Asylum seekers - extending the right to work: evaluation, analysis, and policy options

Footnotes

1 The poll of 1000 people from across Scotland was conducted by Survation in September 2021 and asked about a range of issues relating to refugee rights. Scottish Refugee Council (2021) New polling shows Scotland welcomes refugees - Scottish Refugee Council

2 It should be noted that many third sector studies have been undertaken or commissioned by organisations campaigning for restrictions to be lifted. In the absence of data from more neutral sources, we refer to the findings of this work, but always acknowledge its provenance.

3 Bloch, A. (2008). Refugees in the UK Labour Market: The Conflict between Economic Integration and Policy-led Labour Market Restriction. Journal of Social Policy, 37(1), 21-36, pp.26 & 30.

4 Parkinson, M. et al (2023), Review of the Migration System. Final Report 2023. Australian Government, Department of Home Affairs.

5 Scottish Government (2018a) New Scots Refugee Integration Strategy 2018 - 2022.

6 Konle-Seidl, R. and Bolits, J. (2016) Labour Market Integration of Refugees: Strategies and good practices, European Parliament: Brussels.

7 It should be noted that many third sector studies have been undertaken or commissioned by organisations campaigning for restrictions to be lifted. In the absence of data from more neutral sources, we refer to the findings of this work, but always acknowledge its provenance.

8 Detailed insight into each of these 8 examples are provided in an annex.

9 Gower, M., McKinney, CJ. and Meade, L. (2022). Asylum seekers: the permission to work policy, House of Commons Library Research Briefing, p. 5

10 Ibid. p, 7-8. The most prominent third sector challenges have come from the Lift the Ban coalition of over 200 advocacy groups, employers, and religious organisations.

11 Migration Advisory Committee (2021) Migration Advisory Committee: annual report, 2021, pp. 28-32

12 Refugee Action (2020) Lift the Ban: Why giving people seeking asylum the right to work is common sense

13 Aleynikova, E. and Moseley, M. (2023) The Economic and Social Impacts of Lifting Work Restrictions on People Seeking Asylum, NIESR Discussion Paper No. 549

14 People with a No Recourse to Public Funds (NRPF) attached to their status as either migrants or asylum seekers are not eligible to claim most benefits, tax credits or housing assistance that are paid by the state. Benefits from which people with NRPF status are excluded Universal Credit; State Pension Credit; Personal Independence Payment; Attendance Allowance; Carer’s Allowance; Disability Living Allowance; Housing Benefit; Health in Pregnancy Grant; Child Benefit; Social Housing & Homelessness Assistance; Council Tax Reduction Schemes They are also excluded from claiming many Social Security Scotland benefits, such as Child or Adult Disability Payments; Carer’s Allowance Supplement; Scottish Child Payment; Funeral Support Payment; Job Start Payment; Child Winter Heating Assistance; Winter Heating Payment; payments made from a Welfare Fund under the Welfare Funds (Scotland) Act 2015. They may claim benefits based on national insurance (e.g. Statutory Sick Pay; Statutory Parental Leave Payments; Job Seeker’s Allowance etc.) once they have built up sufficient contributions.

15 Scottish Government (2018a)., p. 10

16 Scottish Government. (2021). A Scotland for the future: opportunities and challenges of Scotland's changing population

17 The poll of 1000 people from across Scotland was conducted by Survation in September 2021 and asked about a range of issues relating to refugee rights. Scottish Refugee Council (2021) New polling shows Scotland welcomes refugees - Scottish Refugee Council

18 See for example: Expert Advisory Group on Migration and Population (2019) Immigration policy and demographic change in Scotland: learning from Australia, Canada and continental Europe; Expert Advisory Group on Migration and Population (2021) Family migration: understanding the drivers, impacts and support needs of migrant families; Expert Advisory Group on Migration and Population (2022) Place-based policy approaches to population challenges: Lessons for Scotland.

19 Scottish Government (2021) A Scotland for the future: opportunities and challenges of Scotland's changing population; Scottish Government (2022) Rural visa pilot proposal: September 2022; Scottish Government (2023) Building a New Scotland: migration to Scotland after independence.

20 Kyambi, S. and Kay, R. (2023) Attitudes to Immigration: A view from Scotland, Migration Policy Scotland, p. 14. Note this survey asked about attitudes to immigration for work, and not about attitudes to those arriving for reasons of humanitarian protection.

21 Scottish Government (2018a), p. 10.

22 Ibid, p. 10

23 Ager, A. and Strang A. (2004) ‘Indicators of Integration. Final Report’ Home Office Development and Practice Report 28, p. 3.

24 Stella, F. and Kay, R. (2023) Language learning and migrant ‘integration’ in Scotland: exploring infrastructure, provision and experiences. Final Project Report. Glasgow: University of Glasgow.

25 Scottish Government (2018a)., p. 77

26 Home Office (2023) Immigration system statistics data tables Asy_D11: Asylum seekers in receipt of support, by support type, accommodation type and local authority

27 Department for Levelling Up, Housing and Communities (2022) Ukraine Sponsorship Scheme: Visa data by country, upper and lower tier local authority. A further 5,500 have arrived with visas sponsored by individuals located in Scotland.

28 Gower, McKinney and Meade (2022)., p.9

29 Directive 2003/9/EC, January 2003, OJ 2003 L 31/18, Article 11, cited in Gower, McKinney and Meade (2022)., p. 9

30 Home Office, IA HO0017 Impact assessment: Permission to work for asylum seekers and failed asylum seekers, 26 July 2010, cited in Gower, McKinney and Meade (2022)., p. 11

31 Ibid.

32 Gower, McKinney and Meade (2022)., p. 7-8.

33 HCWS452, 8 December 2021, cited in Gower, McKinney and Meade (2022)., p.12

34 Gower, McKinney and Meade (2022)., p. 7-8

35 Migration Advisory Committee (2021), p. 32

36 Public Accounts Committee (2023) The Asylum Transformation Programme. Seventy-Sixth Report of Session 2022–23 HC 1334 House of Commons

37 Home Office Immigration statistics. Asylum applications awaiting a decisions (Asy_D03), all points are 31 December except for 2023 which is 30 June

38 Migration Advisory Committee (2021), p. 32

39 Garelli, G. and Tazzioli, M. (2021). Migration and ‘Pull Factor’ Traps. Migration Studies, 9(3), pp. 383-399; Mezzadra, S. (2004). The Right to Escape. Ephemera, 4 (3), pp. 267-275.

40 Tjaden, J. and Heidland T. (2021). Does Welcoming Refugees Attract More Migrants? The Myth of the ‘Merkel’ Effect. Kiel Working Paper 2194. Kiel Institute for the World Economy.

41 Mayblin, L., and James, P. (2016). Is access to the labour market a pull factor for asylum seekers, Policy Briefing: 03/16.2, University of Warwick, p.2

42 In a survey of 246 people carried out by Lift the Ban coalition members, 72% said that they had not known prior to arriving in the UK that people seeking asylum are not allowed to work. Only 16% had been aware of this before their arrival. Refugee Action (2020)., p. 8.

43 Mayblin and James, (2016); Robinson, V., and Segrott, J. (2002). Understanding the Decision-Making of Asylum Seekers, Home Office Research Study 243; Crawley, H. (2010). Chance or Choice? Understanding Why Asylum Seekers Come to the UK, British Refugee Council.

44 Mayblin and James, (2016). p. 4

45 Ibid, p. 3

46 Thielemann, E.R. (2004) Asylum Destination Choice What Makes Some West European Countries

More Attractive Than Others? European Union Politics, 5(2), pp.155-180.

47 Sturge, G. (2023). Asylum statistics, House of Commons Library Research Briefing, p. 11. Figures are for main applicants only.

48 European Council. (2023). Asylum applications in the EU - Consilium (europa.eu)

49 Mayblin and James. (2016)., p. 4.

50 Migration Advisory Committee. (2021)., p. 32

51 Kyambi and Kay. (2023)., p. 14. The survey found less than 15% of people in Scotland agreed that immigrants take jobs away from local workers.

52 Glimer (2020) Scotland Policy Brief 3: Improving labour market access for refugees in Scotland; OECD/UNHCR (2018) Engaging with employers in the hiring of refugees.

53 European Parliament (2015), Third Country Migration and European Labour Markets. Integrating Foreigners. European Parliament Briefing.

54 Refugee Action. (2020)., p.15

55 Ibid p.28

56 Degler, E. and Liebig, T. (2017). Finding their Way, Labour Market Integration of Refugees in Germany. OECD.

57 PRESS RELEASE: Major Dutch companies double down on support for refugees, pledging to help nearly 22,000 refugees enter the job market - The Tent Partnership for Refugees (last accessed October 2023).

58 See for example Glimer. (2020); Refugee Action. (2020)., pp. 42-44

59 Laila, cited in Refugee Action. (2020)., p. 34

60 Farhat, cited in Refugee Action. (2020)., p. 13.

61 European Commission. (2015). The 2015 Ageing Report. Economic and Budgetary Projections for the 28 EU Member States (2023 – 2060). European Commission: Brussels.

62 Kiss, M. (2022). Demographic Outlook for the European Union 2022. European Parliamentary Research Service (EPRS).

63 In July 2023, 87,000 asylum applications were received compared to a total population of 461 million across the EU+ (the 27 European Union Member States plus Norway and Switzerland). This converts to 190 applications per million population, or about 1 application for every 5,300 persons. European Union Agency for Asylum. (2023). Latest Asylum Trends | European Union Agency for Asylum (europa.eu).

64 European Commission. (2023). Statistics on Migration to Europe. European Commission.

65 Office for National Statistics (2023) Projected Population of Scotland (2020-based)

66 Expert Advisory Group on Migration and Population. (2022).

67 For example, in June 2023, Germany passed radical new laws to attract skilled third country nationals in an attempt to stave off labour shortages which have been described as the biggest threat facing the German economy. After years of low employment, German business leaders are now sounding the alarm about the lack of workers – a problem exacerbated by an ageing population. These issues of low unemployment, labour shortages and an ageing population are not unique to Germany. See Immigration from third countries made easier (anerkennung-in-deutschland.de).

68 Statistics Canada. (2023). Canada’s Population Estimates: Record-high population growth in 2022.

69 European Commission. (2015). Portugal: Brazilians to stop population shrinkage and contribute to labour market; Wise, P. (2022). Emigration and low growth fuel Portugal’s demographic crisis. Financial Times, 20 January.

70 Portuguese Refugee Council. (2023). Country Report: Access to the labour market. Portugal. Asylum Information Database, European Council on Refugees and Exiles.

71 These have now been scrapped. SHEV was highly restrictive and poorly conceived. See the Australian case study in the Appendix for more details.

72 With hindsight, these reforms were found to have gone too far, opening up the labour market to the extent that many asylum seekers were left vulnerable to exploitation. However, the key driver for these changes at the time remained the need to fill labour shortages through migration, including the humanitarian protection route. See the Swedish case study in the Appendix for more details.

73Migration Advisory Committee. (2021)., p. 31; see also: Ruiz, I., and Vargas-Silva, C. (2021). What Works for Improving Refugee Outcomes in High-Income Countries? Policy Insights for the UK. COMPAS, University of Oxford; Marbach M, Hainmueller J, Hangartner D. (2018) The long-term impact of employment bans on the economic integration of refugees. Science Advances;4(9): eaap9519. Marbach et al found that employment rates were around 20 percentage points lower for those who had had to wait an additional seven months to access the labour market and that this employment gap persisted for around 10 years.

74 Home Office Immigration Statistics, year ending June 2023, table Asy_D04. Most recent year for which data is available is 2021. Grant rate does not include withdrawn applications.

75 Ager and Strang. (2004); Bloch. (2008)

76 Refugee Action. (2020)., p. 20

77 The New Scots Refugee Integration Strategy 2018 - 2022 (p. 10.) defines integration as ‘a long-term, two-way process, involving positive change in both individuals and host communities, which leads to cohesive, diverse communities’

78 Fasani, F., Frattini, T., and Minale, L. (2020). Lift the Ban? Initial Employment Restrictions and Refugee Labour Market Outcomes, CEPR Discussion Papers 14765.

79 Brücker, H. Jaschke, P. and Y. Kosyakova. (2019). Integrating Refugees and Asylum seekers into the German Economy and Society: Empirical Evidence and Policy Objectives. Migration Policy Institute: Brussels.

80 Ibid.

81 Brücker, H., Kosyakova, Y. and Schuß, E. (2020a). “Fünf Jahre seit der Fluchtmigration 2015: Integration in Arbeitsmarkt und Bildungssystem macht weitere Fortschritte.” IAB-Kurzbericht. No. 4.

82 Rutter, J., and Carter, R. (2018). National Conversation on Immigration, Final Report. p. 98.

83 For example, see Hvidtfeldt, C., Petersen, J. H. and Norredam, M. (2019). Prolonged Periods of Waiting for an Asylum Decision and the Risk of Psychiatric Diagnoses: A 22-Year Longitudinal Cohort Study from Denmark. International Journal of Epidemiology, 49(2), pp. 400-409.

84 Adult dependants have no right to work whilst the main applicants’ asylum claim is unresolved and are excluded from the opportunity to apply for permission to seek work after 12 months. This has gendered implications since most adult dependants are women. Refugee Action. (2020)., p. 43.

85 Hocking, D., Kennedy, G., and Sundram, S. (2015). Mental Disorders in Asylum Seekers: The Role of the Refugee Determination Process and Employment. The Journal of Nervous and Mental Disease, 203(1), pp. 28-32.

86 Fasani, F., Frattini, T. and Minale, L. (2020).

87 Mariyan, cited in Refugee Action. (2020)., p. 43

88 Refugee Action. (2020)., p.4.

89 Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada. (2023). Recent trends - Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada.

90De Jong, S. (2019). A window of Opportunity? Refugee staff’s employment in migrant

support and advocacy organizations. Identities, 26(3)., pp. 321-338.

91 Hooper, K., Desiderio, M. V. and Salant, B. (2017). Improving the Labour Market Integration of Migrants and Refugees: Empowering Cities through Better Use of EU Instruments Migration Policy Institute Europe: Brussels.

92 See related case studies in the Appendix.

93 Aleynikova, E. and Mosley, M. (2023) The Economic and Social Impacts of Lifting Work Restrictions on People Seeking Asylum. NIESR Discussion Paper No. 549.

94 Holtom, D. and Iqbal, H. (2020). Refugee Employment and skills support study. GSR report number 20/2020. Cardiff: Welsh Government.

95 Home Office (2023) Asylum and Resettlement - Asylum applications awaiting a decision; Home Office (2023) Asylum and Protection - Asylum seekers in receipt of support by Local Authority.

96 National Institute for Economic and Social Research, National Institute Global Econometric Model

97 Home Office (2023) Asylum and Resettlement - Asylum seekers in receipt of support.

98 GMCA (2023) ‘Cost Benefit Analysis’.

99 Holtom, D. and Iqbal, H. (2020) Refugee Employment and skills support study. GSR report number 20/2020. Cardiff: Welsh Government.

100 Home Office (2023) Asylum and Protection - Asylum seekers in receipt of support by Local Authority.

101 National Audit Office (2020) Home Office: Asylum accommodation and support. London: Dandy Booksellers Ltd.

102 DWP (2010) The department for work and pensions social cost-benefit analysis framework.

Working Paper 86.

103 Home Office (2021) Asylum Policy: Statement made on 8 December 2021, UK Parliament Written questions, answers and statements.

104 Brell, C., Dustmann, C., & Preston, I. (2020). The Labor Market Integration of Refugee Migrants in High-Income Countries. The Journal of Economic Perspectives, 34(1), 94–121.

105 Home Office (2023) Asylum and Resettlement - Asylum applications awaiting a decision. Published: 25 May 2023. Home Office (2023) Asylum and Protection - Asylum seekers in receipt of support by Local Authority.

106 Gower, McKinney and Meade. (2022)., p. 7

107 Refugee Action. (2020)., p. 6, footnote 6.

108 Refugee Action. (2020). p. 14.

109 Gower, McKinney and Meade. (2022)., p. 8

110 Of the eight countries examined as part of this study, only one has attempted this approach.

111 As part of the 2008 labour reforms, Sweden allowed refused asylum seekers to switch track to being a labour migrant if they could demonstrate that they had the skills and experience needed in Sweden. The main goal was to increase labour migration from third countries to occupational sectors experiencing labour shortages. However, these reforms went too far, putting many workers at risk of exploitation in low-skilled sectors. This prompted OECD to express concern and to call for closer monitoring of collective agreements, amongst other things.

112 Right to Remain (2023) Asylum Support: financial support and Accommodation. Right To Remain Toolkit, July 2023.

113 Law Centre NI (2022) Work for asylum seekers Briefing 1: applying for permission to work

114 HCWS452, 8 December 2021, cited in Gower, McKinney and Meade (2022)., p. 16.

115 Phillimore, J., Jamal, Z., Noubani, A., Hourani, J. and Baillot, H. (2022) Forced migration and sexual and gender-based violence: findings from the SEREDA project in Scotland. Birmingham: University of Birmingham.

116 Last-resort financial assistance is for those who are in a precarious financial situation. The purpose of this is to provide financial support for the time it takes to integrate into the labour market and participate actively in society.

117 Gouvernement du Qubec. (2023). Asylum seekers.

118 Correct as of January 2023. Hoffmeyer-Zlotnik, P., and Stiller, M. (2023a). Forms and levels of material reception conditions . Asylum Information Database, European Council on Refugees and Exiles.

119 Refugee Action. (2020)., p. 19

120 Refugee Action. (2020)., p. 25.

121 Hurstfield, J., Pearson, R., Hooker, H., Ritchie, H. and Sinclair, A. (2004). Employing Refugees: Some Organisations’ Experiences, Brighton: Institute for Employment Studies.

122 Sehic, A. and Vicol, D. (2023). Systemic Drivers of Migrant Worker Exploitation in the UK. Work Rights Centre.

123 See the related country case studies in the appendix.

124 Non-refoulement is a fundamental principle of international law that forbids a country receiving asylum seekers from returning them to a country in which they would be in probable danger of persecution.

125 Berg, L., Dehm, S. and Vogl, A. (2022). Refugees and Asylum Seekers as Workers: Radical Temporariness and Labour Exploitation in Australia. UNSW Law Journal, 45(1), p. 39.

126 Refugee Council of Australia. (2022). Submission to the ‘Migration System for Australia’s Future’ Discussion Paper.

127 Parkinson, M. et al. (2023). Review of the Migration System. Final Report 2023. Australian Government, Department of Home Affairs. p. 81; Reilly identifies similar drivers of vulnerability in specific relation to SHEV visa holders. Reilly, A. (2018). The Vulnerability of Safe Haven Enterprise Visa Holders: Balancing Work, Protection and Future Prospects, University of New South Wales Law Journal 871, 41(3).

128 Berg, Dehm and Vogl, (2022).

129Ibid. p. 2.

130 Many of these people have been in the country for over a decade, have worked, paid taxes, and integrated into their community but face limited rights to work, study or get a mortgage.

131 Kyambi. S. (2020). Ready Steady Go? Preparedness for the UK’s New Immigration System. Migration Policy Scotland, p. 11-12

132 Mayblin and James, (2016)., p.4.

133 Bloch (2008)., p. 4

134 Scottish Government (2018a)., p. 33

135 Glimer (2020).

136 Broadhead, J. (2023). Building an Infrastructure for Community Led Welcome in the UK: Learning from the Mobilisation of the Homes for Ukraine Scheme. Inclusive Cities Policy Brief. COMPAS, University of Oxford.

137 Karyotis, G., Mulvey, G. and Skleparis, D. (2021). Young Syrian refugees in the UK: a Two-Tier System of International Protection? Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies, 47(3), pp. 481-500.

138 Bloch (2008)., p. 6.

139 ibid, p. 6; Fernández-Reino, M. and Rienzo, C. (2022). Migrants in the UK Labour Market: An Overview, The Migration Observatory, University of Oxford, p. 14; Ruiz, I. and Vargas-Silva, C. (2018) Differences in Labour Market Outcomes Between Natives, Refugees and Other Migrants in the UK. Journal of Economic Geography, 18(4), pp. 855–885.

140 Office for National Statistics. (2021). Ethnicity pay gaps: 2019; The Scottish Parliament. (2020). Race Equality, Employment and Skills: Making Progress? Equalities and Human Rights Committee. SP Paper 584, 3^rd report (Session 5).

141 Scottish Government (2018a)., p. 17.

142 Refugee Action. (2020)., p.7; Cheung S., and J. Phillimore, J. (2016). Gender and Refugee Integration: A Quantitative Analysis of Integration and Social Policy Outcomes. Journal of Social Policy, 46(2), pp. 211-230.

143 Vluchtelingenwerk Vlaanderen (2023a). Access to the labour market Asylum Information Database. European Council on Refugees and Exiles.

144 For example, the UK Supreme Court ruled against the Government in June 2023, stating that Rwanda could not be treated as a safe third country as asylum seekers may be sent to their home country.

145 Migrant Integration Policy Index. (2020). Policy Indicators: Key Findings.

146 The ‘criminalisation’ of the people smuggler and the policy of offshore processing in Australia did not work in ‘stopping the boats.’ Any eventual slowing of the boats was down to the country’s pushback of boats at sea, which is illegal under international law. Notwithstanding the harm caused to those asylum seekers - for example, the detention centre on Manus Island was ultimately ruled illegal by the supreme court, forced to shut, and Australia had to pay more than $70 million in compensation to more than 1,000 people it had illegally detained on the island - Australia has also spent over $9.5 billion of taxpayers’ money over the past decade in implementing this policy of offshoring. Reports of abuse, torture and neglect on Nauru continue and the policy has done nothing to stop people from seeking the services of people smugglers in order to find a place of safety. The UK’s ‘stop the boats’ policy shows a failure to learn from Australia’s mistakes.

147 Bloch (2008)., p. 5 &9; Glimer (2020)., p. 1

148 Glimer (2020)., p. 2-3.

149 Scottish Government (2018a), p. 24.

150 See Broadhead (2023) for a discussion of experiences of the Homes for Ukraine scheme in this regard.

151 Migration Advisory Committee (2021)., p 30; Bloch (2008)., p. 5-6

152 Glimer. (2020)., recommendation 3, p. 4

153 Glimer. (2020)., p. 3

154 Broadhead (2023).

155 See for example Skills Development Scotland - Become an Apprentice

156 See Skills Development Scotland (2021). Apprenticeship Equality Action Plan. Final Report 2015-2021.

157 See Scottish Government. (2018b). Fair Start Scotland Launch

158 Glimer (2020)., p. 3.

159 Bloch (2008)., pp. 29-33

160 Bloch (2008)., p. 30

161 Ecctis (an abbreviation for Educational Counselling and Credit Transfer Information Services) is a UK regulated body which provides information, advice and opinion on academic, vocational and professional qualifications and skills from all over the world. It operates recognition services for the UK government and can provide support and advice to individuals and organisations.

162 Asylum Information Database (2022) Access to Socio-Economic Rights for Beneficiaries of Temporary Protection. European Council on Refugees and Exiles, p. 24

163 Government of Portugal decree

164 ‘Good prospect to remain’ is based on nationality and related recognition rates. As of 2021, these countries were Eritrea, Syria and Somalia. Afghanistan was added in 2022.

165 Konle-Seidl and Bolits. (2016).

166 Migration Advisory Committee (2021)., p. 32; Karyotis, Mulvey and Skleparis. (2021)., p. 13

167 Stella and Kay (2023)., pp. 21-2

168 Stella and Kay (2023)., pp.36-8

169 Stella and Kay (2023)., pp. 46-7

170 Degler and Liebig (2017).

171 Brücker, Jaschke, and Kosyakova (2019).

172 Konle-Seidl and Bolits (2016).

173 Government of Canada (2023) Tackling the labour shortage by helping more skilled refugees and other displaced people build their careers in Canada.

174 Glimer (2020)., p. 1

175 Bloch (2008)., pp.26 & 30.

176 Parkinson, M. et al (2023).

177 Scottish Government (2018a)

178 Konle-Seidl, R. and Bolits, J. (2016).

179 Refugee Action (2020); Newman, A. et al. (2018). A Guide for Employers. Supporting access to employment for people from a refugee or asylum seeking background. Deakin, Monash and Australian National Universities.

180 Refugee Action (2020).

181 In December 2022, there were 19,693 people with temporary refugee status – 5,389 on TPVs and 14,294 on SHEVs, according to the Refugee Councilof Australia (2023), Refugee Council welcomes plan to end cruel temporary protection policy. Taken together with all those on other temporary visas such as New Zealand citizens, students, working holiday makers and temporary skilled migrants, it meant that on December 31^st 2022, there were a total of 1.8 million temporary migrants in Australia with work rights (Parkinson, M. et al., 2023), See also: Australian Government.(2023). Review of the Migration System. Department of Home Affairs, p. 42.

182 Refugee Council of Australia. (2022). Submission to the ‘Migration System for Australia’s Future’ Discussion Paper.

183 Sometimes referred to as the ‘legacy caseload.’ This refers to a group of about 30,500 asylum seekers who arrived by boat before January 2014 and who experienced lengthy delays in the processing of their asylum claims. The Rudd government abolished temporary protection visas in 2008 but they were reintroduced y the Coalition in 2014 as one plan of Operation Sovereign Borders, which was designed to deter asylum seekers arriving by boat.

184 Asylum Insight Facts and Analysis (2021). The Legacy Caseload — Asylum Insight; Krock, M. and K. Bones. (2015). Australian Exceptionalism: Temporary Protection and the Rights of Refugees. (last accessed October 2023). Melbourne Journal of International Law, 16, pp.1-28.

185 Explanatory Statement, Migration Amendment (Temporary Protection Visas) Regulation 2013 (Cth), 1; Explanatory Memorandum, Migration and Maritime Powers Legislation Amendment (Resolving the Asylum Legacy Caseload) Bill 2014 (Cth), 6.

186 Berg, Dehm and Vogl. (2022).

187 Refugee Council of Australia (2022).

188 Parkinson, M. et al (2023), p. 81; Reilly, A. (2018) identifies similar drivers of vulnerability in specific relation to SHEV visa holders.

189 See Berg, L. et al. (2022), p. 39

190 For example, see Howe, J. et al. (2019). Towards a Durable Future: Tackling Labour Challenges in the Australian Horticulture Industry. University of Adelaide. This report by labour experts found that the horticulture industry is structurally reliant on undocumented workers and recommended that the Department resolve their status.

191 Berg, L. et al. (2022).

192 Settlement Services International. (2016). Working it out. Occasional Paper 1 . SSI: Ashfield NSW.

193 Robertson, S. and A. Runganaikaloo. (2014). Lives in Limbo: Migration Experiences in Australia’s education-migration nexus. Ethnicities. 14(2), p. 208-226.

194 Centrelink delivers income support and other payments to Australians. It is part of Services Australia - an Australian Government department delivering payments and services on behalf of a number of government programs including Medicare and Child Support.

195 Refugee Council. (2022). Thousands of people seeking asylum living in poverty. Refugee Council, Australia.

196 P Australian Government. (2018). Status Resolution Support Services (SRSS) Programme. Operational Procedures Manual. Department for Home Affairs. p. 186.

197 Asylum Seeker Resource Centre. (2023). Policy Through Poverty: The impact of excluding people seeking asylum from mainstream social support. ASRC: Victoria.

198 $42 is approximately £21 if using an exchange rate correct as of September 2023. Asylum seekers in the UK are entitled to £47.39 (approx. $90 Australian dollars) and housing if they need.

199 Refugee Council. (2022). Thousands of people seeking asylum living in poverty. Refugee Council, Australia.

200 This is the time a person spends in Australia as a resident.

201 Parkinson, M. et al (2023), p. 151.

202 Ibid p. 152

203 Ibid.

204 The Guardian. (2023). In Australia’s severe rental crisis, asylum seekers are increasingly desperate for a place to live.

205 United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees and International Labour Office, ‘Labour Mobility for Refugees: Workshop in Geneva, 11–12 September 2012 – Summary Conclusions’ (Report, October 2012)

206 Many bridging visas provide limited work and study rights in Australia.

207 Reilly (2018).

208 Kenny, M. et al,. Submission 55: Submission to the Joint Standing Committee On Migration. Inquiry into Migration in Regional Australia.

209 Parkinson, M. et al (2023)., p. 6.

210 Leay, C., Lumbus, A., and Hartley, L. (2016). People Seeking Asylum in Australia and Their Access to Employment: Just What Do We Know?. Cosmopolitan Civil Societies Journal 8(2), pp. 63-83.

211 Scott Morrison, ‘Reintroducing TPVs to Resolve Labor’s Asylum Legacy Caseload, Cambodia’

Transcript of Press Conference, Canberra, 25 September 2014) 5, cited in Reilly (2018).

212 Reilly (2018).

213 Parkinson et al. (2023)., p. 98.

214 Ibid. P. 99

215 Carens, J. (2013). The Ethics of Migration, Oxford University Press: Oxford.

216 Parkinson et al. (2023)., p. 2.

217 Department of Home Affairs (2022). Onshore Processing Statistics, October 2022.

218 Government of Canada (2023). News release: Canada doubles resettlement spaces for human rights defenders.

219 Canadian Citizenship and Immigration Resource Centre (2021). Refugee Protection. CCIRC: Montreal.

220 The Government of Canada facilitates the travel of GARs to Canada, grants them permanent residency upon arrival, and covers the costs of their resettlement for one year. GARs are entitled to services such as orientation sessions and life skills training through the Resettlement Assistance Programme. After their first year in Canada, all resettled refugees are eligible for means-tested government social programs. The private sponsorship of refugees (PSRs) are sponsored by groups of private individuals in Canada. PSR Holders (SAHs) are organizations that have a signed agreement with the Canadian government to sponsor a refugee or refugees, or to assist other sponsoring ‘constituent groups’ with their applications. Faith-based organizations play an outsized role in private sponsorship, accounting for 75 per cent of SAHs. Refugees can also be sponsored by ‘Groups of Five’, whereby five or more Canadian citizens and/or permanent residents, who demonstrate their financial means and sponsorship ability, enter into an agreement to support a refugee or refugees. Private sponsors provide settlement assistance to the refugees under their care for one year.

221 Failed claimants receive a conditional removal order and must leave Canada within 30 days of their decision. However, rejected claimants may seek a stay of removal and apply for leave for judicial review; apply for a temporary resident permit; apply for a pre-removal risk assessment; apply for permanent residency on humanitarian and compassionate grounds; appeal their decision to the Refugee Appeal Division (RAD); or seek judicial review through the Federal Court.

222 Statistics Canada (2023). Canada’s Population Estimates: Record-high population growth in 2022.

223 Government of Canada. (2022). Temporary public policy to exempt refugee claimants, in Canada, from certain requirements for open work permit issuance.

224 Government of Canada. (2023). Claim refugee status from inside Canada: Work and study permits

225 Government of Canada. (2022). CIMM – Federal Support for Asylum Seekers.

226 Government of Quebec. (2023). Asylum seekers.

227 Government of Canada. (2023). How long will it take for me to get the work permit under the accelerated process for asylum claimants?

228 Government of Canada. (2023). Asylum claims by year – 2023.

229 Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada. (2023). Recent trends.

230 CBC News. (2023). Quebec's social services under pressure from influx of asylum seekers: advocates.

231 CBC News. (2023). Asylum seekers left sleeping on Toronto streets amid funding stalemate between city, feds.

232 Reuters News. (2023). Canada shut its land border to asylum seekers. More refugees came anyway.

233De Jong. (2019).

234 Hoope, K., Desiderio, M. V. and Salant, B. (2017). Improving the Labour Market Integration of Migrants and Refugees: Empowering Cities through Better Use of EU Instruments (migrationpolicy.org). Migration Policy Institute Europe: Brussels.

235 Picot, G., Zhang, Y. and Hou, F. (2019). Labour market outcomes among refugees to Canada. IDEAS Working Paper Series from RePEc. Statistics Canada: Ottowa.

236 Wilkinson, L. and Garcea, J. (2017). The economic integration of refugees in Canada: a mixed record? Migration Policy Institute: Washington, DC.

237 Krahn, H., Derwing, T., Mulder, M. and Wilkison, L. (2000). Educated and underemployed: Refugee integration into the Canadian labour market. Journal of International Migration and Integration/ Revue de l’integration et de la migration internationale, 1:1, p. 59 -84

238 Bauder, H. (2003). ‘Brain abuse,’ or the devaluation of immigrant labour in Canada. Antipode, 35:4, p. 699–717; Creese, G. and Wiebe, B. (2012). ‘Survival employment’: Gender and deskilling among African immigrants in Canada. International Migration, 50:5, p. 56–76.

239 Fuller, S., and Martin, T. F. (2012). Predicting immigrant employment sequences in the first years of settlement. The International Migration Review, 46:1, p. 138–190.

240 Warman, C. et al. (2015). The portability of new immigrants’ human capital: Language, education, and occupational skills. Canadian Public Policy. Analyse de Politiques, 41(Supplement 1), S64–S79.

241 Dyson, D., Roos-Walker, E., and Hannan, C. A. (2019). A systems approach to immigrant families and the labour market. H. Bauder (Ed.), Putting family first: Migration and integration in Canada UBC Press, p. 92.

242 Cornelissen, L., and Turcotte, M. (2020). Persistent overqualification among immigrants and non-immigrants.

243 Environics Institute. (2022). Canadian public opinion about immigration and refugees.

244 Reese, L. A., and Ye, M. (2011). Policy versus Place Luck: Achieving Local Economic Prosperity. Economic Development Quarterly, 25(3), pp. 221–236.

245 Huddleston, T., Bilgili, O. and Vankova, Z. (2015). Migrant Integration Policy Index 2015. Barcelona/ Brussels: CIDOB and MPG; Wolffhardt, A., Conte, C., and Huddleston, T. (2019). The European benchmark for refugee integration: A comparative analysis of the national integration evaluation mechanism in 14 EU countries. Migration Policy Group: Brussels.

246 Barthoma, S. et al. (2020). Reception Policies, Practices and Responses. Sweden Country Report. RESPOND Working Paper, Uppsala University.

247 Qvist, M. (2012). Styrning av lokala integrationsprogram: Institutioner, nätverk och professionella normer inom det svenska flyktingmottagandet. Linköping Studies in Arts and Science, No. 562. Linköping: Department of Social and Welfare Studies, Linköping University.

248 OECD (2019). International Migration Outlook 2019. OECD Publishing: Paris.

249 Luik, M. A., Emilsson, H. and Bevelander, P. (2018), The Male Immigrant–Native Employment Gap in Sweden: Migrant Admission Categories and Human Capital. Journal of Population Research. 35(4), pp. 363–398.

250 This followed the negative conclusions of the 2007 OECD-Lamaitre report and aimed to speed up migrant integration through employment-orientated measures. It was considered at the time to be the most significant change to Swedish integration policy in decades by the OECD, giving integration a strong labour-market orientation, with gainful employment seen as a key indicator of successful integration.

251 Bevelander, P. and N. Irastorza. (2014). Catching Up: The Labor Market Integration of New Immigrants in Sweden. Washington, DC and Geneva: Migration Policy Institute and International Labour Office.

252 Righard, E., Emilsson, H. and T. G. Jensen. (2020). Integration into the Labour Market and Skills Training in Sweden. Malmo University: Malmo.

253 Migrant Integration Policy Index. (2020). Key findings, Sweden.

254 AT-UND stands for exception from the requirement for a work permit.

255 Informationsvergie. (2023). Working during the asylum application period. Information correct as at September 2023.

256 This is an asylum seeker card which is issued by the Migration Agency’s Reception Unit, and which proves that the carrier is an asylum seeker who is allowed to remain in Sweden while they wait a decision on their application.

257 Migrationsverket (The Swedish Migration Agency). (2023). Statistics on asylum applications.

258 Some associations, organisations and municipalities have special activities only for asylum seekers. Participation in these is voluntary. These are known as early support efforts for asylum seekers. The activities are intended for people waiting for an asylum decision as well as for people who have been granted a residence permit but are still living in an accommodation centre. Activities include learning Swedish, getting information about Swedish society and about how the Swedish labour market works, and learning about looking after one’s own and one’s family’s health. Participation is free of charge and in some cases, the Migration Agency can pay a travel allowance to facilitate attendance at these activities. Informationsvergie. (2023). Activities during the asylum application period.

259 The European Anti-Poverty Network (2019), Poverty Report Sweden 2019. EAPN: Sweden.

260 OECD. (2011). Recruiting Immigrant Workers: Sweden 2011. OECD Publishing.

261 Emilsson, H. (2016). Recruitment to Occupations with a Surplus of Workers: The Unexpected Outcomes of Swedish Demand-Driven Labour Migration Policy. International Migration. 54(2), p. 5-7

Migration 54(2), 5–17, doi: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/imig.12222

262 Frodin, O. and Kjellberg, A. (2018). Migration from Third Countries to Swedish Low-wage Jobs. Nordic Journal of Working Life Studies 8:1, p. 65-85.

263 Ibid.

264 OECD (2011).

265 Åberg, R. (2012). Svensk Arbetsmarknad mot Polarisering efter Millenieskiftet. Arbetsmarknad & Arbetsliv, 21(4), pp. 8–25.

266 OECD. (2016). Working Together: Skills and Labour Market Integration of Immigrants and their Children in Sweden. OECD Publishing: Paris.

267 Some groups of asylum seekers and refugees, such as those from Syria, are likely to be an exception to this.

268 Barthoma, S. et al. (2020). Reception Policies, Practices and Responses. Sweden Country Report. RESPOND Working Paper, Uppsala University.

269 In 2014, Sweden had an unemployment rate of 19% among low-skilled workers, significantly higher than the OECD average for low-skilled employment levels.

270 Pelling, A. (2020). Opening Doors to Labour Migration: Lessons from Sweden. Foundation for European Progressive Studies: Brussels.

271 For example, see Swedish National Audit Office. (2016). Summary: An effective labour immigration system? Swedish National Audit Office.

272 Swedish National Audit Office. (2022). Changing Tracks in the Migration Process. Swedish National Audit Office.

273 Employment conditions in Sweden must correspond to the conditions set in collective bargaining agreements in the relevant sector of the economy. This includes the level of pay, working conditions and the provision of insurance.

274 Swedish National Audit Office (2016).

275 One study of restaurant and cleaning workers in Stockholm found that every second worker was recruited to a company without a collective agreement. See Frodin and Kjellberg (2018).

276 See Pelling (2020)., p. 13 for a full discussion of this problem.

277 OECD. (2019). Finding their way: The integration of refugees in Portugal.

278 Ibid.

279 European Commission. (2021). Portugal: The commitment to hosting refugees and migrants continues; World Bank. (2022). Refugee population by country or territory of asylum - Portugal.

280 Migrant Integration Policy Index. (2020). Key Findings, Portugal.

281 European Commission (2015). Wise (2022).

282 Migrant Integration Policy Index (2020).

283 If an asylum seeker’s application met the admissibility criteria (first stage of the asylum decision) and the claim was not considered unfounded, they are admitted to the regular procedure and they would be issued a temporary residency permit within 30 days. This is valid for 6 months (renewable for equal periods of time). If they have been admitted to the regular procedure, SEF will further assess their application and decide whether the applicant should be recognised as a refugee or not. This stage of the procedure can last up to 6 months and can be extended to 9 months in cases of particular complexity. In practice, this stage could extend beyond 9 months.

284 Portuguese Refugee Council (2023).

285 For details of the decree, please see: diariodarepublica.pt/dr/en/detail/decree-law/24-b-2022-180398387.

286 Asylum Information Database (2022).

287 Portuguese Refugee Council (2023).

288 Stiller, M., and Hoffmeyer-Zlotnik, P. (2022). Country Report: Germany. European Council on Refugees and Exiles.

289 For more on this see: Hoffmeyer-Zlotnik, P., and Stiller, M. (2023b). Overview of the Main Changes Since the Previous Report Update.

290 Hoffmeyer-Zlotnik, P., and Stiller, M. (2023c). Access to the Labour Market. Germany Asylum Information Database, European Council on Refugees and Exiles; Hoffmeyer-Zlotnik, P., and Stiller, M. (2023d). Freedom of Movement. Germany. Asylum Information Database, European Council on Refugees and Exiles.

291 Ibid.

292 Hoffmeyer-Zlotnik, P., and Stiller, M. (2023a).

293 Section 2(1) Asylum Seekers’ Benefit Act.

294 Hoffmeyer-Zlotnik, P., and Stiller, M. (2023e). Reduction or withdrawal of reception conditions. Germany. Asylum Information Database, European Council on Refugees and Exiles.

295 Hoffmeyer-Zlotnik, P., and Stiller, M. (2023f). Conditions in Reception Facilities. Germany. Asylum Information Database, European Council on Refugees and Exiles.

296 Hoffmeyer-Zlotnik, P., and Stiller, M. (2023g). Types of Accommodation. Germany. Asylum Information Database, European Council on Refugees and Exiles.

297 Hoffmeyer-Zlotnik, P., and Stiller, M. (2023h). Healthcare. Germany. Asylum Information Database, European Council on Refugees and Exiles.

298 Degler and Liebig (2017).

299 Brücker, Jaschke, and Kosyakova (2019).

300 For example, many reported trauma and post-traumatic stress and schooling levels among these newcomers was highly polarised, with 26 per cent having only a primary education or less. See Brücker, Jaschke, and Kosyakova (2019).

301 Ibid.

302 Brücker, H., Kosyakova, Y., and Schuß, E. (2020b). Integration in Arbeitsmarkt und Bildungssystem mach weitere Fortschritte. IAB-Kurzbericht No. 4.

303 Ibid.

304 Brücker, Jaschke and Kosyakova (2019).

305 Ibid.

306 Migrant Integration Policy Index. (2020). Key findings, Germany.

307 This draws on 130 independent scientific studies using the Migrant Integration Policy Index (MIPEX).

308 Bundesministerium fur Familie, Senoren, Frauen und Jungen. (2017). Engagement in der Fluchtlingshilfe.

309 BertelsmannStiftung. (2020). Selbststandige mit Migrationshintergrund: Jobmotor fur Deutschland.

310 Institute for Employment Research. (2021). Die Arbeitsmarktwirkungen der COVID-19-Pandemie auf Geflüchtete und andere Migrantinnen und Migranten. IAB Forschungsbericht 5.

311 Vluchtelingenwerk Vlaanderen. (2023b). Overview of the main changes since the previous report update. Asylum Information Database. European Council on Refugees and Exiles.

312 EU+ refers to the 27 European Union Member States, plus Norway and Switzerland. Data source: European Union Agency for Asylum. (2023). Latest Asylum Trends.

313 European Migration Network (2023), Annual Report on Migration and Asylum in Belgium.

314 Vluchtelingenwerk Vlaanderen. (2023c). Health care. Belgium Asylum Information Database. European Council on Refugees and Exiles

315 European Migration Network (2023).

316 Vluchtelingenwerk Vlaanderen. (2023a).

317 KCE. (2019). Asylum seekers: options for more equal access to health care. A stakeholder survey.

318 Donald Trump slashed the annual quote to its lowest level on record before President Biden lifted it to 125,000 for each year, the highest US target since the 1990s. Despite this, however, the bureaucratic hurdles have kept the actual number of resettled refugees far lower.

319 Council on Foreign Relations. (2023). What Is Temporary Protected Status (TPS)?

320 This was increased to 356 days under the Trump Administration but President Biden has reversed this.

321 U.S Citizen and Immigration Services (2023). Asylum | USCIS.

322 Ibid.; Administration for Children and Families Office for Refugee Resettlement. (2022). Benefits and Services Available for Asylees Through HSS’ Office of Refugee Resettlement (ORR).

323 Transactional Records Access Clearinghouse (2023), Immigration Court Asylum Backlog.

324 More than 7.7 million people have left Venezuela in search of protection and a better life.

325 Even with counsel, an asylum seeker has the burden of proving that he or she meets the definition of a refugee. In order to be granted asylum, an individual is required to provide evidence demonstrating either that they have suffered persecution on account of a protected ground in the past, and/or that they have a “well-founded fear” of future persecution in their home country. An individual’s own testimony is usually critical to his or her asylum determination.

326 New York has come under the most pressure because of its unique obligation to provide shelter to anyone who needs it. New York City spent an estimated $1.7 billion on shelter, food, and other services for migrants through the end of July 2023; Chicago expects to have spent $255.7 million between August 2022 and the end of 2023; and Washington, DC spent $36.4 million on migrant services by late August, and expects the total to reach $55.8 million by October 2023. Source: Chishti, M., Gelatt, J., and Putzel-Kavanaugh, C.(2023). New York and Other U.S Cities Struggle with High Costs of Migrant Arrivals. Migration Policy Institute.

327 Connor, P. (2010). Explaining the Refugee Gap: Economic Outcomes of Refugees Versus Other Immigrants. Journal of Refugee Studies, 23(3), pp. 377-397.

328 Poutvaara, P. and D. Wech (2016). Integrating Refugees into the Labor Market – A Comparison of Europe and the United States. ifo DICE Report 14(4), pp. 32 – 43.

329 Kreisberg, A. N., de Graauw, E., and Gleeson S. (2022). Explaining Refugee Employment Declines: Structural Shortcomings in Federal Resettlement Support. Social Problems. Spab080.

330 Van Selm, J. (2019). Migration in the Netherlands: Rhetoric and Perceived Reality Challenge Dutch Tolerance. Migration Policy Institute.

331 Ibid.

332 Dutch Council for Refugees. (2023a). Overview of the main changes since the previous report update. Netherlands. Asylum Information Database. European Council on Refugees and Exiles.

333 Dutch Council for Refugees. (2023b). Access to the labour market. Netherlands. Asylum Information Database. European Council on Refugees and Exiles.

334 PRESS RELEASE: Major Dutch companies double down on support for refugees, pledging to help nearly 22,000 refugees enter the job market - The Tent Partnership for Refugees (last accessed October 2023).

335 Dutch Council for Refugees. (2023a).

336 Dutch Council for Refugees. (2023c). Forms and levels of material reception conditions.Netherlands Asylum Information Database. European Council on Refugees and Exiles.