UK Covid-19 Inquiry - Module 2 report: Scottish Government response

Theme 3: Decision-making structures and framework for considering those at risk in an emergency

Whole system civil emergencies, including pandemics, can have significant impacts on our country. It is important clearly to establish and set out the roles and responsibilities of those involved in emergency management during whole system civil emergencies. Strong decision-making structures, complemented by appropriate checks and balances under normal conditions (“business as usual”) are likely to support a more effective and appropriate response under emergency conditions.

Emergencies can often occur with little or no warning, and so we welcome this opportunity to define and communicate our position on aspects of our emergency preparations. Dealing with whole system civil emergencies, whether foreseen or unforeseen, requires a flexible and adaptive approach. Preparing Scotland, our suite of national guidance documents, is available for use by organisations involved in resilience and emergency preparedness. It seeks to provide a common philosophy which underpins our approach to resilience, while still providing flexibility to enable Scotland to respond to new hazards and threats, known as Integrated Emergency Management (IEM). IEM supports the development of flexible and adaptable arrangements to support the response to the consequences of, rather than the causes of emergencies, irrespective of the scenario.

The purpose of Exercise Pegasus was to test our national and local preparedness for future pandemics across the key phases of a pandemic - emergence, containment, and mitigation. The learnings identified from Exercise Pegasus will inform future plans and actions.

Recommendation 8 – A framework for considering those at risk in an emergency

Chair’s recommendation:

The UK Government, Scottish Government, Welsh Government and Northern Ireland Executive should each agree a framework that identifies people who would be most at risk of becoming infected by and dying from a disease and those who are most likely to be negatively impacted by any steps taken to respond to a future pandemic. The framework should set out the specific steps that could be taken to mitigate the risks to these people.

Equality impact assessments should form part of this framework. Where they cannot be undertaken in a national crisis, they should be reinstated as soon as possible.

Each government should agree and publish in its response to this Report how it will ensure that this framework is embedded into emergency decision-making and who will be responsible for ensuring these issues remain under consideration throughout a national crisis.

Scottish Government response:

The Scottish Government accepts this recommendation in principle. The Scottish Government recognises, as highlighted by CIREG, individuals and groups may be disproportionately impacted by an emergency, and the ways in which they are affected may change based on the nature and timescale of the crisis.

Vulnerability in this context refers to individuals who are more likely to be harmed or less able to independently help themselves during an emergency (e.g. those who rely on the state and cannot live independently). Vulnerability can arise from factors such as age, disability, poverty, pregnancy, mental health, ethnicity, gender, and neurodivergence, although this not an exhaustive list. Emergencies impact many people, including individuals and groups who would not generally be considered ‘vulnerable’ outside the context of an emergency. Vulnerability is shaped by many complex factors, which can be temporary or long-lasting, and their significance may differ based on the specific context of the emergency.

We continue to recognise legal duties, including the legal requirements under the Public Sector Equality Duty, do not stop due to a pandemic or other public health emergencies. This includes the requirement in the Equality Act 2010 (Specific Duties) (Scotland) Regulations 2012 to assess and review policies and practices.

In recognition that some individuals and groups may be disproportionately impacted by an emergency, we will explore how we can utilise and enhance existing stakeholder relationships and networks in order to ensure equality expertise and lived experience can be drawn upon readily during any emergency response. This is in addition to work to ensure these groups directly inform our planning for future events.

Recognising CIREG feedback that multi-agency partners have a significant role in supporting the safety of vulnerable people, the Scottish Government actively supports partners in the maintenance of tools to support the swift identification of, and support to, those most at risk during an incident.

The Scottish Government has established a programme of Future Pandemic Preparedness to ensure all areas of Government take action to effectively manage future pandemic risks. As part of the Future Pandemic Preparedness programme, key enhancements to existing practice relevant to this recommendation will include coordinating a PANEL (Participation, Accountability, Non-discrimination, Empowerment and Legality) - based human rights assessment of both Pandemic ScotOps (the decision-making structures activated during a pandemic crisis) and known, evidence-based Public Health & Social Measures (PHSMs).

The PANEL approach provides a human rights-based lens to embed equity and inclusion into emergency decision-making and pandemic response. Our aim is to ensure those groups at greater risk are systematically considered in advance of, and during, a pandemic crisis.

The Scottish Government will consider whether and how these actions to identify those most vulnerable during pandemics could be used during other whole-system civil emergencies.

In addition, as set out in the Scottish Government’s response to the Module 1 Report, the Scottish Government recognises the vital role of multi-agency partnerships in supporting vulnerable people and is committed to putting measures in place to enable support to reach vulnerable people during civil emergencies.

The Cabinet Office recently circulated internal guidance on Identifying and assessing the disproportionate impacts of emergencies to Vulnerable People in the National Security Risk Assessment (NSRA): Guidance for Lead Government Departments. This guidance sets out principles to identify potentially vulnerable people during an emergency, assisting responders to develop a better understanding of who may be vulnerable in different civil emergencies.

The Scottish Government will integrate this guidance into our updated approach to Civil Contingencies Risk Assessment, as part of our response to recommendation 3, ‘Risk Assessment’ of the Covid Inquiry Module 1 report. This will provide a tool for responders and policy makers to systematically consider vulnerability when planning for, responding to, and recovering from civil emergencies.

Actions and Implementation timescales:

As set out above we continue to make improvements to our Pandemic Preparedness as part of the Future Pandemic Preparedness programme, which is overseen by a Ministerial Oversight Group. This programme continues to build on the lessons identified locally by policy teams from their participation in Exercise Pegasus, ahead of the availability of the formal evaluation report in winter 2026.

The Scottish Government will report on progress on a human-rights based assessment of the Pandemic ScotOps and Public Health and Social Measures (PSHMs) through our published Equality and Human Rights Mainstreaming Action Plan. We will also establish a governance framework to underpin the delivery of the Mainstreaming Action Plan which will be published in Summer 2026.

The Scottish Government will integrate the Cabinet Office’s new Vulnerable People guidance into the updated approach to civil contingencies risk assessment in Scotland, which will be launched in autumn 2027.

Accountable Officer:

The Director General for Exchequer, Strategy and Performance, working with the Civil Contingencies Division within the Scottish Government, will be accountable for the implementation of the Scottish elements of this recommendation.

Recommendation 10 – Civil emergency decision-making structures

Chair’s recommendation:

The UK Government and devolved governments should set out in future pandemic preparedness strategies how decision-making will work in a future pandemic.

This should include provision for COBR to be used as the initial response structure and set out how the UK Government and devolved governments will transition from managing a pandemic through COBR to managing it through separate arrangements in each nation when it becomes clear that the emergency will be longer-term. It should include provision for longer-term decision-making structures in the UK Government which consist of:

A strategy group to set the overall approach to each stage of the pandemic and take decisions on major interventions (e.g. entering and exiting lockdown); and

An operational group to take decisions on the implementation of the agreed strategy throughout the pandemic.

The design of these structures should include an outline of decision-making procedures for each group. The strategy should make express provision for the involvement of the UK Cabinet in the decision-making of the strategy and operational groups. It should also provide that longer-term decision-making should be conducted primarily by the UK, Scottish and Welsh Cabinets and the Northern Ireland Executive. Decision-making groups in each nation should include a minister with responsibility for representing the interests of vulnerable groups. In the UK Government, the Minister for Women and Equalities may be the most appropriate minister in this regard.

Scottish Government response:

The Scottish Government accepts this recommendation in principle and recognises the importance of taking action to manage future pandemic risks, including ensuring we have clear strategic and operational structures for this. Our strategic and operational structures are set out in our Pandemic Response Governance Outline (ScotOps). Related decision-making structures and processes remain subject to standard requirements for record keeping, under the Public Records (Scotland) Act 2011 and release of information.

During a pandemic, Cabinet continues to be the main decision-making body of the Scottish Government. The Scottish Cabinet is made up of the First Minister and all Cabinet Secretaries, including the Cabinet Secretary with portfolio responsibility for human rights and inequalities. This is currently the Cabinet Secretary for Social Justice.^[2]

The Permanent Secretary attends Cabinet meetings as Secretary to the Cabinet. Cabinet is also supported by Cabinet Secretariat who ensure the Scottish Government functions effectively by managing the agenda, minutes, and flow of information for Cabinet meetings and aiding with the coordination and implementation of policy, ensuring Cabinet decisions are translated into action across government.

As part of the Future Pandemic Preparedness programme key enhancements to existing practice on decision-making will include embedding equality roles in governance to ensure equity considerations are integral to decision-making.

Actions and Implementation timescales:

Our Pandemic Response Governance Outline (ScotOps) was tested during Exercise Pegasus and further development of the Pandemic Response Governance Outline will take place during 2026.

Accountable Officer:

The Director General for Exchequer, Strategy and Performance, working with the Civil Contingencies Division within the Scottish Government, will be accountable for the implementation of the Scottish elements of this recommendation.

Recommendation 11 – Contingency arrangements for key individuals

Chair’s recommendation:

The UK Government and devolved governments should each establish formal arrangements for covering the roles of Prime Minister and First Minister (and in Northern Ireland, deputy First Minister) as applicable during a whole-system civil emergency, should the incumbent be unable to undertake their duties for any reason.

Scottish Government response:

The Scottish Government accepts this recommendation.

Statutory provisions in the Scotland Act 1998 set out what happens if the First Minister leaves office or cannot carry out their duties. However, the Scottish Government recognises any change in leadership during a whole-system civil emergency would need to be effected seamlessly, without ambiguity and without delay.

Actions and Implementation timescales:

To deliver this recommendation the Scottish Government will produce detailed operational guidance that will set out clear lines of responsibility for use by Scottish Government officials to support any change in leadership during a whole-system emergency. The guidance will be in place by autumn 2026 and will be reviewed on an annual basis.

Accountable Officer:

The Director General Corporate will be accountable for the implementation of this recommendation in the Scottish context.

Recommendation 12 – Taskforces

Chair’s recommendation:

The response to a future whole-system civil emergency should be coordinated via central taskforces in each of the UK, Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland, with responsibility for the commissioning and synthesis of advice, coordination of a single data picture and facilitation of decision-making processes. In preparation, the UK Government and devolved governments should each design the operating procedures for these taskforces, including, but not limited to, identifying the key roles needed to run the taskforces and how those roles would be appointed. The UK Government should also identify the role of its taskforce in supporting decision-making procedures within the strategy and operational decision-making structures. These arrangements should be incorporated into future pandemic preparedness strategies (see the Inquiry’s Module 1 Report, Recommendation 4).

Scottish Government response:

The Scottish Government accepts this recommendation in principle. CIREG also emphasised the need for strengthened data quality and integration. We recognise the importance of having a central body that can coordinate a consistent data picture and provide clear, timely evidence to support decision-making structures. To achieve this, we are formalising the operational approach for such a group within our Pandemic Response Governance Outline.

Related decision-making structures and processes remain subject to standard requirements for record keeping, under the Public Records (Scotland) Act 2011 and release of information.

As part of the Future Pandemic Preparedness programme key enhancements to existing practice relevant to this recommendation will include:

• drawing together evidence on the potential impacts associated with some of the key interventions the Scottish Government may choose to introduce in response to a future pandemic. This will examine the evidence related to different vulnerable groups and will form an evidence repository that can be updated rapidly and used to inform future emergency decision-making during a crisis. This will include creating a suite of pre-prepared foundational impact assessments of PHSMs, which will be revisited during a crisis using the latest data and evidence. Work on these impact assessments is now under way as part of the Scottish Government’s reform programme for impact assessments and statutory duties
• integrating practical checkpoints into the strategic policy coordination process and consideration of impact so at-risk groups and high-impact populations are systematically considered
• leveraging data-driven tools and cross-government collaboration to deliver a proactive, transparent, and adaptable Impact Assessment models and tools to support emergency decision-making

The Scottish Government considers data and analytical input is central to the functioning of any response to future pandemics. An analytical framework for future pandemics has now been developed and ensures we are well-positioned to deliver timely, coordinated, and impactful analysis during a pandemic.

We are reviewing lessons learned from Exercise Pegasus and have updated the analytical framework to clarify in more detail how analysis feeds into relevant documents such as situational reports and Cabinet papers.

Actions and Implementation timescales:

The Scottish Government’s strategic response is outlined in our Pandemic Response Governance Outline (ScotOps) which was tested during Exercise Pegasus. We are making improvements to this document as a result. This will take place during 2026.

The analytical framework will be reviewed again when the Evaluation reports become available. It is intended to be a live document, subject to regular review and updates, to ensure it remains fit for purpose and relevant advice included in the guidance for analysts under Recommendation 4.

Accountable Officer:

The Director General for Exchequer, Strategy and Performance, working closely with the Civil Contingencies and Population Health Division within the Scottish Government, will be accountable for the implementation of the Scottish elements of this recommendation.

Recommendation 15 – Scrutiny of emergency powers

Chair’s recommendation:

The UK Government and devolved governments should ensure that the draft affirmative procedure is the standard process for enacting substantial and wide-ranging powers in a civil emergency, such as a pandemic, under primary public health legislation.

Any departure from this procedure should be the exception, with clear criteria and safeguards in place to prevent the bypassing of parliamentary scrutiny.

These safeguards should include:

• ‘sunset clauses’ for regulations made using the made affirmative procedure, specifying a clear expiration date, typically within two months; and
• a duty on ministers to report to their respective legislatures every two months on the exercise of emergency powers

Scottish Government response:

The Scottish Government accepts this recommendation. The Scottish Government agrees the draft affirmative procedure should always be the first option for making subordinate legislation in a civil emergency. Instruments should be accompanied by clear and accessible policy and explanatory notes so all those affected can clearly understand the law and how it impacts them.

In line with feedback from stakeholders, the Scottish Government also recognises the importance of consultation on the impact of proposed legislation before legislation is progressed and will seek opportunities to do so as far as is possible in the context of responding to an emergency. The Scottish Government also recognises the valuable role consultation and co-production plays in the development of any guidance resulting from such legislation and the potential value of such guidance in ensuring the implementation of legislation has the impact anticipated and does not generate unintended consequences.

If the Scottish Government considers more urgent action is required, the Scottish Government will first look to make use of an expedited version of the standard draft affirmative procedure. This would involve agreeing a shorter scrutiny timetable with the Scottish Parliament.

Only in exceptional circumstances will the Scottish Government consider making use of the made affirmative procedure. This enables measures to be brought into force immediately, but measures can only stay in force after a certain period of time if approved by Parliament. The Scottish Government agrees the expiration date of any such regulations would typically be within two months.

The made-affirmative procedure is an exceptional power in the statute book. It is only granted by Parliament in circumstances where it is clear more urgent action is required than can take place under the standard affirmative procedure. If a made-affirmative instrument is ever used, the Scottish Government will provide a full explanation as to why urgent action is necessary at the earliest possible opportunity.

Scottish Ministers understand their duty to the Scottish Parliament and the people of Scotland to account, and be held to account, for the actions they take. The Scottish Government therefore uses a variety of means to update the Scottish Parliament and engage in debate and scrutiny.

The Government recognises the need for this scrutiny to include reporting on the exercise of emergency powers as recommended by the Inquiry. It is for the Scottish Parliament to set out how and when it wishes to receive reports. The Scottish Government will respond to any requests from the Scottish Parliament on reporting.

The Government will also continue to consult with the people of Scotland as widely as possible before clearly and openly setting out its policy intentions or potential policy direction.

Actions and Implementation timescales:

This is the Scottish Government’s current approach and in part is formed by the formalised process with the Scottish Parliament’s Delegated Powers and Law Reform (DPLR) Committee and Conveners’ Group. This was set out in a letter from the Convener of the DPLR Committee in March 2025 and agreed to in a response by the Minister for Parliamentary Business in April 2025.

Alongside this agreed expedited scrutiny process, for any future civil emergency, as noted above the Scottish Government will work closely with the Scottish Parliament to ensure it meets any additional scrutiny requirements required by the Parliament.

Accountable Officer:

The Director General Corporate, working with the Cabinet, Parliament and Governance Division within the Scottish Government, is accountable for the implementation of this recommendation in the Scottish context.

Recommendation 16 – Review the applicability of the Civil Contingencies Act 2004 for future civil emergencies

Chair’s recommendation:

The UK Government should undertake a review of the Civil Contingencies Act 2004 to assess its potential role in managing future civil emergencies, including pandemics, and whether it could be employed as an interim emergency framework until more specific legislation with appropriate parliamentary safeguards is passed.

The review should:

• examine the conditions under which the Civil Contingencies Act 2004 may be invoked in a public health emergency
• consider any adjustments to the Act’s safeguards, such as the triple lock test or time limits, which would make it more adaptable to pandemics
• produce clear guidance on the Act’s application for use in civil emergencies, including pandemics, to support its use as an emergency measure in advance of specific legislation – such as a dedicated pandemic bill – being passed

Scottish Government response:

The Scottish Government welcomes this recommendation while recognising it is for UK Government to lead. The UK Government has a statutory duty to review the Civil Contingencies Act 2004 (CCA) on a five-yearly cycle, with the most recent post-implementation review published in 2022.

The Scottish Government will fully engage with the upcoming review and should be consulted on any proposed changes to the CCA. We would need to be satisfied any such emergency invocation respects devolved powers.

Actions and Implementation timescales:

This recommendation will be addressed in the 2027 CCA post-implementation review. The Scottish Government will feed into the review as appropriate.

Accountable Officer:

The Director General for DG Exchequer, Strategy and Performance, working with the Civil Contingencies Division within the Scottish Government, will be accountable for the implementation of the Scottish elements of this recommendation.