Meeting Scotland's workforce needs for a transition to Net Zero – the role of migration and the impact of demographic challenges.

4. Recruiting internationally – the role of immigration and global competition for workers

The challenges of growing a sufficiently large and appropriately skilled domestic workforce at pace are such that, if the UK Government is serious about meeting existing net zero targets, it must reconcile its immigration control objectives with the need for flexible and targeted labour migration. And yet, migration is rarely considered as part of the skills strategy for the green transition. Although numerous reports have been published on green jobs, few, if any address the role of migrant labour.

The UK’s 2021 Green Jobs Taskforce Report, for instance, makes no mention of immigration whatsoever. The Clean Energy Jobs Plan states “Our priority is to grow the domestic skill base to meet the demand for clean energy workers. However, there may be exceptional cases where skilled workers from abroad may be required to fill critical workforce gaps” (UK Government, 2025: 28). There is some recognition that domestic supply may not be sufficient, when it is stated that the Plan will assist the Migration Advisory Committee (with support from the Labour Market Evidence Group) in informing the temporary shortage list. However, no consideration is given to a specific green jobs visa or a dedicated immigration route just for green occupations.

Many occupations critical to the green transition, particularly in construction and related trades, are already facing acute shortages across both high-skilled roles (such as engineers) and mid-skilled roles (such as installers and technicians). Further restrictions on immigration pathways could exacerbate existing gaps and shortages, driving up costs, delaying projects, and ultimately undermining public confidence in the transition itself.^[17]

A strategic mitigation approach could see international migration play an important role in the short and medium term, helping to meet urgent skills needs while the education and training system adapts. In other words, international migration could play a role as a bridging mechanism complementing and providing space for expanded UK training capacity. The challenge is to avoid “locking in” a reliance on migration. Targeting specific shortages that cannot be filled domestically may be the best approach so that migrant workers are seen as complementing local workers.

A more coordinated approach across policy areas, including immigration, climate and industrial strategies must also take account of wider global contexts. The global interdependencies of the climate emergency, the urgency of international targets and the challenges of international agreements and collaboration all contribute to fierce competition for skills and labour. This competition may also directly affect the domestic supply of labour if displaced UK energy workers are able to find better paid work abroad. Strategies and approaches that are mutually beneficial in developing skills and enhancing the capacity of both sending and receiving countries to meet their targets for reduced carbon emissions are likely to be required.

4.1. Current and proposed immigration policies

This section examines current and proposed UK immigration policies, assessing their potential impact on the supply and demand for labour and skills in green jobs. The UK Government’s May 2025 Immigration White Paper is a key focus, but it is important to acknowledge other policies influencing labour demand in the energy sector, such as North Sea licensing and taxation regimes. While these are undoubtedly important, they are beyond the scope of this analysis.

4.1.1. Existing policy and extent of the international green workforce

According to a policy brief by the Centre for European Reform (CER; 2025) between 2011 and 2019, foreign-born workers made a significant contribution to green employment in the UK. In particular, they accounted for about one third of net new employment in green sectors (including energy and construction). Post-pandemic and Brexit, foreign-born workers contributed an even higher share of growth in green jobs, particularly in construction, energy, and skilled trades (e.g. electricians, double-glazing installers), partially offsetting declines in UK-born employment. Arguably then, previous migration policies, including free movement and limited visas for non-Europeans up to 2021 and the relatively liberal regime for all foreign workers between 2021 and 2024 delivered significant labour to fill green jobs.

That said the data on the extent to which labour demand is being met by international migrants in the green sector are not entirely clear, especially at sub national levels. The CER report notes a growing labour demand for green jobs (measured by the number of job adverts), especially in energy, construction and skilled trades. The report does not however model regional or sectoral variation, meaning we are not able to disaggregate down to the level of Scotland and North East Scotland.

The ONS’s “Experimental estimates of green jobs, UK” gives total numbers of green jobs (about 690,900 FTEs in 2023) but does not break down the share held by immigrants (ONS, 2025). Thus, while we know the scale of green/low-carbon jobs, ONS data currently do not appear to have disaggregation by migrant status nor by region although with regard to the latter there is acknowledgment that further work is needed to establish reginal estimates. The earlier Climate Change Committee report from May 2023 titled “A Net Zero Workforce” maps where net-zero will create and transform jobs across regions and sectors and does acknowledge that the spatial concentration of carbon intensive jobs (around Scotland the NES) will potentially be quite disruptive at a local level and so require targeted transition intervention (Climate Change Committee, 2023).

In order to develop clearer analysis of the current role played by international migrant labour and to understand more fully the future needs at national and regional levels and across a range of sectors, better data are required. Ideally, we would have information on key jobs in the green sector broken down at regional level, how many are currently occupied by migrant labour and the gaps that exist.

4.1.2. New policy proposals from UK Government

In May 2025, the UK government published a White Paper, “Restoring Control Over the Immigration System.” This significant overhaul of UK immigration policy aims to reduce net migration from 906,000 in 2023, tighten visa eligibility, and better align immigration with the country’s labour market and broader integration goals. For our purposes, the key elements of the new immigration White Paper include:

1. Raising the minimum qualification level for skilled worker visas from A-level to RQF 6 (degree level) and above.

2. A 32 per cent rise in the Immigration Skills Charge (ISC) boosting employer’s costs and potentially discouraging firms from recruiting internationally.^[18]

3. Scrapping the existing “immigration salary list”, which allows workers doing specific types of job to be brought in with lower pay and replacing it with a “temporary shortage list”. To avoid this becoming a longer run measure, the relevant industry will be expected to set out plans to train and recruit more UK workers.

4. Maintaining the salary threshold of £38,700 but with a subsequent rise for new applications to £41,700 from July 2025.

5. Increasing the standard residency requirement to apply for Indefinite Leave to Remain under the Points-Based System (e.g. for work visas) from 5 years to 10 years.

These immigration reforms are relatively new and so the available evidence of impacts is necessarily limited. However, a 2025 report by the Centre for European Reform (CER, 2025) suggests that by tightening visa rules the new White Paper could undermine the UK’s net zero and housing objectives. Drawing on ONS LFS data, it estimates that more than half (260,000 of 465,000) of foreign-born workers currently employed in green occupations would not have met the new eligibility criteria, including the salary threshold of £38,700.^[19] The challenge is particularly acute in construction, skilled trades, and environmental clean-up occupations. Many of these roles currently offer salaries below the proposed threshold or do not require degree-level qualifications. As a result, labour shortages are likely to emerge in sectors that are critical to achieving both the government’s housebuilding targets and its net zero and retrofit ambitions.

Flexibility is then inevitably required. Indeed, between 2017 and 2023, government exemptions allowed certain foreign workers on offshore wind vessels operating within UK territorial waters (12 nautical miles) to bypass standard visa requirements. These concessions were justified as temporary measures to address labour shortages, given that existing immigration rules (such as sponsorship and visa processing) were considered too rigid for the mobile, project-based nature of offshore work (Friends of the Earth, 2023). With the expiry of these concessions, some industry stakeholders now warn that existing visa routes remain overly inflexible for short-term, rotational offshore roles, potentially leading to renewed labour shortages and project delays. One possible solution mooted is the introduction of a sector specific immigration route where this could take the form of an “offshore wind visa” (Gravelle, 2023).

4.1.3. Alternative policy options

A number of studies and reports, as well as governmental submissions have proposed alternative policy options to bring immigration control in line with green workforce needs. These are laid out below with some discussion of the potential pros, cons and trade-offs of each.

1. Lowering skills and/or salary thresholds either through a dedicated Green Skills Visa or through concessions within existing visa routes for roles critical to net zero (CER 2025; Hooper and Huang 2024; Kumar et al 2023). Whilst a Green skills visa would provide a dedicated route for international recruitment of workers contributing directly to net zero goals (e.g. retrofit, renewable energy) it runs counter to stated goals of the UK government both to reduce net migration and to simplify the immigration system by reversing a previous proliferation of ‘dedicated routes’. Lowering skills and salary thresholds, whether within a dedicated visa or as a concession within existing routes also brings risks of increased worker exploitation and in work poverty as encountered under the social care visa route. A variation entailing potentially less risk could be a green degree visa, allowing international students with appropriate skills to stay in Scotland after graduation, perhaps over a longer time frame than under the current graduate visa. This would, however require a clear definition of ‘green graduate skills’.

2. Expanding or adapting the shortage list to include more climate-critical roles (Hooper and Huang 2024; CER 2025; Kumar et al 2023). This approach is in line with the stated wish of UK Government to manage skills gaps through a temporary shortage list. Inclusion of industries, sectors or job roles might be linked to enhanced domestic training (Kumar et al 2023) and indeed this is the intention currently set out in the proposal for the new Temporary Shortage List, although the exact mechanisms by which this is to be achieved remain untested. The use of shortage occupations lists especially where these involve reduced salary thresholds or strict limits on potential to transfer to other visa and/or settlement routes again bring risks of increased exploitation and potential underemployment, where workers become “trapped” in low-paid jobs with limited mobility, and skills are underutilised. This mirrors issues observed in the social care sector, where poor working conditions and limited career progression are common (Manning, 2025). In the UK’s offshore wind industry, trade unions have previously raised concerns that immigration concessions were used to undercut pay, with some jobs reportedly advertised below the national minimum wage (Friends of the Earth, 2023). Allowing occupational mobility to shortage list visa holders may be a route to mitigate some of these risks and one that might also encourage employers to create better conditions to retain staff (CER 2025).

3. Establishing umbrella sponsorship bodies to support small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs). Some areas of industry with an important contribution to make to the transition to Net Zero involve a considerable proportion of small and medium sized employers, for example construction and retrofitting companies (Kumer et al. 2023). These SMEs often struggle with the administrative and financial burdens of the current immigration system and could be assisted to overcome this by umbrella bodies assuming visa sponsorship and compliance responsibilities on behalf of multiple firms. The recently established Scotland’s Migration Service has a clear remit to support Scottish employers to navigate the immigration system and may be a basis for development of such an initiative.

4. Geographically targeted migration routes and visas. Drawing on the model of a rural visa route, the Scottish Government has responded to the UK Immigration White Paper (Scottish Government, 2025), explicitly flagging the importance of migration levers for green skills planning and arguing for routes tailored to Scotland’s demographic and sectoral needs.^[20] Underlying this is the belief that rising opportunities in the green sector may be constrained due to broader demographic changes, a declining working age population and an already tight labour market.

4.2. International competition

Intensifying global competition for green skills adds a further dimension to the challenges of securing the required workforce. The UK is competing with other high-income nations seeking to attract and retain green skilled workers. As well as reducing the pool of mobile labour willing to relocate to the UK, global competition may also directly affect the domestic supply of labour - if displaced UK energy workers are able to find better paid work abroad they may choose to leave.

Hooper and Huang’s (2024) cross-country report for the Migration Policy Institute, highlights global shortages of green-sector workers and notes that many countries are competing for a limited pool of talent. While acknowledging that available data are patchy, they find that immigrants already make up a substantial share of the green energy workforce in many countries, around 8 per cent of renewable energy workers in Spain (2022) and approximately 26 per cent in Australia (2021).

Huckstep and Dempster (2024) examine the imbalance between the supply of and demand for green skills across ten countries, five in the Global North, including the UK, and five in the Global South, with a particular focus on solar photovoltaics and heat pumps. They find evidence of excess labour demand and argue that labour migration can play a complementary role to domestic training and reskilling efforts, especially given the age-related constraints in many national workforces. More broadly, they contend that UK immigration policy lacks coherence, as green subsidies and investment incentives are not aligned with visa policy. The system, they suggest, is overly complex, bureaucratic, and costly and these issues are compounded by the fact that many firms in green transition related sectors lack experience in international recruitment.

Beyond offering higher wages, many countries are adopting innovative approaches to training and recruitment as a way of securing labour in this competitive context. Huckstep and Dempster recommend a coordinated approach that integrates migration, training, and industrial policy to prevent siloed decision-making. Mechanisms such as umbrella sponsorship arrangements or global skills partnerships with partner countries could support this approach (Huckstep and Dempster, 2024).

Partnerships between sending and receiving countries to build an international pipeline of skilled workers could potentially be a way of mitigating and managing international competition more effectively. Such partnerships could fill immediate skill shortages while investments in building a domestic pool of workers yield results. Bilateral agreements and skills partnerships would be one way to do this, offering both training support and an international recruitment pathway. Training and migration partnerships also offer the opportunity to mitigate the challenges related to the recognition of qualifications while equitably ensuring that the country of origin doesn’t experience ‘brain drain.’

Germany, for example, has developed new Global Skill Partnerships with Ecuador, Nigeria, Vietnam, and Jordan in engineering; and with Ghana and Senegal in construction.^[21] In addition, Australia is training Pacific Island workers in a range of vocational skills, including solar panel installation.^[22] The MOVE_GREEN project between the Spanish region of Andalucia and the Moroccan national employment agency Anapec aims to bring up to forty young Moroccan graduates to Spain for four months of training and internships in green transition-relevant occupations before facilitating their return to employment by Moroccan firms.^[23] None of these training and migration partnerships have yet been formally evaluated for impact and are presented only as examples.

Such partnerships are not substitutes for domestic skills investment. Experience from the health and social care sector in the UK shows that over reliance on international recruitment to fix immediate shortages has come at the detriment of more sustainable workforce development. That said, the potential of training and migration partnerships has been highlighted by several stakeholders, including the Norwegian energy multinational Equinor and by the Institution of Mechanical Engineers.^[24] January 2025 parliamentary committee evidence from SSE (UK Parliament, 2025) suggests that, prior to the UK’s tightening of immigration criteria, SSE were planning to recruit craft workers from overseas training academies.^[25]

Finally, it is worth noting that many of these cited developments happened organically, and in response to regional or sectoral skills needs, but have rarely come about from an explicit linking of green transition strategies and immigration policy. Even in the case of Germany (below), the origins of this partnership were not explicitly linked to migration, even though it is in its current form.^[26]

Green skilled migration between India and Germany

In 2023, an agreement was made between the German solar association and India’s Skill Council for Green Jobs for 2,000 Indian skilled solar panel installers to move to Germany. At the time, India had a surplus of installers who had been trained under the long-running programme ‘Suryamitra,’ whilst Germany must recruit 100,000 solar PV workers by 2030. This programme had been supported by Germany’s international development agency since 2015 which meant that German actors already had an in-depth knowledge of India’s training infrastructure and could ensure that a migration agreement was equitable.

Since then, Germany has stepped up its efforts to attract Indian workers to green jobs in its 2024 strategy, ‘Focus on India,’ which makes it easier for Indian professionals to move and work in Germany. The 30 new measures include a simplified visa process, faster recognition of qualifications, and integration support.

It is interesting to note that while India has sought to capitalise on its youth bulge, creating a network of institutions to provide young people with green skills to international standards, and signing migration partnerships with over thirty countries, the UK Prime Minister has explicitly ruled out any visa liberalisation as part of the free trade deal between the UK and India.