Review of Management Options for the Landing Obligation

Research which considers possible management options for dealing with the landing obligation


Annex 1: Overview of Management Options Identified

Management Options

Objective/Outcome

Country Example

Strengths

Weaknesses/Limitations

Government Controlled Buffer Zone

Allow vessels to access quota for incidental over-quota catches

Denmark, United States

  • Value of additional quota held at point of use
  • Tool to cover uncertainty and variability with catches
  • Can be used as incentive for REM
  • Can work to protect individual holdings
  • Allows vessels to stay at sea for longer
  • Access rules can be designed to change behaviour (increased selectivity)
  • Open-Access Issues
  • Administrative role for government
  • Industry may not want a high proportion of quota held centrally
  • Might be more efficient for industry to manage this type of pooling system

Deemed Value Payment for Over-quota catches

Mitigate open-access conditions in quota pooling systems

New Zealand

  • Can be set to incentivise the purchase of quota before use of pooled quota and to land over-quota catch
  • Ramping rates can be set to protect critical choke species
  • Revenue used to promote selectivity and research
  • Requires information regarding quota prices cost structure of industry and landings price
  • Would require changes to quota trading mechanisms to produce information on quota prices
  • Practical issues in setting the right levy price

Withhold the Economic Use of the Catch

Mitigate open-access conditions in quota pooling systems

Iceland

  • Creates disincentives to use quota pool
  • Revenue used to promote selectivity and research
  • Requires information on variable costs of vessels

Renegotiate TAC Allocations

Improve alignment between quota holdings and catch compositions

  • Potential beneficial impact upon overcapacity at EU level
  • MS holdings more accurately reflect current patterns of abundance and distribution
  • Long-run objective
  • Likely to be politically arduous and lengthy process
  • Scotland likely to be net loser

European/Regional Open Trading Platform

Improve alignment between quota holdings and catch compositions

  • Increase international quota swapping
  • Improve information and efficiency or current mechanisms
  • Political fear of Scottish quota leaving Scotland
  • Requires collective action and consent at EU level

Retrospective balancing

Allow fleet to cover incidental catches

New Zealand

  • Promotes compliance
  • Helps vessels access cover incidental catches
  • Required changes to quota trading arrangements

Online real-time public trading platform in Scotland

Improve quota trading mechanisms, improve alignment between quota holdings and catch compositions, allow fleet to cover incidental catches

Canada, Denmark, US, New Zealand, Iceland

  • Promotes compliance
  • Helps vessels access additional quota
  • Improves information and efficiency of trades
  • Can be designed to prevent concentration of quota holdings
  • Potential to reduce leasing costs
  • Requires changes to quota management
  • May promote concentration of fleet

Allow FQAs to be sold as small units

Improve alignment between quota holdings and catch compositions

New Zealand

  • Allows vessels to hold quota portfolios that more accurately reflect true catch
  • Wider socio-economic benefits (new entry)
  • Potential to change ownership structure of fleet with uncertain consequences

PO managed Risk Pools for Choke Species Quota

Allow fleet to cover incidental catches

Denmark, Canada, US

  • May be more effective than Government buffer Zone
  • Create downward pressure upon catching choke species
  • Can be designed to incentivise behaviour changes (greater selectivity)
  • Administrative burden for POs
  • May undermine the quota investments of some
  • Enforcement issues for POs
  • Open-access issues have to be addressed

Demonstrating the Right to Catch

Enforcement of the discard ban

  • Additional powers to POs to enforce ban
  • Bottom-up enforcement often increases legitimacy
  • May not be practical given licences changes
  • Political objection to giving POs this power

Mixed Fisheries Management TAC/Quota Regime

Improve alignment between quota holdings and catch compositions

  • Gives fishers more control over their catches
  • Quota regime more accurately reflects distribution and abundance of stocks
  • Control over single species los
  • Practical application far off- highly theoretical

Remote Electronic Monitoring

Monitoring and Enforcement

Denmark, US, Canada

  • Most effective method for full control
  • Aids compliance
  • No great effect on pelagic fleet
  • Can be used to provide evidence for the removal of additional regulations ( DAS)
  • Potential for level playing field within Scotland
  • Likely to expose demersal fleet to risk of bankruptcy/reduction in operations
  • Political contentious
  • Issues with creating level playing field across Europe

Observer Programmes

Monitoring and Enforcement

US, Canada, Norway

  • More acceptable to some in industry
  • Unlikely to be effective
  • High cost and administration

Reference Fleets

Monitoring and Enforcement

  • More acceptable to some in industry
  • Less costly than observers
  • Reactive to bad behaviour
  • Room for illegal discarding to continue
  • No level- playing field

High financial penalties for illegal discarding

Enforcement

Iceland, US, New Zealand

  • Incentives for compliance
  • Incentives for greater selectivity
  • Reduce operations of some vessels

Increase demand for low value species

Utilize bycatch

Iceland, US

  • Increase prices for low value fish
  • Aids compliance- incentive to land
  • Greater utilisation of resources- less waste
  • Could create incentive to target fish and overexploited
  • Development of new markets rare

Use bycatch for non-human consumption

Utilize bycatch

New Zealand, US, Canada, Denmark

  • Greater utilisation of resources- less waste
  • Fishermen receive better price for bycatch
  • Aids compliance- incentives to land
  • Could create incentives to target new species

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