Fujitsu e-Counting Contract: Human Oversight, Audit Trail & Post-Horizon Risk Assessment: FOI release

Information requested

You asked for information in relation to the Scottish Government's contract with Fujitsu Services Limited for the provision of electronic vote counting (eCounting) services for the 2022 Scottish Local Government elections and subsequent by-elections. You asked an overarching question in the background section of your email and then for information under a number of specific categories.

 

Response

I have responded to your questions and requests for information in the order that you set them out.

The question this FOI request asks is simple: in the period since that 2007 failure, and since the Horizon scandal became public, what human oversight requirements has the Scottish Government written into its e-counting contracts — and were those requirements reviewed and strengthened following the Inquiry's findings?

Local Government elections are the legal responsibility of each of Scotland's 32 local authorities' Returning Officers. The Scottish Government, acting on behalf of Returning Officers, has awarded contracts for the electronic vote counting (eCounting) services aspect of Local Government elections since 2007. This ensures that all local authorities use the same electronic counting system design and operating approach.

All eCounting contracts let from the 2012 elections onwards took account of lessons learned from 2007 and have included rigorous testing and independent accreditation requirements to ensure the accuracy, integrity and security of the systems used. It is worth noting that the software and workflow systems used to capture and process votes have been provided by a specialist elections software company (Idox Elections Limited) since 2012, who operate as sub-contractors to the principal contractor. This is relevant to your questions about Fujitsu Services Limited; that company only provided the networks that hosted the Idox specialist software.

Since 2012, the Scottish Government’s contractual requirements for electronic vote counting have included the manual review of any ballot paper which the electronic system is unable to process due to the vote marks being doubtful or potentially being invalid. There is also a requirement for any ballot paper than cannot be scanned into the system to be entered manually into the system. No ballot paper can be rejected by the system and only the relevant Council’s Returning Officer or depute is able to reject a vote.

I have attached a copy of a factsheet dated February 2022, which provides an overview of the system used in 2022, and which I hope contains material of interest to you.

More broadly, the Scottish Government has published a range of information about its contracts with Fujitsu, in response to earlier FOISA requests. It can be found here:

https://www.gov.scot/publications/foi-202400441621/ and here: https://www.gov.scot/publications/foi-202400434290/

Category 1 — Contract Terms: Human Oversight and Audit Trail Requirements

1. 1. The full contract specification for the e-counting agreement with Fujitsu Services Limited signed in or around November 2020, or any subsequent renewal or replacement contract, specifically including:

• the human oversight requirements — at what decision points a named human was contractually required to review and approve automated outputs before they became final;
• the audit trail requirements — what logging of system activity, vote tallying, discrepancy flags, and error events was contractually mandated, and in what format;
• the error-handling and challenge protocols — what process was contractually required when the system generated an unexpected result, a discrepancy, or a rejection.

I enclose a copy of the Specification for the contract with Fujitsu Services Limited in relation to the supply of electronic vote counting (eCounting) services for the Scottish Local Government elections held in May 2022.

2. Any contractual provision requiring Fujitsu to disclose known defects, software errors, or system anomalies to the Scottish Government or to Returning Officers before, during, or after an election count;

The Specification attached details the extensive and rigorous testing process the system was subject to prior to its deployment, as well as the requirements to flag any anomalies during the vote counting process. The testing required was designed to ensure the system has no defects and that it counts votes in accordance with the legislative provisions.

3. Any contractual provision governing remote access by Fujitsu personnel to the e-counting system during a live count — including what access was permitted, what authorisation was required, and how any intervention was to be logged.

The Specification details the secuirty and access control requirements.

The eCounting system was built to the authorised design at sites provided by each of the 32 councils.

Each site operated entirely separately from all other sites and no site was connected to the internet.

That means remote access was not possible. System access was restricted to personnel authorised by the Returning Officers at each of the 32 Counts. Access to the database was restricted and only permitted by special authorisation provided by a support desk and at the request of the Returning Officer. The system was subject to penetration testing and other security testing prior to acceptance.

Category 2 — Post-Horizon Risk Assessment

1. 1. Any risk assessment, internal review, or due diligence exercise conducted by the Scottish Government after the Post Office Horizon IT Inquiry's findings became public, specifically addressing whether Fujitsu's documented governance failures in the Horizon context were relevant to its fitness to hold the e-counting contract;

2. 2. Any correspondence between the Scottish Government and Fujitsu in which the Horizon scandal, the Inquiry's findings, or Fujitsu's accountability record was discussed in the context of the e-counting contract;

3. 3. Any advice received by the Scottish Government — from legal advisers, procurement officers, or any other source — on whether the Horizon findings required any review, renegotiation, or termination of the e-counting contract;

4. 4. Any assessment of whether the human oversight requirements in the e-counting contract were adequate in light of the Inquiry's findings, and whether any changes were made or recommended as a result.

The Scottish Government does not hold any information listed in Category 2.

Category 3 — The 2007 Failure: Lessons Applied

1. 1. Any review or post-incident report produced by or for the Scottish Government following the 2007 discovery that electronic counting machines had rejected tens of thousands of votes without human approval;

The eCounting of votes at the 2007 elections was the subject of an independent review and subsequent recommendations, known as the Gould report. I have enclosed a copy of that report.

Please note that the 2007 election count covered both Scottish Parliament and Local Government elections, which were held concurrently. The Gould report recommended, among other things, that these elections should in future be held on different dates and that has been the case ever since. Only Local Government elections have been electronically counted since 2007.

1. 2. Any contractual or procedural change made after 2007 specifically to ensure that automated rejection or modification of vote tallies could not occur without mandatory human sign-off;

The specifications for the electronic counting of votes for the 2012, 2017, 2022 and 2027 Local Government elections have all included a requirement that all votes which the electronic system is unable to process due to the vote marks being doubtful or potentially invalid are manually reviewed by an adjudicator. Neither the system or an adjudicator can reject a vote. Only the relevant Council’s Returning Officer or depute is able to reject a vote.

1. 3. Any assessment of whether those post-2007 changes were carried forward into the 2020 Fujitsu contract and remained operative in the 2022 elections and beyond.

Every eCounting project has incorporated and built on lessons learned from predecessor projects.

Category 4 — Error Rate Data and Verification

1. 1. Error rate data for each Scottish local government election in which e-counting has been used (2007, 2012, 2017, 2022), including the number and category of votes rejected, queried, or requiring manual review by the system;

Data on the number of votes rejected for electronically counted elections is not held by the Scottish Government. A range of statutory reports which include information on rejected votes and the statutory reasons for rejection are published by each of the 32 local authorities following the elections. These will be available on each of the 32 councils' websites. The Electoral Management Board for Scotland has published some data for 2017 and 2022 centrally, which can be found here:

2017 election results: https://www.emb.scot/downloads/download/103/scottish-localgovernment-election-2017

1. 2022 election results data: https://view.officeapps.live.com/op/view.aspx?src=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.emb.scot%2Fdownloads%2Ffile%2F980%2Flocal-governmentelections-2022-results-updated-with-postals-station-split&wdOrigin=BROWSELINK

1. 2. The verification protocol applied after each count to confirm that the electronic tally matched an independently verifiable audit trail;

It is the responsibility of each of the 32 Returning Officers to ensure that data gathered on the number of votes cast in person and by post matches the data captured by the electronic counting system.

1. 3. Any instance in which a discrepancy between the electronic tally and an independent verification was identified, and how it was resolved.

Once votes are scanned into the system and have been verified by the council as matching the data they hold on votes cast, it is not possible for election results to be generated unless all the data matches throughout the system. This is because the system is designed to track every single vote processed through it and every decision taken on that vote is recorded in audit logs from start to finish.

The system is designed to not allow a count to take place without every vote being accounted for, whether it was accepted or rejected (the latter can only be done by the Returning Officer or their depute).

Category 5 — Current Contract Status

1. 1. Whether the November 2020 five-year contract with Fujitsu has expired, been renewed, or been replaced, and if so on what terms;

The November 2020 contract was extended in accordance with its terms, supported by a Contract Variation Agreement (CVA 002) dated October 2022, which is attached. Under this arrangement, Fujitsu continues to provide electronic vote counting services for by‑elections, with services commissioned through individual Statements of Work.

1. 2. Whether any procurement exercise is underway or planned for future e-counting contracts, and whether Fujitsu's Horizon record is a factor in the evaluation criteria;

A procurement exercise for electronic vote counting services for the 2027 Local Government elections has already been undertaken. In relation to evaluation criteria, all procurement exercises undertaken by the Scottish Government are conducted in accordance with the Public Contracts (Scotland) Regulations 2015 and are designed to ensure fair and open competition.

Following the procurement exercise completed in 2025, a new contract was awarded to CGI to provide electronic vote counting services. This new arrangement will replace the existing Fujitsu contract, with transition of by‑election services to CGI scheduled from January 2027 onwards.

1. 3. The current contractual position on human oversight requirements for any e-counting system to be used in future Scottish elections.

Human oversight remains an integral part of the delivery of electronic vote counting services under current and future contractual arrangements. Electronic counting systems are designed to support, rather than replace, the statutory responsibilities of Returning Officers. The conduct of elections, including verification and declaration of results, remains subject to human decision‑making and oversight in line with electoral law and guidance. Future contractual arrangements, arising from the 2025 procurement exercise, maintain appropriate levels of human oversight, governance and assurance to ensure the integrity and transparency of the count process.

About FOI

The Scottish Government is committed to publishing all information released in response to Freedom of Information requests. View all FOI responses at https://www.gov.scot/foi-responses.

FOI 202600520309 - Information released - Attachments

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