Grenfell Inquiry phase 1 recommendations: Scottish Government response

Scottish Government response to the Grenfell Tower Inquiry Phase 1 recommendations produced for Scottish Ministers by the Scottish Government Grenfell Inquiry Fire Safety Working Group (GIFSWG ).


Annex A: Full list of Grenfell Phase 1 report recommendations

Grenfell Phase 1 Report - Recommendations

1 that the owner and manager of every high-rise residential building be required by law to provide their local fire and rescue service with information about the design of its external walls together with details of the materials of which they are constructed and to inform the fire and rescue service of any material changes made to them

2 that all fire and rescue services ensure that their personnel at all levels understand the risk of fire taking hold in the external walls of high-rise buildings and know how to recognise it when it occurs.

3 that the LFB review, and revise as appropriate, Appendix 1 to PN633 to ensure that it fully reflects the principles in GRA 3.2;

4 that the LFB ensure that all officers of the rank of Crew Manager and above are trained in carrying out the requirements of PN633 relating to the inspection of high-rise buildings.

5 that the owner and manager of every high-rise residential building be required by law to provide their local fire and rescue services with up-to-date plans in both paper and electronic form of every floor of the building identifying the location of key fire safety systems;

6 that the owner and manager of every high-rise residential building be required by law to ensure that the building contains a premises information box, the contents of which must include a copy of the up-to-date floor plans and information about the nature of any lift intended for use by the fire and rescue services.

7 I also recommend, insofar as it is not already the case, that all fire and rescue services be equipped to receive and store electronic plans and to make them available to incident commanders and control room managers.

8 that the owner and manager of every high-rise residential building be required by law to carry out regular inspections of any lifts that are designed to be used by firefighters in an emergency and to report the results of such inspections to their local fire and rescue service at monthly intervals;

9 that the owner and manager of every high-rise residential building be required by law to carry out regular tests of the mechanism which allows firefighters to take control of the lifts and to inform their local fire and rescue service at monthly intervals that they have done so.

10 that the London Fire Brigade (LFB) review its policies on communications between the control room and the incident commander;

11 that all officers who may be expected to act as incident commanders (i.e. all those above the rank of Crew Manager) receive training directed to the specific requirements of communication with the control room;

12  that all control room operators (CROs) of Assistant Operations Manager rank and above receive training directed to the specific requirements of communication with the incident commander;

13 that a dedicated communication link be provided between the senior officer in the control room and the incident commander

14 that the LFB's policies be amended to draw a clearer distinction between callers seeking advice and callers who believe they are trapped and need rescuing;

15 that the LFB provide regular and more effective refresher training to CROs at all levels, including supervisors;

16 that all fire and rescue services develop policies for handling a large number of Fire Survival Guidance (FSG) calls simultaneously;

17 that electronic systems be developed to record FSG information in the control room and display it simultaneously at the bridgehead and in any command units;

18 that policies be developed for managing a transition from "stay put" to "get out";

19 that control room staff receive training directed specifically to handling such a change of advice and conveying it effectively to callers.

20 that steps be taken to investigate methods by which assisting control rooms can obtain access to the information available to the host control room.

21 that the London Ambulance Service (LAS) and the Metropolitan Police Service (MPS) review their protocols and policies to ensure that their operators can identify FSG calls (as defined by the LFB) and pass them to the LFB as soon as possible

22 that the LFB develop policies and training to ensure better control of deployments and the use of resources;

23 that the LFB develop policies and training to ensure that better information is obtained from crews returning from deployments and that the information is recorded in a form that enables it to be made available immediately to the incident commander (and thereafter to the command units and the control room).

24 that the LFB develop a communication system to enable direct communication between the control room and the incident commander and improve the means of communication between the incident commander and the bridgehead.

25 that the LFB investigate the use of modern communication techniques to provide a direct line of communication between the control room and the bridgehead, allowing information to be transmitted directly between the control room and the bridgehead and providing an integrated system of recording FSG information and the results of deployments.

26  that the LFB urgently take steps to obtain equipment that enables firefighters wearing helmets and breathing apparatus to communicate with the bridgehead effectively, including when operating in high-rise buildings;

27  that urgent steps be taken to ensure that the command support system is fully operative on all command units and that crews are trained in its use.

28 that the government develop national guidelines for carrying out partial or total evacuations of high-rise residential buildings, such guidelines to include the means of protecting fire exit routes and procedures for evacuating persons who are unable to use the stairs in an emergency, or who may require assistance (such as disabled people, older people and young children);

29 that fire and rescue services develop policies for partial and total evacuation of high-rise residential buildings and training to support them;

30 that the owner and manager of every high-rise residential building be required by law to draw up and keep under regular review evacuation plans, copies of which are to be provided in electronic and paper form to their local fire and rescue service and placed in an information box on the premises;

31 that all high-rise residential buildings (both those already in existence and those built in the future) be equipped with facilities for use by the fire and rescue services enabling them to send an evacuation signal to the whole or a selected part of the building by means of sounders or similar devices;

32 that the owner and manager of every high-rise residential building be required by law to prepare personal emergency evacuation plans (PEEPs) for all residents whose ability to self-evacuate may be compromised (such as persons with reduced mobility or cognition);

33 that the owner and manager of every high-rise residential building be required by law to include up-to-date information about persons with reduced mobility and their associated PEEPs in the premises information box;

34 that all fire and rescue services be equipped with smoke hoods to assist in the evacuation of occupants through smoke-filled exit routes.

35 that in all high-rise buildings floor numbers be clearly marked on each landing within the stairways and in a prominent place in all lobbies in such a way as to be visible both in normal conditions and in low lighting or smoky conditions

36 that the owner and manager of every residential building containing separate dwellings (whether or not it is a high-rise building) be required by law to provide fire safety instructions (including instructions for evacuation) in a form that the occupants of the building can reasonably be expected to understand, taking into account the nature of the building and their knowledge of the occupants.

37 that the owner and manager of every residential building containing separate dwellings (whether or not they are high-rise buildings) carry out an urgent inspection of all fire doors to ensure that they comply with applicable legislative standards;

38 that the owner and manager of every residential building containing separate dwellings (whether or not they are high-rise buildings) be required by law to carry out checks at not less than three-monthly intervals to ensure that all fire doors are fitted with effective self-closing devices in working order.

39 that all those who have responsibility in whatever capacity for the condition of the entrance doors to individual flats in high-rise residential buildings, whose external walls incorporate unsafe cladding, be required by law to ensure that such doors comply with current standards.

40 that each emergency service must communicate the declaration of a Major Incident to all other Category 1 Responders as soon as possible;

41 that on the declaration of a Major Incident clear lines of communication must be established as soon as possible between the control rooms of the individual emergency services;

42 that a single point of contact should be designated within each control room to facilitate such communication;

43 that a "METHANE" (Major incident declared, Exact location, Type of incident, Hazards, Access, Number and type of casualties, Emergency services present and required ) message should be sent as soon as possible by the emergency service declaring a Major Incident.

44 that steps be taken to investigate the compatibility of the LFB systems with those of the MPS and the LAS with a view to enabling all three emergency services' systems to read each other's messages.

45 that steps be taken to ensure that the airborne datalink system on every NPAS helicopter observing an incident which involves one of the other emergency services defaults to the National Emergency Service user encryption.

46 that the LFB, the MPS, the LAS and the London local authorities all investigate ways of improving the collection of information about survivors and making it available more rapidly to those wishing to make contact with them.

Contact

Email: joe.mcshane@gov.scot

Back to top