urgent advice was sought from the Building Safety Regulator and the National Fire Chiefs Council on the nature and scale of the problem with drop keys. The Inquiry found that on the night of the fire the drop keys being used by some firefighters were not effective, there were differing key patterns as well as the use of non-standard keys.

The Inquiry identified failings on behalf of the gas transporter company which owns and operates the pipes and apparatus that transported gas to Grenfell Tower. The company, while not owning the gas, is responsible for the safety of the service pipework up to the point of the emergency control valve located at each customer meter. Gas transporters have a duty to maintain access to pipeline isolation valves as part of appropriate arrangements for responding to incidents and emergencies. The Inquiry recommend that all gas transporters should have a legal duty to inspect emergency control valves at intervals to ensure that they are accessible and to reinstate them if they are not. Additionally, they should be required by law to check the accessibility of each valve on its system at least once every three years and to report the results of that inspection to the Health and Safety Executive as part of its gas safety case review.

Recommendation 24 (para 113.39)

The construction regulator sponsors the development of a [construction] library, perhaps as part of a joint project with the University of Queensland, to provide a continuing resource for designers.

Rationale

This recommendation followed the consideration by the Inquiry of creation of a Cladding Materials library by the University of Queensland. Ensuring that building products were safe for their intended use was strengthened by the Queensland Building and Construction Commission Act 1991 which was amended to impose obligations on those involved in specifying or supplying products (including designers, architects, engineers, manufacturers, importers, suppliers and installers) to ensure that they are safe and fit for their intended purpose.

Funded through the government, it is a library and point of reference for designers and fire engineers who are considering using cladding materials. It provides a substantial database of information on a large range of products, including their performance in fire to assist in assessing the hazards posed by particular materials. A series of tests have been carried out on each product, including small scale flammability tests, with the aim of identifying its properties.

Originally intended to develop the Cladding Materials Library to incorporate results of intermediate and large-scale tests, including tests similar to those carried out on the cladding materials used at Grenfell Tower. The programme was discontinued when the government decided to prohibit the use of certain cladding materials.

Scottish context

Provision of a Cladding Materials library is not a devolved or reserved matter and has potential to strengthen the system across the UK.

Scottish Government response

The Scottish Government accepts the recommendation. Requirements for a national construction library will be discussed with the UK Government.

Recommendation 25 (para 113.40)

That it be made a legal requirement for the government to maintain a publicly accessible record of recommendations made by select committees, coroners, and public inquiries together with a description of the steps taken in response.

Rationale

The Inquiry’s investigations found that some important recommendations affecting fire safety were ignored by the UK Government in the years leading up to the Grenfell Tower fire. There was no system for recording recommendations made by public bodies or keeping track of the department’s response to them.

The Inquiry recommended that it should be a legal requirement for the government to maintain a publicly accessible record of recommendations made by select committees, coroners, and public inquiries together with a description of the steps taken in response. If the government decides not to accept a recommendation, it should record its reasons for doing so. Scrutiny of its actions should be a matter for Parliament, to which it should be required to report annually.

Scottish context

The recommendation to put in place a system for recording recommendations made by public bodies or keeping track of the department’s response to them is not fully devolved or reserved and is applicable across the UK.

In Scotland it is a legal requirement of the Scottish Courts and Tribunals Service (SCTS) to publish determinations of Fatal Accidents Inquiries including the response reports which will normally detail what action has been taken or is proposed to be taken in light of the recommendations.

The statutory framework for public inquiries is set out in UK legislation, the Inquiries Act 2005. A public inquiry is run by an independent chair and is independent of government. At its conclusion, the chair must deliver a report to the relevant Minister setting out the facts, the recommendations (if applicable) and anything else the panel considers to be relevant to the terms of reference. A report of an inquiry must, unless one of the statutory exceptions apply, be laid before Parliament and published in full.

Select Committees are a feature of the UK Government. In Scotland, the Scottish Parliament have a number of Committees made up of small groups of MSPs (cross-party) looking at specific subjects / areas (e.g. Criminal Justice Committee, Economy and Fair Work Committee, Local Government, Housing and Planning Committee). The purpose of committees is to hold the Scottish Government to account; they examine proposed legislation and consider amendments, consider petitions suggested by the public, and can hold inquiries (within their own remit). This is not the same as a public inquiry under the Inquiries Act 2005. Committees can use an inquiry to gather information and examine an issue. During an inquiry, a committee will usually ask individuals and organisations for their views; examine the views it gets; hold evidence sessions where they question members of the public, organisations, and experts; visit organisations, companies, and communities to get a deeper understanding of the inquiry topic. The committee publishes its report on the Parliament website. The Scottish Government must respond to the committee’s recommendations, setting out whether they agree or not.

Scottish Government response

The Scottish Government accepts the recommendation which covers both reserved and devolved matters. In Scotland there are mechanisms already in place meet to the devolved areas of the recommendation as set out. In regard to public inquiries Scottish Government officials will continue to engage and collaborate with UK Government counterparts through the Inquiry Sponsors Network, which meets on a quarterly basis. Any amendment to the current framework for public inquiries is likely to require amendment to legislation which will require consideration at a UK level.

Recommendation 27 (para 113.43)

Government seeks urgent advice from the Building Safety Regulator and the National Fire Chiefs Council on the nature and scale of the problem [with drop keys] and the appropriate response to it.

Rationale

The Inquiry found that firefighters were using differing key patterns as well as the frequent use of non-standard keys.

Scottish context

This is a devolved matter and SFRS has reviewed the position in Scotland advising that firefighters are provided with standard issue drop keys by the fire service. SFRS routinely inspect high-rise domestic buildings in Scotland through their Operational Assurance Visits, and part of this process involves the checking of facilities, including the firefighters switch on lifts where appropriate to ensure they operate as designed. Where there are issues noted, these are passed to the responsible persons or factors for resolution and thereafter checked again at the following inspection by operational crews.

Scottish Government response

The Scottish Government accepts the recommendation. SFRS are reviewing their policy around these inspections. The need for a change to the technical guidance will be considered through the review of Section 2 (Fire) of the Technical Handbooks that will be undertaken in response to Recommendation 5.

Recommendation 28 (para 113.44)

Every gas transporter be required by law to check the accessibility of each such valve on its system at least once every three years and to report the results of that inspection to the Health and Safety Executive as part of its gas safety case review.

Rationale

The Inquiry found that it was well known in the gas industry that pipeline isolation valves are often lost, for example, because they have been covered over by landscaping or road works. The survey of Grenfell Tower carried out by the gas transporter in 2008 showed that “fire valves” (pipeline isolation valves) had been installed on the pipes supplying gas to the Tower. Being unable to find them in October 2016 was almost certainly attributable to the landscaping works completed as part of the refurbishment and steps should have been taken to reinstate them immediately.

The failure to reinstate the pipeline isolation valves did not affect the course of events surrounding the fire because burning debris falling on the east side of the Tower would have prevented anyone from obtaining access to them. However, the Inquiry considered that on another occasion access to them might be of critical importance and they recommended that all gas transporters should have a legal duty to inspect these emergency valves at intervals to ensure that they are accessible and to reinstate them if they are not.

Scottish context

This is a reserved matter. The Health and Safety Executive (HSE) monitors and oversees the health and safety of onshore gas distribution and supply

Scottish Government response

The Scottish Government accepts the recommendation. Officials will work with UK Government and the HSE to monitor and contribute to change in requirements where this is required. Considering the related gas riser location concerns raised within the report and the apparent lack of understanding of the specific requirements in Approved Document B relating to firefighting stairs, will be included in the review of Section 2 (Fire) of the Technical Handbooks that will be undertaken in response to Recommendation 5.