Grenfell Tower Inquiry phase 2 report: Scottish Government response

9: Resilience and local authorities

Background

Recommendations made under the Resilience theme cut across a number of issues, including the following:

• consideration of the cultural context and needs of residents
• engagement and involvement of community groups, the voluntary sector and faith groups in planning, response, and recovery
• sufficient plans being in place to respond to and recover from a major incident
• staff being appropriately trained for the roles they would be expected to undertake in an emergency
• protocols for response and the adoption of resilience standards
• sufficiency of available guidance
• training uptake, and
• scrutiny and assurance or plans, and arrangements.

The Inquiry criticised the action and role of Ministers and MHCLG and Cabinet office in the response to Grenfell. There was also criticism in relation to the sufficiency of UK guidance, training uptake by responders, scrutiny, and assurance of the quality of planning and preparation of response and resilience forums and the degree to which duties under the Civil Contingencies are being met.

Recommendation 42 (para 113.67)

Recommend that the Civil Contingencies Act 2004 be reviewed, and consideration be given to granting a designated Secretary of State the power to carry out the functions of a Category 1 responder in its place for a limited period of time.

Rationale

The Inquiry contends that the UK Government’s powers in sections 5 and 7 of the Act to intervene in response to an emergency are far-reaching but they do not enable it to intervene promptly or decisively when a Category 1 responder is challenged beyond its capability.

Scottish context

The Civil Contingencies Act 2004 is reserved to the UK Government. It is recommended that change is made to enable a designated Secretary of State to take over control for a period of time.

Scottish Government response

The Scottish Government accepts this recommendation, and we will work with UK Government where a review of the Act is considered necessary.

Recommendation 43 (para 113.68) and Recommendation 44 (para 113.69)

Regulation be amended to require Category 1 responders to establish and maintain partnerships with the voluntary, community and faith organisations in the areas in which they are responsible for preparing for and responding to emergencies.

Guidance be revised, reduced in length and consolidated in one document which lays greater emphasis on the need for those leading the response to consider the requirements for recovery, the need to identify vulnerable people, the importance of identifying and ensuring co-operation with voluntary, community and faith groups and is consistent with the Equality Act 2010.

Rationale

The failure to involve voluntary, community and faith groups in resilience structures for planning, response and recovery was detrimental to the quality of the response to and recovery from the incident. It also meant that the links between these organisations and the statutory resilience bodies did not exist or were not strong enough and so could not be mobilised as effectively in the response.

Scottish context

This is both a devolved and reserved matter. Through Preparing Scotland, guidance is provided to categorised responders on how they can support building resilience communities. This includes voluntary, community and faith groups which should be seen as an integral part of the response structure and should be involved as early as possible in the planning phase so they can contribute to the response and recovery phases of any emergency.

Scottish Government response

The Scottish Government accepts this recommendation in principle. We will continue to work with reliance partnerships to integrate voluntary, community and faith group into resilience structures. Through the review in 2025 - 2026 of Preparing Scotland Guidance and the broader resilience doctrine in Scotland work will be undertaken to identify how the approach can be strengthened.

Recommendation 45 (para 113.69)

Regard for humanitarian considerations be expressly recognised by making it the ninth principle of effective response and recovery.

Rationale

The Inquiry determined that humanitarian considerations were not fully understood, nor had provision made for them in terms of the preparation for an adverse event or the response to the Grenfell Tower fire itself. The contention is that making humanitarian consideration the ninth principle of the integrated emergency management system would address this in the future. It is not clear however what the Inquiry means by humanitarian considerations.

Scottish context

Introducing a humanitarian principle in Scotland will require consultation with resilience stakeholders. In Scotland, the need to deal sensitively and pay attention to the needs of populations served by the resilience system is addressed through guidance, learning, training, and practice.

Scottish Government response

The Scottish Government accepts this recommendation. We will work with resilience stakeholders through the Scottish Resilience Partnership in 2025 - 2026 to better incorporate humanitarian considerations into planning, response, and recovery.

Recommendation 46 (para 113.70)

Guidance on the operation of the London Local Authority Gold arrangements be revised and that existing and newly appointed chief executives be given regular training to ensure they are familiar with its principles.

Rationale

Although each London local authority is a separate Category 1 responder, there are arrangements for promoting resilience across the capital as a whole, through the London Local Authority Gold arrangements. Events demonstrated, however, that there is a need for a clearer understanding of the nature of the London Gold arrangements, in situations in which a local authority is affected.

Scottish context

In Scotland steps have been taken to improve the available training for Gold Command level officers / officials. The Scottish Multiagency Resilience Training and Exercising Unit (SMARTEU) has developed the Multi-Agency Strategic Incident Management (MASIM) Course bringing together strategic and / or developing leaders who would participate at a strategic level in a Resilience Partnership (RP), to respond to or recover from major incident including civil emergencies and terrorist incidents.

Scottish Government response

The Scottish Government accepts this recommendation. We will continue to work with resilience stakeholders to ensure we strengthen the guidance and training for Gold Command level officers / officials.

Recommendation 47 (para 113.71)

Local resilience forums adopt national standards to ensure effective training, preparation and planning for emergencies and adopt independent auditing schemes to identify deficiencies and secure compliance.

Rationale

The Inquiry’s investigation revealed the inability of the London Resilience Forum to monitor the quality of its members’ planning, training, and preparation for responding to emergencies. Neither Minimum Standards for London, which applied at the time, nor its replacement, Resilience Standards for London, gave the local resilience forum any means of securing compliance with the standards they prescribed. They note that in the UK Resilience Framework the UK Government has recognised the need to strengthen local resilience forums.

Scottish context

National Resilience Standards apply only in England and Wales. The adoption or development of Resilience Standards in Scotland would be a matter for the Scottish Government in consultation with stakeholders.

Scottish Government consulted on National Resilience Standards and their potential use in Scotland in 2018 when they were being established by Cabinet Office. The consensus from the resilience sector was that resilience standards should not be adopted.

Scottish Government response

The Scottish Government accepts this recommendation. We will work with resilience stakeholders through the Scottish Resilience Partnership in 2025 - 2026 to reconsider the adoption of Resilience Standards as part of the work on validation and assurance.

Recommendation 48 (para 113.71) and Recommendation 49 (para 113.73)

A mechanism be introduced for independently verifying the frequency and quality of training provided by local authorities and other Category 1 responders.

Local authorities train all their employees, including chief executives, to regard resilience as an integral part of their responsibilities.

Rationale

The Inquiry found that decisions on training were left entirely to categorised responders and that there was no consistent approach to either quality or quantity of that training and no verification of that external to the organisation. The Inquiry concluded that provision of resilience awareness and training within the RBKC was insufficient.

Scottish context

This is a devolved matter. There is a suite of accessible online learning materials, which can be supplemented by facilitated learning sessions, offered by the Scottish Government to all categorised responders and their staff. In Scotland, the uptake of this learning has been good across the responder community.

Scottish Government response

The Scottish Government accepts this recommendation. In February 2025, a public consultation was launched on the learning and training needs of Category 1 responders and how support can be provided. This will shape the ongoing learning and development offer from the Scottish Government which will be published during 2025 - 2026.

Recommendation 50 (para 113.74)

Local authorities devise methods of obtaining and recording information in relation to resilience, if possible, in electronic form, and practise putting them into operation under a variety of different circumstances.

Rationale

The Inquiry found no effective means of collecting and recording information about those who had been displaced from the Tower and surrounding buildings, including those who were missing.

Scottish context

This matter is devolved.

Scottish Government response

The Scottish Government accepts this recommendation. Existing Care for People guidance sets out in some detail the considerations that responders should have in relation to information gathering approaches pre and post incident. Through the review in 2025 - 2026 of Preparing Scotland Guidance and the broader resilience doctrine in Scotland work will be undertaken to identify how the approach can be strengthened.

Recommendation 51 (para 113.75)

Local authorities make such arrangements as are reasonably practicable for enabling them to place people in temporary accommodation at short notice and in ways that meet their personal, religious, and cultural requirements.

Rationale

There was no system in place for obtaining, at short notice, a large amount of accommodation for displaced people.

Scottish context

This matter is devolved. Existing Scottish Government guidance reminds categorised responders of their responsibilities and that they must give due regard to the Equality Act 2010 when identifying rest centres and other accommodation in an emergency.

Scottish Government response

The Scottish Government accepts this recommendation. Through the review in 2025 - 2026 of Preparing Scotland Guidance and the broader resilience doctrine in Scotland work will be undertaken to identify how the approach can be strengthened.

Recommendation 52 (para 113.76)

Local authorities include in their contingency plans arrangements for providing immediate financial assistance to people affected by an emergency.

Rationale

The Inquiry found that RBKC did not have in place adequate arrangements for providing financial assistance to those affected by the fire.

Scottish context

This is a devolved matter. Local authorities should have in place contingency plans for providing immediate financial assistance to people affected by an emergency. Current guidance only suggests referring people to financial advice service in the mid to long term after the adverse event.

Scottish Government response

The Scottish Government accepts this recommendation. We will work with local authorities and broader resilience partners to devise ways in which financial support could be provided to people affected.

Recommendation 53 (para 113.76)

That as part of their planning for emergencies local authorities give detailed consideration to the availability of key workers and the role, they are expected to play so that suitable contingency arrangements can be made to ensure, as far as possible, continuity of support.

Rationale

This recommendation centres around the availability, quality and consistency of the specific workers attached to the victims and family of the Grenfell Tower fire. The level of support provided to residents by key workers varied. Some said that their social workers and key workers had been helpful and that key workers had provided advice on counselling. Others reported that the high turnover of key workers was unhelpful and one complained that they had no experience of dealing with people facing trauma.

Scottish context

This is a devolved matter. Current Care for People guidance covers consideration for the provision of mental health first aid and the need to consider how to meet the needs of those experiencing trauma. There is however no specific guidance on continuity of key / link worker provision to individuals or families affected.

Scottish Government response

The Scottish Government accepts this recommendation. Through the review in 2025 - 2026 of resilience doctrine, structures, and Preparing Scotland Guidance we will identify how the approach can be strengthened.

Recommendation 54 (para 113.77) and Recommendation 55 (para 113.78)

That as part of their emergency planning local authorities make effective arrangements for continuing communication with those who need assistance using the most suitable technology and a range of languages appropriate to the area.

That all local authorities include in their plans for responding to emergencies arrangements for providing information to the public by whatever combination of modern methods of communication are likely to be most effective for the areas for which they are responsible.

Rationale

As a Category 1 responder there is a duty under the Civil Contingencies Act 2004 to communicate with the public and provide them with information and advice as necessary in an emergency.

Scottish context

This is devolved a matter. Current guidance asks responders to ensure that they have plans that include the ability to effectively communicate with those affected and the public.

Scottish Government response

The Scottish Government accepts this recommendation in principle. We will continue to work with local authorities and broader resilience partners to identify how the approach can be strengthened.

Recommendation 56 (para 113.78)

In future, to avoid confusion, wasted effort and frustration we also recommend that what in the past has been called by the police a “casualty bureau” be described in a way that makes it clear that it does not provide information to the public about people affected by the emergency.

Rationale

There was widespread confusion around the role of the casualty bureau with many members of the public believing it was a way for them to find out about their friends and family impacted by the fire. The telephone number of the casualty bureau was mistakenly given to those seeking information about family and friends. The result was that they were unable to obtain any help from the casualty bureau without understanding why, which caused considerable frustration and anger.

Scottish context

Policing is a devolved matter. Guidance with procedure in relation to the casualty bureau is agreed at a nation level via the National Police Chiefs’ Council (NPCC).

Scottish Government response

The Scottish Government understands that NPCC accepts this recommendation. The NPCC has been working to discharge a similar recommendation made in 2018 by the Kerslake independent review of the Manchester Arena bombing. It has updated the standard operating procedures for the casualty bureau and will continue to assure delivery against them. Although the casualty bureau will continue to be known as such, the NPCC has worked with force communication leads on how to clearly describe the functions of a casualty bureau and is working with local government to ensure that communications in the event of a critical incident are clear to the public. A review will be undertaken (6 – 12 months) to ensure this continues to be imbedded.