Future arrangements to secure food standards and safety in Scotland

written review of the Food Standards Agency Scotland functions


Chapter 6 - Future options for the FSA in Scotland

29. Introduction

29.1 The Panel established two basic principles, which were generally endorsed by stakeholders that would guide our analysis and conclusions. Firstly as Scotland has particular challenges in relation to diet (and in particular obesity) and certain foodborne diseases the Panel considered that food safety should not be divorced from nutrition and labelling. Secondly there was general agreement that such advice on food safety, nutrition and labelling should be independent and transparent and should be provided by an organisation which should remain at arms length from Central Government.

29.2 On the basis of having adopted these two guiding principles the Panel were able to rule out the option of transferring labelling and nutrition into the Scottish Government and this was not considered further.

30. Key issues to judge feasibility of options

30.1 The Panel was able to identify and agree a suite of key issues by which it would base its analysis and conclusions. They were:

  • Independence from government and industry
  • Evidence-based and consumer focus
  • Transparency and openness
  • Handling incidents and emergencies
  • Expertise
  • Consistency of policy across the UK
  • Flexibility
  • Response Time
  • Cost
  • Influence within Europe
  • Fit with other Scottish Government Policies.

Independence from government and industry

30.2 The Food Standards Agency is a non-Ministerial Department, which means it does not report to a specific Minister (though it reports through a Minister to Parliament), nor is it subject to direction by a Minister. This means that stakeholders perceive it as independent. Whilst on the whole the FSA enjoys a good working relationship with food industry it regulates, it maintains the necessary distance from the powerful food and drink industry lobbying; its advice on front of pack traffic light labelling is one example of this. The panel considered that this independence is a crucial factor in creating and retaining consumer and industry confidence in FSA advice.

Evidence-based and consumer focus

30.3 The FSA has a sole statutory objective: to protect public health from risks that may arise in connection with the consumption of food, and otherwise to protect the interests of consumers in all matters connected with food. It does this by basing its decisions on the best scientific advice available, including independent expert advice from its advisory scientific committees and specifically commissioned research. The FSA also ensures that it takes a consumer focus through a programme of consumer research and engagement, including appointment of consumer representatives to its scientific committees and a recently established consumer panel. This is reflected by two of its three core values: putting the consumer first and science and evidence-based. Again, the panel felt that the FSA's sole focus on consumers, delivered by robust, evidence based policy and implementation, is a crucial factor in creating and retaining consumer and industry confidence in FSA advice.

Transparency and Openness

30.4 The Food Standards Agency has the unusual power to publish advice it gives to Ministers. It also makes its board meeting available live and on demand and publishes board papers in advance. This is in contrast to the workings of Government Departments and other public bodies whose advice to Ministers is not routinely published. This means that the FSA is seen by consumers and industry as independent of government, and that when Ministers take a decision, the public and industry can see the advice that has been given in relation to consumer protection. (Ministers will consider other issues such as legal issues, cost, impact on industry etc in addition to considering the FSA's advice when making a decision.) Its scientific committees also all meet in public to ensure that risk assessment advice is transparent and it is clear where a risk management decision adopted by the Board may diverge. The FSA values this power; openness is one of its three core values: "Being open means that we will use plain language and communicate in a timely way, that we will explain the reasons for our decisions and advice, and that we will publish our targets and our achievements against them". The panel considered that this transparency and openness is a crucial factor in creating and retaining consumer and industry confidence in FSA advice.

Handling Food Incidents and Emergencies

30.5 Food emergencies can pose a very serious risk to public health, and also to our economy. The current UK wide system for handling food emergencies has an excellent record and the FSA is closely linked into international networks for example through EFSA. Poor handling of food emergencies, such as the German E.Coli contaminated beansprouts[25] incident, can have a substantial impact on confidence in the competence of Governments and Agencies by the public, industry and the media as well as a direct impact on the economy and health of the population. Therefore the panel considered that any change to the structure or workings of the Food Standards Agency would have to ensure that both consumer and industry confidence in the handling of food emergencies was at a minimum maintained at current levels and that mechanisms are in place to identify emerging risks.

Expertise

30.6 The Food Standards Agency's advice and work is evidence-based. It commissions both scientific research and consumer surveys, employs scientists and takes advice from nine independent scientific committees, which comprise more than 140 independent experts who are appointed through open competition. These scientists provide independent advice and challenge that is fundamental to the Agency's work and reputation. The FSA also works closely with EFSA through membership of its Advisory Forum made up of Member States as EFSA has responsibility for EU-wide risk assessments and scientific advice. The panel considered that any new model would have to have access to a similar level of scientific expertise, in order to maintain the necessary consumer and industry confidence and to support Scottish Ministers in policy development.

Consistency of policy

30.7 As a general principle, FSA maintains consistency in its approach across the UK. The rationale is three-fold:

  • there is free movement of food across the UK, so regulation should be consistent to ensure safety;
  • consumers move throughout the UK so for their safety and to avoid confusion, advice and safety precautions should be consistent; and
  • most importantly, as the FSA's advice is evidence-based it would only give different advice across the UK if the evidence differed across the UK.

The panel therefore considered that consistency in industry regulation and consumer advice across the UK was desirable, though not essential.

Flexibility

30.8 In tandem with the discussions on consistency, the Panel and stakeholders frequently discussed the desirability of flexibility. Almost every aspect of the FSA's work is devolved in Scotland, but its approach was usually to seek consistency across the UK. With different political priorities in each administration, Scotland-specific work to support a particular Scottish objective (such as the Preventing Obesity Route Map) is likely to be needed in future. The panel considered that it would be desirable, though not essential, for any new arrangements to allow action to better protect consumers to be taken in Scotland even if that action could or would not be taken elsewhere in the UK, or if that action was not deemed the same level of prioritisation as Scotland.

Response Time

30.9 There had been occasions when action could have been taken more swiftly in Scotland, perhaps because of a different industry structure or because there was a consensus amongst stakeholders which was unique to Scotland. In particular, the UK Government's Better Regulation Strategy and moratorium on government advertising campaigns meant these variations in speed of action were becoming more common, as action that would be acceptable and desirable in Scotland might be slowed or blocked in England, in order to meet new schemes designed to minimise bureaucracy. The panel therefore considered it essential that work in Scotland should be able to progress at the fastest possible pace, rather than being held up by issues in other parts of the UK.

Cost

30.10 It has proved very difficult to generate accurate costs as any estimate is extremely sensitive to how a new or remodelled organisation is organised and managed. For example a new organisation might choose to employ its own scientists or alternatively commission its own research, or it could enter into an agreement to share research costs with the UK FSA or another organisation closer to home. It is likely that any new structure would have to collaborate extensively with the existing FSA and other agencies. The panel considered that any additional transition or running costs from any new arrangements would need to be justified by an improved service to the public.

Influence within the European Union

30.11 The European Union develops much of the food regulation in the UK. Before the machinery of government changes, the Food Standards Agency led negotiations for all of the UK. Because the FSA is a science and evidence-based organisation combined with its political independence, it has established a strong reputation amongst other member states. It remains the competent authority for food safety and therefore represents the UK in key EU and international fora, such as the Standing Committee on the Food Chain and Animal Health and EFSA's Advisory Forum. It was previously seen as driving the food agenda across Europe, for example measures to reduce salt intake even where voluntary approaches were being used rather than legislation. Since the machinery of government changes, that leadership has been lost in respect of nutrition and labelling. As well as diluting the UK voice, the changes have also meant that when government policy differs in different parts of the UK, the Scottish position may not be well-represented in European negotiations led by the Department of Health (e.g. on labelling issues). The panel therefore considered that it would be desirable for any new arrangements to give Scotland a strong voice in developing the UK position, and give the UK a strong position in Europe.

Wider Scottish Government policy

30.12 The Scottish Government's purpose is to focus government and public services on creating a more successful country, with opportunities for all of Scotland to flourish, through increasing sustainable economic growth. A number of specific Scottish Government policies were relevant to the Panel's considerations:

  • Food and health policy
  • Sustainable economic growth policy
  • Food and drink policy
  • Public Bodies policy

31. Options

31.1 Having agreed the key issues against which each option would be assessed, the Panel then identified a number of options which it considered in some depth:

  • Option 1 Status Quo
  • Option 2 Enhance the current structure
  • Option 3 Stand-alone FSA Scotland.
  • Option 4 FSA Scotland bolted on to existing Scottish Public
    Body

31.2 For the purpose of the report we describe options 1 and 4 first as they can be discounted.

Option 1 - Status Quo

31.3 The Panel felt it necessary to consider the implications of the status quo even though it was clear that this was unlikely to be a viable option and that the remit had explicitly set them the task of looking at the feasibility of a discrete body.

31.4 The Panel considered the status quo to mean the system as it currently stands following the movement of nutrition and labelling into DH and Defra in England and the retention of those functions in Scotland. The Panel noted that since the recent change no major problems had been observed but they did identify some inconsistencies and issues that would make the status quo difficult going forward. These were:

  • Recognition that the continued capacity for the Aberdeen office to provide Scottish Ministers advice on nutrition and labelling policy relies on adequate resourcing agreed by the UK FSA Board, as well as constructive relationships with staff in Defra and DH. It is the opinion of the Panel that whilst the staff in Aberdeen can rely on DH and Defra continuing with current existing work, it is possible over time that the UK Government would wish to pursue different areas of work on nutrition and labelling leaving the Scottish FSA in a position where it will need to have its own independent capacity to provide advice to Scottish Ministers.
  • It is also possible that the FSA in Aberdeen would be unable to react swiftly to any request from Scottish Ministers, as they would need time for staff to be redeployed, recruited or work commissioned, although the FSA Board assured us they were prepared to respond to any new demands.
  • Where previously the FSA was the body that represented the UK in negotiations in Europe on nutrition and labelling that function would now be carried out by DH and Defra. Some members of the Panel were concerned that whilst DH and Defra are required to reflect other devolved administration's views there was likelihood that Scotland's position may not be heard adequately.
  • It was therefore felt that while maintaining the status quo was feasible, other options could provide a more stable footing for on-going work.

31.5 Therefore the Panel agreed that Option 1 was not in the best interests of Scotland

Option 4 - FSA Scotland bolted on to existing Scottish Public Body

31.6 The Panel gave serious consideration to the possibility of securing the FSA within an existing public body as a means by which a discrete FSA in Scotland could be established with maximum efficiency.

31.7 The Panel noted that the FSA has a unique role in protecting the consumer, a key feature of which is its ability to publish its advice. That level of freedom from Ministerial influence was identified by Scottish Ministers as a key element that they wished to retain as they felt this was crucial to retain consumer confidence.

31.8 The Panel considered a limited number of existing bodies that were deemed potential candidates for this role However, they agreed that no other existing body would be suitable, partly because there were none which allowed a neat fit by function but more specifically as none of those considered had that same ability to publish its advice. The Panel felt that moving functions to a different body could jeopardise the arms-length nature of the organisation from the government which had been deemed essential in maintaining consumer confidence.

31.9 One of the main reasons for considering a bolt-on model would be to avoid duplication with any other public body, particularly around support functions such as IT, HR, finance etc. However most of those benefits could be realised through contracting out to the private sector or through a service level agreement (SLA) with an existing public organisation. In terms of core work, there was felt to be little duplication with other bodies. There were already SLAs in place with animal welfare. Research work could already be jointly commissioned where more than one body had an interest, and research bodies such as the Rowett Institute were already focussing their research activities on Government priorities.

31.10 A variation on this option would be to move only some of the current functions of the Food Standards Agency to other bodies. The most obvious functions that might be moved would be nutrition and compositional and country of origin labelling, as in England. However there was overwhelming support from stakeholders to keep these functions together with food safety and food standards, so the Panel did not investigate this possibility further.

31.11 There might be some scope for a very radical rethink in creating new public bodies that bring together the functions of various existing bodies. One might be a farm to fork official controls body, discussed later in this report. Another might be an independent Public Safety / Resilience Body that dealt with food emergencies, health emergencies, environmental disasters such as flooding and storms and other emergencies such as terrorist attacks. However removing the emergency handling from other food safety work could pose its own problems.

31.12 In summary, the Panel considered that there was no great duplication with any other public body's work, moving functions to a different body could jeopardise the independence from government and openness that was necessary to maintain consumer confidence, potential efficiencies from sharing support functions could be realised through other means, and stakeholders were overwhelmingly in favour of keeping nutrition and labelling functions with food safety and food standards. Therefore the Panel agreed that this option was not viable and it was not considered further.

31.13 Having discounted options 1 and 4, the Panel focussed its deliberations on the remaining two options. Enhancing the current structure and a stand‑alone Scottish Food Agency.

Option 2- Enhancing the current structure

31.14 The current structure of the FSA is expressly a UK structure, without formal devolution to its regional offices. Option 2 considers an arrangement whereby the Scottish office and Director would have more autonomy and were able to advise Scottish Ministers directly on some issues, such as nutrition.

31.15 The Panel considered whether such autonomy could be acquired in two ways.

  • An administrative model achieved by clarifying reporting arrangements, resource transfer and other requirements to allow the Scottish FSA to function more autonomously. This might be achieved through memoranda of understanding between various partners.
  • A legal model which would see the creation of a legal entity (for example the Scottish Director or a Scottish Board) and endowing certain functions upon that entity, such as advising Scottish Ministers on particular issues.

31.16 Advice on the second of those two options considered by the Panel suggested that the legal model was not tenable and was therefore not considered further.

31.17 The Panel considered the option of an enhanced administrative model against the options. For the purposes of the report reference to enhanced model refers to the enhanced administrative model.

Option 3 - Stand-alone Scottish Food Standards Agency

31.18 A stand-alone Scottish Food Standards Agency would mean creating a new legal person, or more probably body. This new Scottish board would be endowed with all the powers of the current FSA for Scotland. Advice to Scottish Ministers would come from that board. There would be likely to be significant collaboration and co-operation between the new body and the FSA UK on issues such as food incident handling and research. Memoranda of Understanding and Service Level agreements could be used to formalise this relationship.

31.19 Creating a new body from scratch would mean that new functions, or a new focus, would be possible. Stakeholders were strongly in favour of the FSA's core values of putting the consumer first, openness and independence and science and evidence-based. Given such strong support, the Panel therefore felt that a new stand-alone Scottish body should also have these values, a single statutory purpose of consumer health and protection and powers to publish advice to Ministers. The analysis of the options makes those assumptions.

31.20 Few stakeholders gave opinions as to the type of public body a stand-alone Scottish body should be, and those who did believe it should be a non-Ministerial Department, (like the FSA UK). As there was no intention to change the functions, there would be no rationale to change the type of public body, so the analysis assumes that a new stand-alone body would be a Scottish non-Ministerial Department.

31.21 Given this assumed purpose of consumer health, the Panel felt that it would be inappropriate to have SFAC as currently constituted as the Scottish board, given the direct industry representation. The Panel therefore assumed a new Scottish board for the purposes of its analysis.

32. Analysis of remaining options against the key issues

Independence from government and industry

32.1 The FSA already has an established reputation for independence which would continue under an enhanced model. Therefore as long as a new Scottish FSA was established as Non-Ministerial Department and given the same objective and values as the UK FSA, there should be no difference between options 2 and 3. There may slightly more risk of change to the FSA's current, highly valued ways of working, in the stand-alone option, but assuming the majority of staff would transfer from FSA Scotland and would thus be well-versed in these ways of working, the risk could be minimised.

Evidence-based and consumer focus

32.2 The enhanced model would enable continuing access to the evidence available through the different parts of the FSA across the UK and through the FSA's links with EFSA and other international bodies. However, it is likely that the FSA would have to establish an agreement with the DH and Defra to ensure that they had continuing access to evidence gathering that they were engaged in and which would be required to allow FSA Scotland to develop their work. The FSA has already established methods of consumer engagement and research, including involvement of consumer representatives in its scientific advice. As a stand-alone body's sole focus would be on Scottish consumers, rather than UK consumers, it may be able to take a more tailored approach and commission specific research to benefit Scottish public health - although it may be cost-effective in some instances to join forces with the FSA on more complex issues.

Transparency and Openness

32.3 The enhanced model would maintain and possibly strengthen the transparency and openness of existing arrangements. Again, with the same objective and values for a stand-alone body as the UK FSA, there should be no impact. Establishing a stand alone body may take time to embed these working practices, but can also learn from current practice of the FSA.

Handling of emergencies and incidents

32.4 The Panel noted that the present system is robust and works well. Any change will introduce an element of risk to such a system. However, they also noted that there was scope to improve some aspects of handling with a greater degree of flexibility for local input rather than always handling every issue from the centre, though that should be carefully managed. Linkages with key international bodies and the ability to identify emerging risks would be critical but more difficult for a stand-alone body.

32.5 At the early stage of the feasibility study the Panel became aware of the fatal outbreak of Shiga-toxin producing Escherichia coli in Germany last summer, followed by similar reports from the French authorities, and in particular the confusing and conflicting comments from agencies and officials not just across countries on the continent but also within countries as to the source of the outbreak. As well as the health impact, the resulting confusion was no doubt damaging to the producers of the foods concerned and also impacted on the public's confidence in the ability of the system to manage such outbreaks. The Panel perceived that the failure to communicate a consistent message was partly due to the federated nature of the systems in Germany, and the response of national agencies trying to deflect the problem rather than working together to present a coherent assessment of the problem.

32.6 The Panel noted that the consumer groups who responded to the feasibility study were strongly in favour of retaining the current processes and communication links.

32.7 In the event that either option was adopted the Panel agreed that that a clear communication and handling strategy would be required by the Scottish FSA with agencies across the UK and also across Europe. The Panel noted that such arrangements exist between the Health Protection Agency and Health Protection Scotland which allow them to manage incidences collectively, although their remit is much narrower and they are not dealing with the complexity of the global food chain in the same way.

Availability of Expertise

32.8 The Panel noted that the FSA in Scotland had, prior to the transfer of nutrition and labelling functions into Westminster Departments, significant access to expert advice and support from colleagues in the London office of the FSA. In addition they have had access to several advisory groups which are now subject to Machinery of Government changes. The main impact of the changes has been around access to the Scientific Advisory Committee on Nutrition (SACN) as the other key committees still fall under the FSA's responsibilities. As part of the changes to the FSA in London the secretariat for SACN has moved into DH and therefore the UK FSA currently has no locus in determining the agenda or work programme for SACN. SACN is currently subject to Machinery of Government changes, although as yet these have not been clarified, and therefore the role of the devolved administrations has yet to be determined. The Scottish Government has observer status on SACN, which has been delegated to FSA Scotland.

32.9 There did seem to be a genuine desire on the part of the FSA Board to continue nutrition and labelling work. There was concern from some Panel members that there was an over reliance on the expectation that they would be able to rely on good will of colleagues now working in DH. The Panel recognised that whilst relationships have been maintained between colleagues that transferred into DH and those in Scotland but that over time the potential for working relationships to deteriorate was significant. This may be accelerated if the agenda on nutrition and labelling diverges between countries. Some Panel members were however convinced by the FSA's assurances that it would provide resources on nutrition and labelling issues as required to meet Scottish Ministers requests for advice and meet its responsibilities to Scottish consumers. This could be clearly articulated in a memorandum of understanding.

32.10 It was noted that there was potential for the Scottish Government to ensure that the work undertaken by the Rowett Institute, a centrally funded resource based in Aberdeen, was able to reflect the needs of the FSA in Scotland to ensure that they could continue to provide some evidence based advice to Scottish Ministers. But the nature of this advice was very different to the analysis provided through the FSA - which would at times need to commission additional work to inform its policy advice. A key risk for the FSA in Scotland was ensuring continuing access to UK wide surveys on diet and nutrition as these were now under the control of DH. There was no suggestion that the FSA would not have access to that information but under either option a clear understanding of the access and involvement in its further development should be articulated. The FSA in Scotland often paid for additional work to be undertaken to enhance the Scottish element. It may be that if these surveys were to be decommissioned that Scotland could not afford to undertake the survey on its own.

32.11 The Panel noted that under either option the FSA in Scotland would need to establish Memorandum of understanding or other arrangement with DH and advisory committees to ensure ongoing access and to avoid where possible unnecessary duplication.

Consistency

32.12 This was an issue raised by industry and consumer stakeholders in particular. Their rationale for consistency was the desire to minimise administrative burden and also limit confusion and misunderstanding by industry and consumers who operate or travel across the UK.

32.13 There were arguments that with an enhanced Scottish FSA operating within a federated structure the possibility for consistency of approach was potentially easier. However, it was noted that as nutrition and labelling are devolved it has been possible and indeed the reality to have different positions across the UK. Arguably the amount of variation may be limited if organisations across the UK develop and implement policy based on evidence but there remains scope for such evidence to be interpreted differently.

32.14 The Panel felt that the enhanced option would offer most consistency, but noted that much of the new legislation is EU based so there is little scope for variation in what Scotland might do differently than the rest of the UK. The main exception is in relation to nutrition policy which needs to be taken forward through a mix of voluntary and regulatory initiatives - although the companies concerned will generally operate on a UK-basis regardless.

Flexibility

32.15 Whilst consistency was, in some cases, desirable, the Panel recognised that there were others in which it was important for Scotland to be able to act alone, particularly to support specific Scottish Government objectives (such as the Prevention of Obesity Route Map). Whilst under an enhanced model the Scottish FSA office might have the legal powers to do so, this would always depend on the resources allocated to it by the UK FSA. Further, as the division of responsibilities between the Scottish and wider UK offices would be agreed in legislation, there was the possibility that flexibility to take a Scottish approach might be needed in future. As there would be no such constraints of the work programme of a stand-alone body, the Panel therefore considered that the stand-alone option would offer most flexibility.

Response Time

32.16 For example it had been suggested that the UK FSA offices in London had diverted resources and attention to dealing with the "Red Tape" challenge and to manage the UK Government's "one in, one out" policy whereby government agencies and departments have to either justify existing regulations or where they want to introduce a new regulation have considered which regulations to drop which had a negative impact on Scotland. The Scottish Government is also fully committed to better regulation and reducing unnecessary burdens on business to promote sustainable economic growth and have adopted 5 key principles requiring any regulation to be transparent, accountable, proportionate, consistent, and targeted.

32.17 However, we found little evidence to support the concerns that had been raised. For example the Panel were made aware that the introduction of Remedial Action Notices which was initially an issue but is now being progressed in Scotland. Meat industry representatives also expressed concern that they would have been able to move ahead with new IT systems to enable effective food chain information to be communicated to the slaughterhouse. It is feasible that a stand-alone or enhanced FSA in Scotland could have acted more quickly than counterparts in the UK.

32.18 The UK FSA Board suggested at the meeting on 25 January with the Expert Panel they do not wish to move at the slowest, but rather makes progress where possible as examples of best practice to other countries and that they were moving towards allowing offices working with devolved administrations to move ahead more rapidly. An enhanced arrangement could help solve this issue.

Cost

32.19 The Panel agreed that the enhanced option was cheaper as it would require minimal additional cost, unless the UK FSA was unable to meet requirements of FSA Scotland to deliver Scottish Minsters aspirations. In that case the Scottish Government may be required to increase allocation to the FSA in Aberdeen.

32.20 The Panel found it difficult to assess the overall costs of the stand-alone option. Based on estimates from the FSA the cost of a stand‑alone agency in Scotland could be approximately £15 million (including costs for a Meat Inspection Service). This would be broadly covered by existing expenditure but assumed, reasonably, ongoing collaboration with FSA. Additional analysis of potential costs of a stand-alone agency that had limited or no collaboration with the FSA in England suggested that the cost could be as high as 50% more than the fully collaborative stand-alone agency. The Panel agreed that further work was needed to develop more robust estimates and did not take a view as to whether the additional cost of the stand-alone option was in line with its potential benefits.

Influence within Europe and internationally

32.21 The UK FSA represents the UK Government (including the devolved administrations) on food safety and standards issues in the European Union. Up until the changes the UK FSA also represented the UK and the devolved administrations on nutrition and labelling. This is now being handled directly by DH on nutrition and Defra on labelling. While the UK government is obliged to seek the views of the devolved administrations the overall position is now being handled by officials under the control of Ministers who do not share the same views on nutrition and labelling as those held by Scottish Ministers. Therefore there may be a risk that the position of Scotland and other devolved administrations is not being adequately represented.

32.22 However, neither option would necessarily alleviate that as an issue, as Scotland does not have the right to be present at such negotiations as that falls to the Member State which is the UK. It may be possible under either option for the FSA in Scotland to take a greater role in engaging with other European countries in support of the Government's policy ambitions, but there would be a cost associated with that. This could also only be done on a more informal basis.

32.23 Where the UK FSA still represents the UK in Europe on food safety, either option is likely to lead to a greater input on Scottish matters but that it may be that the enhanced Scottish FSA has greater potential influence as it is still part of the UK FSA.

33. Fit with other Government policies

Fit with public bodies policy to streamline public bodies landscape in Scotland

33.1 The stand-alone option would require the establishment a new Scottish public body. The Public Bodies Team advised that the addition of a public body would be within the remit of the policy if it could be justified by the benefits it would bring, but that it would have to contain both the FSA and the Meat Inspection Service as they could not justify the creation of two separate bodies.

Fit with Scottish Government food and health policy

33.2 Scottish Ministers have re-iterated their view that policy must be based on evidence. Both options would support that and would be consistent regardless of the option chosen. There would need to be a discussion with the UK FSA, UK Government and Scottish Ministers over the provision of resources to help develop and maintain an appropriate evidence base in Scotland for advice on food safety, standards, nutrition and labelling, particularly if the variation in policy between administrations continued

Fit with Scottish Government sustainable economic growth & food and drink policy

33.3 A reputation for safe, quality food is essential for the success of the Scottish food and drink industry. The UK FSA already has a strong reputation with consumers for ensuring safe, healthy food, its statutory purpose. This is likely to be more easily maintained if an enhanced Scottish FSA is adopted. The consistency in regulation and enforcement which the enhanced option would be likely to bring should minimise costs for UK-wide retailers and producers who sell UK-wide. It was noted by some members of the Panel that there was a very strong perception that a Scottish FSA may have better relationship with industry and that it could help minimise bureaucracy for food producers, processors and retailers. Therefore both options bring potential advantages for industry. It would need to be ensured that independence was not compromised.

34. Conclusion

34.1 The Panel members agreed that the options were finely balanced on three of the issues: independence from government and industry; evidence-based and consumer focus; and transparency and openness.

34.2 On handling food incidents and emergencies; expertise; consistency of policy across the UK; and influence within Europe, the Panel agreed that the enhanced model was preferable and that the stand-alone model would be viable, as long as the necessary relationships with the FSA UK, DH and DEFRA were put in place.

34.3 On flexibility, response time and fit with other Scottish Government policies, the Panel agreed that the stand-alone option was preferable. The enhanced model would be viable only if the necessary resources and organisational culture were put in place.

34.4 On cost, the Panel agreed that the enhanced option was cheaper. As further work was needed to develop more robust estimates, the Panel did not take a view as to whether the additional cost of the stand-alone option was in line with its potential benefits.

34.5 The Panel was therefore able to agree that both an administratively enhanced Scottish FSA and stand-alone Scottish FSA were viable options and both options could serve Scottish long-term interests.

34.6 The Panel wanted to determine whether it could make a recommendation as to the best option for Scotland's long-term interests. After considering all the issues, the Panel could only reach a majority view in favour of the stand-alone option.

34.7 Panel members' individual preferences between the two options were determined by the importance that they individually placed on specific issues, and on how well each panel member thought the proposed models would work. For example, an enhanced model with sufficient resources for Scotland and a culture of taking the initiative on Scottish issues would rate more highly on flexibility than an enhanced model where resources were tight and FSAS was dissuaded from being proactive. Similarly, a stand-alone model with excellent formal and informal relationships with FSA UK would rate more strongly on incident handling than a stand-alone model with ineffective communications.

34.8 Of the issues where there was significant difference between the two options, the Panel member with experience of consumer representation issues felt that handling of incidents and emergencies, expertise, consistency (while allowing Scotland the flexibility to move ahead when necessary), independence, transparency and influence in Europe were the most important issues for the long-term interests of Scottish consumers. The enhanced model was preferable for each of these issues. She considered that while a stand-alone model might bring in extra capacity and flexibility in nutrition and labelling, the benefits lost would be a high price to pay. She also considered that further efficiency in meat inspection could come at the expense of rigour in food safety and standards.

34.9 The Panel member with wide experience of the meat industry felt that the stand-alone option had better potential for more efficient and effective meat inspection. The Scottish meat brands have an international recognition and reputation for quality and high standards and the industry would not accept any dilution of these. It also provides a very real opportunity for more effective stakeholder engagement in decision making processes

34.10 The Panel agreed that the enhanced administrative option could be achieved more simply than creating a stand-alone option, which would require primary legislation. However, it also provided less certainty as it relied on memoranda of understanding which are not legally binding; the success of the model would rely on all parties adhering to the agreement with Scottish Ministers. Therefore the effectiveness of this option would depend on the actions of three UK Government Departments (UK FSA, DH and DEFRA). The majority of the Panel felt it was not in the best long-term interests of Scotland to rely on UK Government Departments' actions on a devolved issue. They recognised that relationships with UK Departments were also crucial to the success of the stand-alone model, particularly on expertise, handling incidents and emergencies and influence within Europe, but felt there was less risk of inadequate relationships in the stand-alone model.

35. Recommendation

35.1 The Panel, and many stakeholders, felt that the UK FSA functioned well prior to the machinery of government changes. It was regrettable that decisions taken by the UK Government resulted in the need for this review.

35.2 The Panel agreed that both an administratively enhanced Scottish FSA and stand-alone Scottish FSA would be feasible.

35.3 The options the Panel considered were defined by their structure and governance. But the Panel recognised that the organisational, management, cultural, staffing and other resource implications of each option would be just as crucial to its desirability.

35.4 The consumer representative on the Panel felt strongly that the best option was to enhance the status quo, building on the established expertise, practices and reputation of the FSA. She was concerned that the lack of direct access to the greater resources of the FSA could undermine public protection. This would require adequate resourcing of the FSA's Aberdeen office to ensure that it was able to respond efficiently and effectively to specific Scottish issues and lead its policy on nutrition and labelling issues.

35.5 The remaining members of the Panel felt that the stand‑alone option would offer the best outcome for Scotland's long term interests, as the enhanced model did not offer the necessary certainty. The stand-alone model would allow more flexibility to respond quickly to Scottish needs and it would enable the new body to take the most relevant and necessary decisions for Scotland without being subsidiary to UK priorities

Contact

Email: Heather Curran

Back to top