

Scottish Peace Institute

Report to inform the development of a Peace Institute in Scotland

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Executive Summary

The Scottish Programme of Government 2022 committed to establishing a Peace Institute in Scotland. This Report was commissioned by the Scottish Government to review good practice and set out Options for the development of the Peace Institute. It draws on a literature review, focus groups with Scottish organisations involved in peacebuilding, and interviews with those running similar Peace Institutes or organisations globally. The key findings, in summary, are as follows.

1. **Strong support from a vibrant set of organisations engaged in peace work.** There is a lively and diverse peacebuilding ‘sector’ in Scotland who overwhelmingly welcome the prospect of a Peace Institute and see it as enhancing their work.
2. **Internationally complex landscape.** The proposition for a Scottish Peace Institute comes at a time where international conflicts are becoming more complex in their nature, their resolution more challenging, and traditional ways of ‘doing’ peacebuilding are being re-thought. [Redacted]

[Redacted]

Introduction

A Scottish Peace Institute: A Programme of Government Commitment

In ‘A Fairer Greener Scotland’ Programme of Government, agreed in September 2021 ([Scottish Government, 9: 2021](#)), ‘Scotland in the World’, Chapter 6, provides the following commitment:

By the end of 2022 we will establish a Peace Institute, with a focus on human rights, that enables us to develop further our understanding of conflict resolution and peace. I)

[Redacted]

In February 2022, a team comprising leading researchers, peace mediation and peacebuilding experts, comprising Professor Christine Bell, Dr Monalisa Adhikari, Andy Carl, and Chris Thornton, was commissioned by the Scottish Government to lead on this review (see Appendix 3 for bios). This Report is the final product of the review process, informed by interviews and discussions with multiple stakeholders, within and outside Scotland working on peacebuilding.

Methodology

The Report has been produced using the following research methods:

- i)* *desk review* of literature on the organisations involved in peacebuilding and their contribution and effectiveness, including a particular focus on Peace Institutes and similar bodies. Appendix I sets out the bibliography.
- ii)* *institutional review* comprising a desk-based review of Peace Institutes and related peace-support organisations in other countries, with a view to understand their mandate, modalities of working and effectiveness. We also conducted a desk-based institutional review of the Scottish organisations with connection to peacebuilding activities, focusing on what they offer. Both desk-based reviews were supplemented by the focus groups and interviews.
- iii)* *semi-structured interviews* with key informants in comparator Peace Institutes or other similar peacebuilding organisations involved in the peace mediation/support field to understand how these organisations work, assess what has worked, to test ideas for how a Scottish Peace Institute would be received. The interviews also helped identify areas where a Scottish Peace Institute could add value, and the challenges and risks the Institute needs to be cognizant of.
- iv)* *focus group discussions and meetings with the Scottish Government*. Meetings were held with organisations and individuals who conduct or have connections to peacebuilding work in Scotland, to appraise the existing expertise that could be harnessed by the Scottish Peace Institute. The focus group discussions were undertaken with three key constituencies in Scotland, comprising, a) representatives of Universities/ academic institutions (attended by twenty representatives); b) civil society organisations working in Scotland but whose work has a broader resonance for peace-support work internationally (attended by six representatives); c) and Scotland based organisations working internationally on peace/ and related issues (attended by six representatives). A final group was held to feed back our emergent thinking and get further engagement, and this also enabled some of those unable to attend earlier meetings to attend. In addition, two meetings with the relevant Cabinet secretaries and civil servants were undertaken to understand the vision behind the Programme of Government commitment to establish a peace institute. The meetings helped obtain information from the civil servants supporting the process on (a) devolution issues and the relevant concordats and legislation regarding Scotland's international work (b) reports into current peace operation support activities funded by the Scottish Government – notably the work of

Beyond Borders. Appendix II lists all stakeholders consulted through focus group discussions, interviews and written feedback.

This Report is divided into two Parts. Part II addresses points (i)-(iv) of the Terms of reference dealing with the literature review of organisations, effectiveness in the current peacebuilding context, and the implication for Scotland's Peace Institute offer. [Redacted]

Part I: A Scottish Peace Institute: Understanding the Environment

The Global Context: Case for Peace Support and Scotland's 'Place'

Contemporary Challenges to the Effectiveness of Peacebuilding Organisations

- A rise in geopolitical conflict both directly and through proxy wars, coupled with the break-down of effective international responses.
- A fragmentation of conflict in many conflict-affected countries, highlighting a need to revise peace process models that assume one big peace mediation between a state and opposition armed groups. Complex conflict systems involving interwoven local, national and geopolitical conflict that need to be addressed through interlinked formal and informal spaces and processes to deal with both conflict prevention and peacebuilding.
- Inclusion challenges to peace processes from groups not at the heart of the conflict, such as women, and non-aligned minorities. These challenges require new thinking on how to get armed parties to end use of force (often requires closely mediated and narrow negotiations), while creating the types of broader buy-in necessary to sustaining and building peace as a product of meaningful social justice (requires broad inclusive processes).
- Concern that peacebuilding activity is too 'supply driven' from global North. Peacebuilding support and assistance is often driven by the institutional aims and interests of actors in the global North, rather than being responsive to demands for support from the global South and inclusive of local expertise.
- The rise of social violence, repression under autocratic regimes and the pressure on civic space and human rights defenders poses a challenge for what building peace in the twenty-first century means in practice.

The Scottish Peace Institute proposition arrives at a moment when conflicts are becoming more complex, their resolution more challenging, and traditional ways of 'doing peacebuilding' are being re-thought, as set out in the box above. Such a context provides both a challenge and an opportunity for a unique Scottish contribution.

Scotland has had a strong contemporary connection with peace and justice activities. The relatively short and limited consultations which informed this report demonstrated a consensus over 'why Scotland' - that is, what Scotland might contribute as a country - that could shape a Peace Institute and build its activities. There was also a consensus that a Scottish Peace Institute could provide a way of linking up a vibrant peacebuilding sector that makes a powerful contribution but currently has no single focal point connecting different organisations and initiatives. This consensus revolved around the distinct attributes of Scotland. These include that Scotland is a country committed to rule of law and peaceful

resolution of contentious issues through its political and legal institutions, with a strong civic commitment to human rights, peace and justice. This connection is evidenced by a range of activities over the years, including but not limited to:

- The establishment of the Edinburgh Festival in 1947 with an aim to 'provide a platform for the flowering of the human spirit' by bringing people and artists together from around the world, in the immediate aftermath of the Second World War.
- The Edinburgh Conversations, a series of meetings that took place between 1983 and 1989 between prominent political & military leaders in Western countries and their Soviet counterparts, enabling face-to-face dialogue to take place in a neutral setting.
- The establishment of South Caucasus Track Two dialogue in Craigellachie in Speyside (2003)
- The use of Scotland as a venue for the Northern Ireland peace talks, producing the St. Andrews Agreement (2004)
- The holding of a peaceful and democratic referendum on independence with the agreement of two governments, (2014)
- The launch of the first Women in Conflict Initiative and Peace Fellowship Programme (with Beyond Borders, 2015)
- UN Office for Genocide Prevention delegation sent to Scotland (2018) who met with the First Minister within the Scottish Parliament and visited Interfaith Scotland in Glasgow, and consulted with various faith communities across Scotland as part of the Global [*Plan of Action for Religious Leader & Actors to Prevent Incitement to Violence that could lead to Atrocity Crimes*](#).
- The [*Edinburgh Declaration of International Mediators \(2018\)*](#)
- The launch of the [*PA-X Peace Agreement Database \(2018\)*](#), University of Edinburgh, the world's largest peace and transition process database, and the [*Peace and Conflict Resolution Research Programme 2022*](#).

The idea of a Scottish contribution to global peace and justice connects to a civic sense of Scotland's place in the world, embraced by the Scottish government and articulated in its Programme for Government (2021). As Gethins writes, 'Scotland has close links with countries throughout the world forged over the centuries by commerce, conflict, migration and education.' (Gethins, 2021: 49). The focus group discussions together with writing by those involved in peacebuilding in Scotland (see eg Muller, 2017), point to the following distinct attributes of Scotland that point to a distinctive contribution.

- **Scotland's long history and clearly articulated identity as small nation "with a large footprint", peacefully negotiating its position and distinctiveness within a larger state.** Its devolved settlement provides an example of how smaller nations within larger states can transition towards greater democracy in a peaceful and consensual

manner. The de-centralisation of power within the UK provides a template for other countries confronted by the need for change (Muller 2017).

- **A stated Scottish Government commitment, and a social sensibility of people and organisations for: social justice, human rights and equality, as a principle of government; and for an ethos of ‘civicness’ and resolving differences democratically rather than through force.** This commitment is coupled with recognition of the lasting consequences of Scottish historical involvement in slavery and colonisation, and a commitment to use that experience to inform current peacebuilding activities.
- **Scotland’s strong global cultural contribution that has historically linked to peace and bringing people together (e.g. Edinburgh Festival).** Internationalism is at the heart of its cultural festivals, its legal and educational institutions (Muller, 2017).
- **Scotland’s expertise and history of peacemaking and building and support for dialogue.** These include the Edinburgh Conversations during the Cold War, to the work of the Quakers, Beyond Borders, the International IDEA/Edinburgh Centre for Constitutional Law Annual Post-Conflict Dialogues and Annual Women Constitution-makers Network meetings, and the many other activities of Scottish organisations and individuals in the field (see further below).
- **Scotland’s political and geographical location that is accessible, yet outside state capitals, safe, welcoming and with great natural beauty and a rich built heritage for meetings.** A country of beautiful countryside and castles provides the perfect backdrop for cultural diplomacy and engagement with wider international civil society in relation to peace and political transition related issues
- **Scotland’s diverse mix of expertise relating to current peacebuilding challenges.** This expertise includes managing climate change; women peace and security (and feminist approaches to security); digital provision relating to peace and justice; ‘conflict prevention’ skills; mediation and building a ‘culture of peace’ and ‘better, fairer, and more localised and inclusive systems of governance.

We consider how many of these attributes could be taken forward by a Scottish Peace Institute with a distinct peacebuilding approach, when further reviewing Scotland’s current ecology of peacebuilding organisations below.

[Literature Review: Peacebuilding Organisations and Effectiveness](#)

Since 1990, negotiations have been one of the main ways of ending violent intra-state conflict (Bell 2008). These produced a year-on-year reduction of conflict until around 2012, when figures in Syria alone began to reverse this trend. Since that time, the [Institute for Economics and Peace](#) ascertains that violent conflict has increased annually while all measures used to evaluate ‘peace’ in its Global Index system, have dropped. The legacies of this violence impacts lives and livelihoods and has a detrimental effect across all socio-economic indicators. The Institute for Economics and Peace quantifies the global economic

cost of war and violence to be equivalent to \$14.4 trillion in 2019 in constant purchasing power parity terms, equivalent to 10% of global gross domestic product (GDP). Recently, the International Office of Migration report points to corresponding increases in migration, with currently 3.5% of the world's population displaced ([IOM 2022](#)). V-DEM Institute's [Democracy Report 2022](#) noted (pp.6-7) that "liberal democracies (...) are now down to the lowest levels in over 35 years - 34 nations home to only 13% of the world population. (...) 2021 comes with a record number of nations autocratizing in the last 50 years - 33 countries home to 36% of the world population - 2.8 billion people. (...)." The rise of authoritarianism is a major direct threat both to negative (stop-the-violence) peace and to positive (build social justice) peace.

The increase in violent conflicts has prompted questioning of the effectiveness of international conflict resolution efforts, including peacekeeping, peacebuilding, preventive diplomacy, and peacemaking (Ghali, 1992). The UN has been central to the discourse, policy and practices of such conflict resolution efforts. Faced with increasingly complex conflicts, its peace efforts have evolved, with their mandates expanding, and remits overlapping. Contemporary peacekeeping mandates, for instance, have broadened to include various peacebuilding functions, including, promoting human security, protection of civilians, ensuring local ownership, gender inclusivity, and building sustainable institutions (Peter, 2019). The shifts have also changed the vocabulary used for international peace support. Increasingly scholars and practitioners deploy 'peace operations' as a term used to account for whole range of multidimensional, multifunctional and complex peace operations, authorized by the UN Security Council, that involve not only military but also various civilian and police components, instead of peacekeeping (Aoi, De Coning and Thakur, 2007). The UN's peacemaking efforts have also seen an increased professionalization of mediation processes and practices (see eg [UN Mediation Support Unit](#)). This has been the result of increased expectation from mediation processes, where mediators today are not only tasked to bring violent conflicts to an end, but are also increasingly asked to integrate norms of gender equality, human rights, and justice, in their efforts (Hellmüller, Pring and Richmond, 2020).

Over that time, however, the UN has ceased to be dominant actor in the field, with a range of regional and sub-regional organisations often playing a primary role (Nash, 2021). Key western states such as Norway, Finland, and Switzerland have adopted peace facilitation or mediation as a key element of their foreign policy (Bell, 2008), often linking this position to support for international legal norms such as those of human rights, international criminal law, as all connected in their focus on 'the common good'. In more recent times, a range of non-Western states whose motives are less known and whose positions are less clearly tied to international legal standards have become more assertive in the peacemaking space (Peter and Rice, 2022; Carothers and Samet-Moran 2015; Peter 2022).

Alongside intergovernmental and governmental intervention, a very broad range of non-governmental organisations such as [Conciliation Resources](#), [Interpeace](#), [Bergoff Foundation](#), and [Saferword](#) – to mention merely a few, engage in peacebuilding support. These efforts sit alongside (and sometimes overlap with) what is often termed ‘private peacebuilding diplomacy’, and the work of organisations such as the [Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue](#), which offer forms of independent peace mediation. These organisations are often funded by western states and work in partnership with their agendas, but also typically work in partnership with local peacebuilding organisations in conflict-affected states.

The broad range and diversity of peacebuilding efforts means that coordination and competition within the peacebuilding field is increasingly itself a major challenge for effectiveness – particularly with increased pressure on public funds. Project-funding often requires organisations to assert a capacity to deliver something distinctive, rather than a capacity to connect and build across organisations and a shared conflict analysis.

Coordination and competition challenges take place against wider criticism of ‘liberal peacebuilding’ as a project and goal. Scholars focusing on peacekeeping and peacebuilding, outline that multilateral UN Peace Operations make a positive difference not only in terms of ending violence but also democratization process (Howard, 2019). However, other scholars point out that peacebuilding was premised on building sustainable peace with liberal institutions such as rule of law, democracy, and freedom of speech, and these have rarely been achieved (Barnett and Zürcher, 2008; Zaum, 2012). Instead, peacebuilding interventions on the local level are charged with producing forms of ‘hybrid political order’- that imbibe both liberal and illiberal features (Boege, Brown and Clements, 2009). Peace agreements themselves often produce forms of ‘formalised unsettlement’ in which political institutions characterised by forms of power-sharing create political institutions as ongoing mechanisms of conflict resolution – rather than stable mechanisms of government (Bell and Pospisil, 2017). Whether viewed as ‘hybrid political orders’ or forms of ‘formalised unsettlement’, the attempt to resolve the conflict by providing for forms of liberal state in practice produce mechanisms of conflict management, rather than conflict resolution or even transformation (Kriesberg, 2017). Even more critical approaches point to the ways in which liberal peacebuilding justified forms of forcible western intervention (Chandler, 2017); while others point to the way that liberal peacebuilding has not adequately responded to contemporary global challenges such as climate change; ever-widening global inequalities between societies and within societies; and an ongoing arms race (Cf. De Coning, 2019).

Coupled with this critical literature, is a lively empirical and conceptual literature on how one would even measure and evaluate what ‘success’ in peacebuilding looks like. What are the appropriate ‘peace indicators’, how can reliable data be captured, and whose preferred measurements should be used - those of international actors seeking to define when ‘exit’ can happen, or the ‘everyday local’ definitions of peace outcomes generated by local

communities as reflecting the change they want to see (Mac Ginty and Firchow, 2016; Caplan, 2020; Autesserre, 2021).

Over time, as peacebuilding failures have appeared to mount, a sense of a field in crisis and in need of a major re-think has emerged (Wilton Park, 2022). This sense of crisis has been exacerbated by the recent conflicts in Afghanistan and Ukraine, however, these conflicts have made the sense of crisis visible and more acute, rather than caused it. Against this backdrop, a number of persistent charges have been made as set out below, and the establishment of a Scottish Peace Institute should attempt to avoid these.

Global Tensions and the Need to Cohere Strategies: Contrary and ambiguous national peace-making paradigms

A coherent multilateral normative approach to peacebuilding has been undermined by states signalling institutional commitments to their own peacebuilding paradigms (Peter and Rice, 2022; Peter 2022). In most cases these are integral to and dwarfed by their defence and security paradigms. The US, Russia, China, and Turkey all have elaborated peacebuilding through national security paradigms. All are framed by national strategic and security interests and priorities. Support to conflict prevention, peace processes and peacebuilding tend to be managed as a complementary 'space' vastly dwarfed by investments in 'hard security' and the humanitarian and other aid responses to war. Peacebuilding organisations have also collectively failed to come together to significantly influence the conflict or the global response to it. Few are even imagining what it might look like if they did.

Global North domination

The growth of the international peacebuilding sector (of practice and research) especially as it related to mediation and other in-conflict roles, has been dominated by a largely government-sponsored professional sector with a disproportionate presence in the global 'North' and the global 'West'. Peacebuilding organisations in the more developed world have tended to focus on promoting peace abroad and not at home. While there are historic peace movements across the world, international public and private peace and mediation organisations over the last thirty years have tended to have their headquarters in the developed world with their programming focused on armed conflict in low- and middle-income countries. There are exceptions and different incentive and disincentives have influenced this phenomenon. Most, if not all, institutions working in this space are now looking at how to get better at promoting peace both in the world and at home. For some this has meant exploring their national, historic and inherited relations with violence, slavery and colonial exploitation and for others this has involved looking at their ways of working, and power, gender and identity in their global relationships. There is demand for better and more equal relationships and more equitable institutional development. Many have reached the conclusion that it is crucial to connect work on peace 'out there' in the world, with peace 'here' at home.

Supply-driven peace intervention

Peace operation support and mediation are often perceived as ‘supply driven’. That is, to be driven not by peacebuilding needs and wishes in conflict-affected states, but by institutional imperatives within the Northern-based states and donor communities. In addition to the problems above, it means that any new organisations need to be set up understanding that they have to be driven by either a process of understanding need in countries in which they plan to ‘do work’, and indeed that there really should be a clear sense of the need driving the establishment of the organisation.

Exclusion and Inclusion dilemmas

Civic disillusionment with what peace mediation, peace processes and agreements deliver is now rife. In particular processes are critiqued for being ‘elite-driven’, focused on armed actors and politicians, and neglecting a broad range of communities and people not adequately represented by these groups, such as women, young people, and non-dominant minorities. The need to provide more inclusive peace processes has become a central feature of attempted renewal of peace support practices. However, often recommendations on inclusion are not specific, do not really connect constituencies with meaningful processes of change or entry points to elite mediation, and fail to ensure adequate forms of civilian protection to people whose lives are outside of green zones, where no meaningful personal security exists (Wilton Park, 2022). Often an overriding focus on ‘a comprehensive peace agreement’ that remains elusive, means that the importance of localised processes of peacemaking are overlooked, despite their capacity to provide for early stage peace-making in which communities intervene to constrain conflict, or culturally appropriate forms of peacebuilding that work ‘from the bottom up’.

Peace Institutes: What are they? How do they work?

Against this broad outline of peacebuilding organisations and challenges, Peace Institutes arguably form a specific category of organisation. They face all the challenges above, but also face a more specific set of questions as to how they operate. While the Scottish Peace Institute will need to articulate its own priorities, experiences of other peace institutes can offer insights on specific questions of effectiveness and contribution of these types of organisation.

A limited scholarship exists dealing with Peace Institutes and how they operate: literature on organisational effectiveness has focused on role of UN or UN-led transitional administrations, NGOs, regional organizations, and lately intergovernmental organizations (Barnett, 1995; Boehmer, Gartzke and Nordstrom, 2004; Zaum, 2006; Franks and Richmond, 2008; Nilsson, 2012; Coe and Nash, 2020). There is little to no dedicated scholarly literature on what we might consider ‘national’ peace institutes. A partial exception is Tarkhani’s recent attempt to create an inventory of peacebuilding research centres (2022) . This

inventory evidences the exponential growth in the academic centres, programs, and organizations with a shared mandate on peacebuilding, and the sheer diversity in their scale, patterns of funding, and thematic focus.

Some focused insights can be found in reports – such as this one - commissioned to help establish particular Peace Institutes or similar organisations. These include the report undertaken by Emily Forbes on international Peace Institutes, whose aim was to support thinking into a Welsh Peace Institute (Forbes, 2015); the wider report into the establishment of a range of activities at the Maze prison site in Northern Ireland, which included thinking on a Conflict Resolution Centre (Maze Masterplanning Consortium, 2006); and a series of documents which supported the thinking, establishment, and initial years of development of the European Peace Institute (European Forum for International Mediation and Dialogue, 2012). The appraisal that follows draws on this literature, on desk-based institutional review and on semi-structured interviews with senior personnel from Peace Institutes or similar organisations.

Peace Institutes fall at the intersection between the State and Non-State organisations: they have a close relationship to the States which host them, often being established by these States, but with varying degrees of operational independence. There is no strict established model for peace institutes, and they exhibit significant variation in terms of their relationship to government, activities, and funding models.

Peace Institutes: What are they and how do they work?

- Peace institutes exhibit significant variation in their status, governance, activities and funding.
- Peace Institutes tend to focus on delivering three main things, but not all do all three to the same degree, and indeed many have changed their emphasis over time.
 - Production of knowledge and skills: researching on peace, providing training, etc. These often focus on the distinct capacities that are available in the jurisdiction.
 - Bringing together actors nationally to work on peace issues and give a platform to peace promotion as an approach and something that has governmental support.
 - Peace promotion practical activities, such as programming in other countries, or mediation support with conflict parties (track one), or related track two (civil society) often with support of home government as an extension of that government's values, development ambitions, and/or foreign policy.
- Peace institutes may grow, develop and change the balance of their activities over time. However, choices undertaken at the outset do condition and limit the potential development of the peace institute over time.

The following analysis is based on a qualitative study of a spectrum of peace institutes from across Europe and North America. Twelve peace institutes, broadly defined, were examined in depth, selected from a larger sample to cover the full spectrum of existing institutes in terms of size, activities and relationship to Government (see longer list in Forbes 2015):

1. Austrian Study Centre for Peace and Conflict Resolution (ASPR); Schlaining, Austria.
2. Peace Research Institute of Oslo (PRIO); Oslo, Norway.
3. Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI); Stockholm, Sweden.
4. United States Institute for Peace (USIP); Washington D.C, United States of America.
5. SwissPeace; Bern, Switzerland.
6. International Catalan Peace Institute (ICPI); Barcelona, Spain.
7. Aland Islands Peace Institute (AIPI); Aland Islands, Finland.
8. Bonn Center for Conflict Studies (BICC); Bonn, Germany.
9. European Institute for Peace (EIP); Brussels, Belgium.
10. Flemish Peace Institute; Brussels, Belgium.
11. Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue (CHD); Geneva, Switzerland.
12. Conflict Management Initiative (CMI); Helsinki, Finland.

We have largely focused on institutes in contexts of similar population and size to Scotland, with the exception of the United States Institute for Peace (USIP) which is included for comparison purposes. We included CHD and CMI although these are technically not Peace Institutes, as they are Non-Governmental Organizations that have close relationships to their host Governments and special legal status provided by the host State.

We compare the twelve organizations across the following critical dimensions:

- Range of activities;
- Independence and relationship to Government/ host State;
- Budgets and funding models.

Of the twelve institutes examined, 25% are institutionally linked to regional or sub-national Government institutions;¹ 25% were established by national Governments or Parliaments;² four were established as independent organizations but developed varying levels of linkage to their host governments;³ and one was established as a multilateral initiative between

¹ The Aland Islands Peace Institute (AIPI); the Bonn International Center for Conflict Studies (BICC); the Catalan Institute for Peace (ICPI); and the Flemish Peace Institute.

² The Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI); Peace Research Institute of Oslo (PRIO); and the United States Institute for Peace (USIP).

³ The Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue (HD); the Crisis Management Initiative (CMI); the Austrian Study Center for Peace and Conflict Resolution (ASPCR); and SwissPeace.

several states.⁴ Annual budgets range from 400k Eur/annum⁵ to 40 million Eur/annum,⁶ and activities vary from academic research and policy advice to Track 1 mediation.

Range of Activities

The activities of the twelve peace institutes studies comprise three main activities:

- Knowledge, research and policy-oriented work
- Training and support for peacebuilding organisations
- In-country programming, or forms of in-country support, including direct (Track I) mediation-support activities, facilitation of dialogue,⁷ and (Track II) mediation between communities and other stakeholders more tangentially linked to the conflict parties.

It is common for the operational sphere of activities to do all or some of these activities, and also for the activities engaged in to change or expand over the duration of a peace institute's existence. USIP, for example, describe an initial focus on research between 1984 and 1995, before their work shifted into active programming. This active programming began with training of officials in the former Yugoslavia. In 2001, USIP engaged in its first mediation work in the Philippines and Nigeria. In 2007, this work further expanded to include community dialogue and peacebuilding. The ASPR describe a similar evolution: between 1982 and 1992 they engaged in research work, before expanding into training and mediation support. They initially had a geographic focus on the former Yugoslavia and South Caucuses, but currently work in a range of countries including Iraq, Libya, Sudan and South Sudan.

Some peace institutes are responsible for the distribution of awards, prizes and grants. Some of these are prizes to peace practitioners and activists, others focus on funding research and policy work. The ICPI disburses approximately 40% of its 1.4 million Euro budget in grants, awards and prizes. ICPI for example offer a number of prizes of 6000 Euros each to organizations working to promote peace and culture of toleration. They also offer prizes of 750 Euros to young researchers working on topics related to peace. Grants of up to 80'000 Euros are provided to researchers and academics working on priority topics identified by the ICPI.

Peace institutes with strong links to their host governments often play key roles in policy formation, diplomacy, and international relations. PRIO, for example, while framed as a 'peace research' institute not only has close links to Norwegian policy makers, but also acts to some extent as a branch of the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. They, for example, were responsible for organizing a significant portion of the programme of the 2020

⁴ The European Institute for Peace (EIP)

⁵ AIPI

⁶ USIP

⁷ Dialogue is (somewhat artificially) distinguished from mediation by its open-ended nature and lack of specific targeted outputs or objectives.

Norwegian Royal visit to Jordan. The Flemish Peace Institute was founded following a scandal regarding the use of Flemish arms in human rights abuses. Following this they provide a vital service to parliament in examining arms trade and production.

Peace institutes may also benefit from strategic partnerships with host states. HD, for example, has a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) with Switzerland and a close relationship with the city of Geneva. These relationships allow for *inter alia* the facilitation of visas and other travel arrangements, and the provision of security for events by the Geneva police.

Relationship to Government/host State

Of the organizations studied, several were established on the direct initiative of their respective legislatures and endowed with special legal status in their constitutive acts. For example, the Catalan Institute for Peace was created in 2007 by the Catalan Parliament under the “Law for the Promotion of Peace”. Similarly, USIP was established in 1988 by Congress under the United States Institute for Peace Act.

The Flemish Peace Institute has the closest formal relationship with parliament, existing as a para-parliamentary organization inside the Flemish parliament. Other states opted for less formal creation of their peace institutes: the BICC has the formal legal status of a Non-Profit Limited Company, but the State of North Rhine-Westphalia (NRW) is a majority shareholder in the company, with a minority stake being held by the State of Brandenburg.

Regardless of the manner of their founding, peace institutes exhibit considerable variation in their continued relationships to their host states and the role of these host states in their ongoing governance. We can discern three broad models for the ongoing governance of peace institutes:

- 1) Direct oversight and direction by host government;
- 2) Indirect oversight and direction by host government (operationally independent with ex-post oversight);
- 3) Independent oversight and direction.

Very few of the peace institutes studied offer a direct and continuing role for the host government in their ongoing governance, regardless of the manner of their founding. USIP is the most notable exception: its governing board is composed of the Secretaries of State and Defence, the President of the National Defence University,⁸ and twelve members of Congress. EIP has a similar governance model with eight member states nominating a representative to the Board of Governors. The Board of Trustees of the BICC is also composed of representatives of the NRW State.⁹

⁸ A serving US Army officer.

⁹ Along with a representative of the University of Bonn.

More common, however, is an indirect model of political involvement in governance, whereby the host state nominates independent figures to serve on the board of the institute, or responsibility to select board members is delegated to respected state or non-state institutions. For example, the International Catalan Institute for Peace (ICPI) was “endowed with autonomy” in its constitutive act. The ten members of its board are chosen by the Catalan Government (3 members) and the Catalan Parliament (7 members). However, the parliament-appointed members are not drawn from political parties: they are independent academics, journalists, activists, and professionals, proposed by the Catalan Council for Fostering Peace. This Council includes political parties and local and national government agencies, but its involvement in appointing the Board ensures that the Board has significant autonomy and distance from political stakeholders. The Government-appointed members are the current head of the development agency and two political appointees but they remain a minority on the Board. The Board meets 10 times per year granting it a relatively high degree of oversight over the organization’s activities, but the ICPI only reports to parliament annually. The members of PRIO’s board are selected by respected Norwegian institutions: the Institute for Social Research, the Association of Norwegian Research Institutes, the University of Oslo, the Norwegian Employer’s association, and the Nordic International Studies Association, as well as from among PRIO’s staff itself. A similar approach was taken by the Flemish Peace Institute with members selected by Flemish political parties, the Social and Economic Council of Flanders, the Flanders interuniversity council and the Flemish peace movement.

Other peace institutes are governed by boards wholly independent of their host governments. Unsurprisingly this includes independent organizations like the Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue, but also includes organizations with close formal links to their host governments such as SIPRI. Here boards are composed of leading experts in the field or individuals with special expertise, such as finance, auditing and management. New board members of SIPRI are recommended by the current Governing Board, the Research Staff Collegium and the staff union, before being confirmed by the Swedish Government.

National Identity

The appointment procedure for the board of the peace institute must be distinguished from the national identity of the institute and its governing structures. For example, although CMI was founded as an independent body and does not have a formal link with the Government of Finland, it is closely identified with former Finnish President and Nobel-Prize winner Martti Ahtisaari – who played a key mediation role in Namibia and Aceh, Indonesia, and a demilitarisation role in Northern Ireland. The board of CMI is exclusively Finnish. Its current senior leadership are also all Finnish. The same applies to the ASPR, whose leadership are all Austrian; and SwissPeace whose foundation board are exclusively Swiss.

Some independent peace organizations, notably the ASPR and SwissPeace, have strengthened their national identity and links to their host states over time. SwissPeace

began as an independent initiative by members of the University of Bern, and only in 1996 began to receive a guaranteed annual contribution from the Swiss Federal Council. Building on existing capacities and organizations with a proven track record in the field was deemed more cost-effective and efficient than establishing a new body to operate as a peace institute.

Conversely, while SIPRI was founded by the Swedish Parliament in 1966, its leadership and board are highly international encompassing senior former diplomats, UN officials, and academics from many nationalities, such as France, Singapore, the United Kingdom, Russia and the United States.¹⁰ Its current executive director, Dan Smith, is British.

Organizations with a strong national identity often supplement their governance structures with an “advisory board” or “scientific board” with a more international make-up. Where the board is responsible for ‘governance’, the advisory board advises on the substance of the work in quality and ideas terms. Both SwissPeace and the Flemish Peace Institute, for example, have advisory boards composed of international experts, while their governing boards remain dominated by Swiss and Flemish nationals respectively.

Regardless of the formal oversight and control Governments’ maintain over the operations of a peace institute. Most successful peace institutes exist in states where there is a close alignment between the goals and strategy of the peace institute and the foreign policy or international affairs agenda of the state. The actions of the peace institutes are therefore a central pillar of the foreign policy of the state and are perceived as a valuable strategic resource for the host government, rather than a net cost and liability.

Partnerships

Many peace institutes operate in partnership and collaboration with others. SwissPeace, for example, are renowned for their trainings in mediation, negotiation and conflict resolution. They often partner with the Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue (HD) or other similar organizations to offer training to local partners, negotiators and conflict parties who are identified by HD and engaged in HD processes.

The ICPI also engages in partnerships to multiply its efforts. For example, the Commission of Europe (CoE) is responsible for supporting the activities of the Colombian Truth and Reconciliation Commission in Europe. The ICPI provides technical and logistical support to this effort, for example, training 40 interviewers for the CoE and helping establish the 14 European nodes of the truth commission. They also work with local organizations such as *Taula per Mèxic* (Barcelona-based NGO, focusing on peacebuilding, humanitarianism and human rights) to implement projects at the local level. This model of partnerships with connections up to international, multilateral and supranational organizations and down to

¹⁰ Although the Chairman of SIPRI’s board, Jan Eliasson, is Swedish, the other six members are not.

local partner organizations is one common way that peace institutes seek to multiply their impact.

Specialisations and Unique Selling Points (USPs)

Within the broad field of activities outlined above, several peace institutes have articulated thematic specializations. The BICC has three (inter-related) research clusters:

- Armament and arms control: Controlling arms and supporting disarmament
- Dynamics of violent conflict: Preventing, transforming and ending violent conflict;
- Order and change: Understanding violence in social orders.

The Flemish Peace Institute has two programmes 1) on Arms trade and production; and 2) on Peace and Security. The AIPI works on three issues: autonomy regimes, minorities, and demilitarization. The ICPI operates four programmes:

- Memory, coexistence and reconciliation;
- Violence in non-war settings;
- Social and political dialogue;
- Alternatives to security.

AIPI and ICPI (both sub-state organisations) draw heavily on their regional expertise and example, although the ICPI has deliberately sought to frame itself as “international” and to draw from broader examples in its work. The AIPI foregrounds the Aland example in almost all of its work, with the exception of its Journal on Autonomy and Security Studies which is still thematically linked.

In some cases, the thematic specialisation of the Peace Institute is established at the outset and is delineated in the founding charter of the organization. However, in most cases the organization’s thematic expertise grows organically out of the operational networks of the organization, the experience and interests of its staff and the strategic direction established by the board.

Besides thematic expertise, many peace institutes have a geographic focus which is either specifically articulated or develops naturally due to the networks, expertise, and language skills of their staff. ASPR, for example, had an initial focus on the former Yugoslavia and southern Caucasus, and retains an ongoing connection to the former Soviet Union, which naturally grew out of its strategic location on the border of the Iron Curtain. ICPI does not articulate a specific geographic focus, but its work clearly skews towards activities in Central and Latin America, and longstanding engagement with diaspora communities present in Catalonia.

Many peace institutes are outward looking, seeking to contribute to peace abroad and internationally. Some, however, also have a mandate to promote the values of peace, non-violent resolution of disputes, and coexistence, in their host States. This includes ICPI, which

seeks to promote peace in Catalonia, and USIP, which has long had peace education activities in all 50 U.S. States.

Most successful peace institutes have a USP which is central to establishing their place in the field. CMI, for example, draws heavily on the network, reputation and expertise of its founder and President Martti Ahtisaari. Other peace institutes benefit from their location and headquarters: ASPR is headquartered in the impressive Schlaining Castle, HD enjoys the use of the Villa Plantamour on the banks of Lake Geneva as its headquarters. The Villa Plantamour is donated to HD by the Canton of Geneva. Such venues offer perfect conditions for the conduct of peace negotiations and dialogue between conflict parties.

Some peace institutes have sought to make their own national example their USP, such as AIPI (autonomy focus). While this may seem an attractive option it does seem to prove somewhat limiting as each conflict is unique (or is perceived by the parties to the conflict to be unique), and therefore requires tailored lessons learned and strategies to respond to the conflict.

More importantly perhaps, peace institutes benefit from the geographic proximity of like-minded organizations and potential partners –the ‘ecosystem’ of peace organisations in which it sits. CHD’s location in Geneva allows it to partner with other organizations such as the International Commission of the Red Cross (ICRC), the United Nations, the WHO, Geneva Peacebuilding Platform, Geneva Call, Geneva Center for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces etc. The European Institute of Peace (EIP) benefits from its location in Brussels to partner with European Union institutions, the European Union now having a new peace mediation mandate. Research-focused peace institutes, such as PRIO and SIPRI, benefit from existing higher education capacities in Norway and Sweden respectively which have a strong focus on social sciences. PRIO also benefits from the explicitly “peace-focused” and mediation-minded foreign policy of Norway.

Budget and Funding models

The budgets of the peace institutes studied range between 400k EUR and 40mil EUR. The funding model for almost all peace institutes examined consists of a core grant provided by the host government, supplemented by project specific funding from a range of governments and multilateral institutions. USIP is again an outlier in that it receives its funding from one source: the US Congress.¹¹ This model proved problematic during the Trump administration which sought to divest USIP of its funding (Sonenshine, 2017).

More common is the mixed core and project funding model. The BICC, for example, receives an annual core grant of 1 million Euros from the NRW Government. This corresponds to approximately 25% of its total operating budget. The remaining funds are received primarily from other German federal government bodies, including the Federal Foreign Office, the

¹¹ USIP was granted special dispensation to seek funding from US philanthropic sources for the construction of its headquarter.

Ministry of Interior, the Department of Education, and the public research councils for specific projects. Small amounts are received from the EU and philanthropic foundations, such as the Volkswagen Foundation. It should be noted that the BICC operates almost exclusively on German sources of funding. The AIPI similarly receives a core grant from the Aland Parliament. This core grant corresponds to approximately 40% of its budget, which the remaining 60% coming from the Government of Finland and Sweden and the EU for specific projects.

Some peace institutes engage in relatively limited income-generating activities, most significantly the sale of publications and royalties from academic journals and the provision of training. ASPR, for example, offer an International Civilian Peacebuilding Training (IPT) for which many attendees are self-funded, covering the costs of the training. Most partnerships, however, tend to rely upon cost-sharing, rather than payment for services; the latter may be specifically prohibited under certain types of grant or legal status. No peace institute has successfully engaged in mass private individual fundraising, of the type deployed by charities such as *Médecins Sans Frontiers* or humanitarian organizations like Action Aid. The long-term, difficult to measure, and sometimes distasteful work of peace-making and -building is less suited to public appeals.

Peace institutes may grow, develop, and change the balance of their activities over time. However, choices undertaken at the outset do condition and limit the potential development of the peace institute over time. For example, peace institutes with close ties to their host Government may struggle to diversify sources of funding and grow; they may also be more vulnerable to the vagaries of politics and shifts in public opinion and priorities. Similarly, while it is essential that peace institutes have a USP, peace institutes which focus on a specific national or sub-national example or issue almost exclusively, may find their growth limited by the perceived relevance of this example to others and long-term shifts in the nature of conflict and conflict resolution efforts. Peace institutes also benefit from geographic proximity to potential partners and like-minded institutions, as well as existing infrastructure and other capacities.

Scotland's Existing Peace and Justice Infrastructure

Having examined Scotland's potential contribution to peacebuilding in general terms, and set out a backdrop of the current peacebuilding challenges and how other Peace Institutes have been established, we turn to the question of Scotland's existing peace and justice infrastructure.

Our necessarily limited consultations affirmed the strength of peace support activity in Scotland, and illustrated great interest and enthusiasm for the development of the Scottish Peace Institute. Consultations also highlighted that Scotland has the convening power, and the ability to deliver international peace support work. The consultations highlighted that

Scotland-based organisations today work both directly in peacebuilding activities and also in ways that indirectly connect to peacebuilding work (such as promotion and protection of human rights, or development). Of those organisations directly engaged in peacebuilding support, Scottish institutions work across various scales/ levels in international peace-support, ranging from quiet diplomacy at the multilateral level through the UN system, national level with conflict-affected states directly, and localised community-driven peace initiatives at sub-national level in these states. These organisations and types of connection include the following:

- Organisations which work directly on peacebuilding, such as the [Quakers](#), [Beyond Borders](#), [Edinburgh Peace and Justice Centre](#), [Interfaith Scotland](#), [Place for Hope](#), [Women's International League for Peace and Freedom](#) and [Pax Christi Scotland](#). All of these work within a strong sense of what they can contribute within Scotland, some also as part of a wider global grouping, but with strong practical support functions to conflict-affected countries.
- University projects which often straddle research, mediation support, and support to people in conflict-affected states, such as the [Peace and Conflict Resolution Evidence Platform](#) (PeaceRep) based in the University of Edinburgh, and involving also researchers from St Andrews and Glasgow, which is currently the UK's largest conflict-peacebuilding research programme, and is funded by FCDO, with smaller elements of research supported by UN Women, and a range of other organisations. This programme is engaged in both rapid response and 'futures thinking' for a range of international peacebuilding efforts led by international organisations and states within conflict-affected countries. It focuses on peace and transition process design and has generated and hosts the world's largest peace process database – the [PA-X Peace Agreement Database](#). It also support new thinking on 'inclusion' with reference to non-dominant minorities, women, and young people and children.¹²
- Governmental agencies that connect to issues core to peace, rights and justice as part of Scotland's wider international development work, such as [Police Scotland](#), the [Human Rights Commission](#) and [Children and Young People's Commissioner](#). Police Scotland for example, have an '[International Academy](#)' which 'supports human rights across the world'. The [Scottish Human Rights Commission](#) is an internationally recognised 'National Human Rights Institute'(NHRI) and as such complies with international standards on the formation of NHRIs, and has played a key role in international organisations and networks relating to good practice and NHRIs (see [here](#)); and the UK-wide [Equality and Human Rights Commission](#), [Scotland Committee](#), which deals with domestic equality commitments linked to international equality standards.
- Organisations that provide mediation services, or engage in conflict reduction activities within Scotland, such as [SACRO](#), [Scottish Mediation](#), [Scottish Centre for Conflict Resolution](#), and [Centre for Good Relations](#). Many of these work globally, and understand their work to be at heard 'peacebuilding' in some form. For example, the Centre for

¹² In the interests of transparency author Christine Bell is Director of the Programme which was formerly known as the 'Political Settlement Research Programme'.

Good Relations uses mediation-type processes to seek constructive ways through societal challenges, valuing the role of building relationships within a system to bring about effective change, and working to transform conflict to achieve long-term positive outcomes, and seeks to work across Europe on issues such as far-right extremism.

- Organisations that support various refugee, displaced, or other diaspora communities which include large numbers of people who come from conflict-affected countries, such as the [Scottish Refugee Council](#) and [Council for Ethnic Minority Voluntary Organisations](#) (CEMVO). These communities are themselves repositories of expertise within Scotland, and as the Catalan Institute indicates –and can often seek to play valuable diaspora roles in supporting peacebuilding in their countries of origin.
- Organisations that are headquartered in Scotland, and are key global international development and humanitarian organisations with work focused on conflict and its consequences, such as [Halo Trust](#), and [Mercy Corps](#). While global organisations, rather than ‘Scottish’ ones, their presence in Scotland gives access to a wide set of capacities and expertise.
- Scottish international development organisations, such as [Scottish Catholic International Aid Fund](#), as well as other members of the [Scotland's International Development Alliance](#). Many of these link to Scotland’s international development efforts.
- Scottish organisations who work on human rights, inter-faith dialogue, anti-sectarianism, equality, climate justice, well-being and disarmament, that are critically connected to ensuring peace, often playing a critical role in connecting to international organisations, international standards, and notions of good practice. These include [BEMIS](#), [CEMVO](#), [Scottish Alliance of Equality Councils](#), [Faith in Communities Scotland](#), [Edinburgh Inter-faith Association](#), [Arc of Inclusion](#), [Friends of the Earth Scotland](#) among others. Many of these organisations work in partnerships of international solidarity or are part of broader global organisations and use international norms as a reference point.

Along with the ecosystem of organisations and institutes in Scotland is an ecosystem of UK and other devolved peacebuilding activities which has something to offer the Scottish Peace Institute in terms of learning and future partnership. For reasons of space, we focus here on initiatives which have had some connection to UK or devolved government, or been similar to the Peace Institute idea, rather than the broader peacebuilding tapestry.

UK Government

The FCDO is responsible for UK Government (HMG) activities on peace. These activities have often taken place under labels other than ‘peace’. For example, in recent years FCDO conflict resolution approaches were articulated through [‘stabilisation’ policy](#). A recent UK [Integrated Review of Defence, Security, Development and Foreign Policy](#), 2021 has placed conflict as a central theme with a commitment to conflict prevention and conflict resolution re-centred in policy-making in ways that are still being developed (HM Government, 2021). Relatively recently a Mediation and Reconciliation Hub has been established at the newly reconfigured UK Government's Office for Conflict Stabilisation and Mediation, which is now

part of the response to the Integrated review.¹³ A new [UK Strategy on International Development 2022](#), emphasises trade but also issues that relate to peacebuilding and are also emphasised by the Scottish government: such as women, peace and security, climate change, and humanitarianism. Central, to the UK offer on peace, stabilisation, and conflict resolution, is a sense that peace is one of a number of foreign policy objectives amongst which there may be different priorities in particular settings, depending on wider UK capacities and interests. In part as a result of the Integrated Review developing the UK approach to ‘mediation’ is under active consideration as part of a new Strategic Conflict Framework, but again will need to factor in an understanding that the UK as one of the Permanent five UNSC members will never be seen as a ‘neutral’ mediator but one with a clear geopolitical position – something that requires understanding when this is an advantage and when it is a disadvantage. Across these new strategies, UK interests appear increasingly defined in terms of balancing competing ‘national’ priorities, rather a more general promotion of ‘the common global good’ as some Nordic countries articulate their approach to conflict resolution and peace promotion.

The Scottish approach is likely to be different, in particular, given that the Scottish Peace Institute would have to work within devolution constraints that determine that it is not responsible for UK foreign policy. However, as Muller and others have pointed out, the sub-national setting of Scotland means it is open to define what a Scottish contribution to peace might look like. Scotland can articulate a distinctive Scottish approach to the common good or ‘common weal’, rooted in its own tapestry of organisations, international connections and political culture, rather than linked to a strategic foreign policy objective. This would be different, and often complementary or additional, to the UK capacities in ways that could even lead to forms of coordination. The formation of SCGA has set out a model in this respect: it has both a place in the Programme of Government, and core funding from the Scottish Government, the founding Universities, and funded projects from FCDO. Views were expressed that cooperation would be possible and even welcome, despite or even perhaps because, the Scottish and UK-level contributions and approaches were likely to be different.

Other devolved settings

The examples of Northern Ireland and Wales in contrast to the UK, have seen some moves to establish a peace institute type organisation that are both interesting and chastening as they provide most proximate examples operating within a largely similar devolved context. In neither case, despite serious consideration and considerable civic support, was a peace institute as such established, although other organisations have in practice undertaken some similar roles.

¹³ There have been suggestions that foreign aid on conflict prevention and the climate emergency will be cut (Morrison, 2022).

In Wales, the peace institute concept appears to have begun with civil society concerns relating to militarisation with Wales initiated by CND Wales (see [Proposal for a Peace Institute, from CND Cymru Archives](#)). The peace institute concept was taken up by civil society and in particular linked to the centenary of the First World War. A process of report commissioning reviewing similar peace institutes was undertaken (see Forbes 2015). However, what resulted was not a peace institute but [Academi Heddwch Cymru](#), or a 'Welsh Peace Academy' network funded by the Welsh Government, and connected to a [Welsh Centre for International Affairs](#). The Peace Academy's website defines its goals as being:

to operate to extend Wales' strong tradition of peace-making and peace-promotion, by developing and coordinating an independent **community of researchers** in related fields.

The Academy is to work 'to **place peace firmly on Wales' national agenda**, as well as on the **international stage** and understands itself to be part of the global tapestry of Peace Institutes. At time of writing no further Peace Institute has been established or appears to be in the process of being established.

In Northern Ireland a Conflict Resolution Centre operating as in-effect a peace institute was considered as part of the plans to develop the former Maze prison (where troubles-related prisoners were kept) post peace process. Ultimately the plans for the site fell victim to the particular politics of Northern Ireland in ways that are not applicable to Scotland. However, key also to the failure to establish the Conflict Resolution Centre was the reluctance to commit ongoing funding: there was a desire that a peace institute could self-fund but all cost appraisals of self-funding showed that this was unrealistic without some strong visitor attraction such as a museum, and that was politically contentious (see, Maze Masterplanning Consortium, 2006). Indeed, other conflict resolution centres that were established, such as the [Clinton Centre](#), struggled to sustain once initial budgets were exhausted. In the absence of a government-supported Peace Institute, other centres and institutions have been established creating an 'ecosystem', such as the [John and Pat Hume Foundation](#), the long-standing [INCORE](#) at the University of Ulster, [The Senator George J. Mitchell Institute for Global Peace, Security and Justice](#), and the [Causeway Initiative for Peace-building and Conflict Resolution International](#), which operates as a company.

Although offering a cautionary tale, there are important lessons from the Maze proposal that could be useful to Scotland. These include:

- The importance of elements such as culture and exhibition to draw people into the physical space of the Institute in ways that generate repeat visits and interaction.
- The importance of cross-party support for the Peace Institute
- The importance of a core government grant which has properly costed future planning built into it
- The importance of a buy in of a range of relevant organisations, in particular the Universities (all of whom were to be given dedicated space in the Centre)

Ireland

Beyond the UK, it is worth noting that close neighbour, Ireland, in its most recent Programme of Government also committed to establishing an Institute for Peace Support and Leadership Training in The Curragh, Kildare (Department of the Taoiseach, 2021: 115).

[Redacted]

Conclusion

In conclusion, we are persuaded that the Peace Institute is an important Scottish Government Commitment, we feel this reflects the overwhelming response from consultations. We hope that the report provides a basis to make the appropriate decisions to move its establishment forward, taking care to navigate concerns and risks over *how* this is done.

Appendix I: Bibliography

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Appendix II: List of people consulted

(Through interviews and focus group discussions and other written response)

We thank the following organisations and individuals for the valuable time they took to be part of interviews, discussions, and/or to respond with valuable written comment on drafts, as part of the research process of the Report, with the note that that they are not responsible for the Report’s contents and nothing in the Report should be attributed or assumed to be the views of any of the organisations or individuals below.

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[Redacted]	[Redacted], University of Glasgow
[Redacted]	[Redacted], Pax Christi Scotland
[Redacted]	[Redacted], Austrian Study Centre for Peace and Conflict Resolution
[Redacted]	[Redacted], Intermediate
[Redacted]	[Redacted], Centre for Good Relations
[Redacted]	[Redacted], Edinburgh and Lothians Regional Equality Council
[Redacted]	[Redacted], Edinburgh Interfaith Association
[Redacted]	[Redacted], Core Solutions
[Redacted]	[Redacted], University of Glasgow
[Redacted]	[Redacted], University of Edinburgh
[Redacted]	[Redacted], Centre for Good Relations
[Redacted]	[Redacted], Police Scotland
[Redacted]	[Redacted], Edinburgh Peace Institute
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Appendix III: About the Authors

Christine Bell: received her legal education in Cambridge and Harvard, is a qualified Barrister and US Attorney-at-law, and has been a Professor of International Law and of Constitutional Law, in Scotland and Northern Ireland for over thirty years. She is a Fellow of the Royal Society of Edinburgh, and the British Academy and a globally-recognised expert on the constitutional and legal aspects of peace processes and political transitions. She was been a member of the Northern Irish Human Rights Commission established under the Belfast/Good Friday Agreement. She has been involved in track one and track two mediation in peace processes in Northern Ireland, Sri Lanka, Colombia, Aceh, Ogaden-Ethiopia, Israel-Palestine, and the Basque country. She currently runs the Peace and Conflict Resolution Evidence Platform, University of Edinburgh (funded by FCDO).

Monalisa Adhikari: Monalisa Adhikari has a PhD in International Relations from University of Edinburgh in 2020. She is currently a Lecturer in International Relations at Keele University. Her research focuses on peace processes, and peacebuilding assistance to conflict-affected states, with a particular focus on the increased engagement of non-western powers such as India, China, and Japan. She has published widely on peace processes in South and Southeast Asia. Prior to joining academia, she worked as an international development professional, working for FIA Foundation in London, Institute for Defense and Strategic Analyses in India, and The Asia Foundation, and has overseen projects in over dozen countries, across Southeast Asia, Latin America, and East Africa.

Andy Carl: is a peacebuilding practitioner with a career of leadership in the international NGO sector. He helped establish the NGO International Alert in 1989, and in 1994 co-founded Conciliation Resources where he was Executive Director for 22 years. He currently works as an independent consultant and advisor to groups, governments and organizations engaged in working on peace, justice and social change processes, including: advisor to the government of Catalonia on their dialogue and negotiations with Madrid; advisor to the Somali Political Dialogue Platform- an in-country unofficial mediation and research initiative; and advising on the establishment of a new Ethiopian peace research facility. He has a BA in English Literature, University of California at Berkeley and an MPhil, Trinity College, Dublin.

Chris Thornton: has more than ten years of experience managing complex peace processes in North Africa for the Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue (CHD). As such he managed complex mediation processes involving high-level engagement with political and military

actors, including in running a confidential dialogue process in Tunisia, and advising the Acting-SRSG Stephanie Williams on the Libyan Political Dialogue Forum (LPDF), which helped form the Government of National Unity. He has worked as a consultant for international organisations, NGOs, think tanks and Governments. Chris has conducted research on political transitions, mediation, and pluralism in peace processes and holds a Masters in International Affairs, Graduate Institute in Geneva, a Masters in History, University of Edinburgh, and is currently working on a DPhil in International Relations, University of Oxford.