Electoral boundaries - determination process: independent review report

The final report of the Independent Review of the Process for Determining Electoral Boundaries in Scotland, chaired by Andrew Kerr OBE.


Parliamentary Process

At the heart of what I have considered as part of this Review is the method by which changes to electoral boundaries are implemented. Currently, that means the process by which Parliament considers, and approves or rejects, proposed changes, however under a form of automaticity, that approval process would be quite different. Automaticity, or the automatic approval of boundary changes, comes in a range of different forms which can be seen across a number of comparable countries. What these different forms of automaticity have in common is that politicians do not have the final say over where boundaries are drawn, or whether or not to approve proposed changes. I have considered firstly, whether to recommend a form of automaticity be introduced, and if so, what model is the best fit for Scotland and the particular circumstances that apply here.

It is worth noting that this Review considered the approval process for changes to Scottish Parliament electoral boundaries, and local government electoral arrangements (ward boundaries and councillor numbers). Currently, both of these sets of reviews are conducted by Boundaries Scotland and then considered by a Scottish Parliament Committee before being subject to a vote by all members of Parliament.

Internationally, there are many different processes by which electoral boundaries are set and approved. This review has considered comparable countries with electoral systems which allow for electoral boundary reviews to be held in a similar manner to Scotland. While the following countries all implement changes to electoral boundaries through a process of automaticity, there are different approaches to how this is achieved.

Reviews of UK Parliamentary (Westminster) constituencies and Welsh Senedd constituencies are not subject to a vote in Parliament, nor is there an opportunity for elected representatives or Ministers to contribute to the review outside of the public consultation. The boundary changes are implemented through legislation that is not subject to a vote in Parliament. Similar processes take place in Australia and New Zealand – there are differences in who considers boundary proposals at different stages – however both countries implement changes to boundaries without the decision being subject to a vote in Parliament.

In Canada, Parliamentarians have an opportunity to formally table objections to proposed boundary changes if they have concerns about process, however any written objection must be co-signed by a minimum of 10 MPs. The boundary commission consider objections and a final report is written. Parliamentarians still do not vote on the final changes.

In this context, Scotland, therefore, is currently something of an outlier internationally. In the countries considered by this Review, there is a clear pattern where politicians are not responsible for approving changes to electoral boundaries. Fundamentally, this means that there is no conflict, or perceived conflict, of interest whereby elected representatives are able to legislate for changes (or block changes) to their own seats. I believe that implementing a similar process in Scotland would help aid public trust in the boundary-setting process. While I do not believe that partisan ‘gerrymandering’ (changing electoral boundaries for political gain) is currently an issue in Scotland, it is important that the public perception of the process is that it is apolitical and that it is one that is future-proofed against any accusation or perception of politicisation. Politicians voting for or against changes to the boundaries of their own, or their party’s, existing seats could give a perception of politicising an important foundation of our elections, and automaticity would help protect the independence of the boundary-setting process. Across the world, democratic norms have been eroded in recent years, and I believe that future-proofing systems such as this against bad-faith actors is an important step to take.

In the public consultation I held, the first question I asked was whether Scotland should adopt a system of automaticity. Of the responses received, there was not a clear consensus on whether the process should be changed to automaticity or not. There was a range of views put forward on the matter by members of the public and organisations, however the main themes that came through the consultation were ensuring that boundary reviews were, and appeared, politically impartial, and the need to ensure there was sufficient scrutiny throughout the process. On the question of how best politicians should interact with boundary reviews, individual respondents largely thought there should be a formal role for parliamentarians, however most respondents thought their contributions would be most appropriately made as part of the public consultation. A clear thread through the diverse views put forward was that scrutiny of proposed boundary changes was important, whether this scrutiny role rests with Parliament or through improved and enhanced consultation processes.

Taking the views expressed in the public consultation and stakeholder engagement into account, I recommend that the process used to implement reviews of electoral boundaries change to one of automaticity:

1. Scotland should adopt a process of automaticity for reviews of Scottish Parliament constituencies and regions, and for local government ward boundaries and councillor numbers. Boundary reviews should not be subject to a vote in Parliament as they are at present but, following consultation, Boundaries Scotland will be able to make the final decisions on electoral boundaries.

Automaticity would mean that proposals and subsequent decisions on boundary changes would be made by Boundaries Scotland at all stages of the process. I believe that this would offer protection from possible perceptions that the approvals process is in some way political, or subject to pressure from political figures. Automaticity would align Scotland with international best practice, where many comparable countries do not allow politicians to vote on boundary changes. While legislation would continue to be required to implement boundary changes and make them law, this legislative process should be one where there is no discretion as to whether the changes are approved or not.

2. The Scottish Parliament and local authorities should be statutory consultees for the relevant electoral boundary reviews. This should take place as the first round of consultation.

It is my view that while the Scottish Parliament should not be able to approve or reject recommendations made by Boundaries Scotland, it is important for politicians to have an appropriate place to express their views during boundary reviews. There should be sufficient time for a meaningful period of engagement with parliamentarians, such as an 8-week consultation period, however the exact method by which the Parliament gathers views and responds during this period should be up to the Parliament itself to decide. I anticipate that under current practices of scrutiny, a Parliamentary Committee may be the most appropriate forum for gathering and reporting on views of interested MSPs, however it may be that a wider whole Parliament exercise is deemed a more appropriate way of enabling a greater number of parliamentarians to contribute.

This recommendation would bring the way that elected representatives are consulted during reviews of Scottish Parliament constituencies and regions into alignment with how, under the current system, local authorities are consulted during reviews of local government electoral arrangements. Currently, local authorities are consulted at the beginning of reviews of local government electoral arrangements – a system which Boundaries Scotland and COSLA have indicated works well most of the time.

Consulting the Scottish Parliament at the beginning of a review, I believe, strikes a balance by ensuring that politicians with valuable experience and local knowledge of their communities are consulted early and can fully contribute to boundary reviews. However, they would no longer have an effective power of veto over changes to their own seats for Scottish Parliament reviews. Furthermore, removing the ability of MSPs to vote on local government electoral arrangements removes the potential opportunity for councillors or party representatives to lobby Parliamentarians to accept or reject boundary recommendations.

Contact

Email: ElectionsTeam@gov.scot

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